An Opening for Nonviolence

 

<>The text that follows is the complete text of Chapter 10, “An Opening for Nonviolence”, of the book When the Rain Returns: Toward Justice and Reconciliation in Palestine and Israel, which was authored by the “International Quaker Working Party on Israel and Palestine” and published in 2004 by the American Friends Service Committee, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 

 

You can get more information about the book, including the Table of Contents and the bios of the co-authors, at this page on the AFSC website.  Copies of the entire book can be ordered from AFSC using this order form.

 

The 14 members of the International Quaker Working Party (IQWP) jointly authored and take collective responsibility for the whole text of the book.  However Tony Bing, a former Director of Peace and Global Studies Program at Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana and co-clerk of IQWP, was the principal author of Chapter 10, and is therefore listed as such at the head of the text that follows.

 

Readers are invited to use and share the information in this chapter under the standard rules of the “Creative Commons” license, namely that you are free to copy, distribute, use, and transmit the work without cost or payment provided you satisfy the following three conditions:

 

  1. You must attribute the work in the manner specified at its head (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work);
  2. If you use, alter, transform, or build upon this work, you may do so and distribute the resulting work only under standard “fair use” rules or under the same or similar license to this one;
  3. For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the license terms of this work. The best way to do this is with a link to this web page.

 

In addition to Tony Bing the other members of the IQWP  were: Kathy Bergen (Canada), Max Carter (USA), Helena Cobban (USA), James Fine (USA), Deborah J. Gerner (USA), Stevie Krayer (UK), James H. Matlack (USA), Richard McCutcheon (Canada), Mmereko Emily Mnisi (South Africa), Ron Mock (USA), Gendolyn Zoharah Simmons (USA), Hilda Silverman (USA), and Jean Zaru (Palestine).

 

 

 

An Opening for Nonviolence

 

By Tony Bing et al.

 

Creative Commons License attribution to “Tony Bing and the International Quaker Working Party on Israel and Palestine,  When the Rain Returns: Toward Justice and Reconciliation in Palestine and Israel (Philadelphia, PA: American Friends Service Committee, 2004.)”

 

 

“Nonviolence takes a sustained discipline and planning.  At this time in our history, we hear a lot of Palestinians, especially those who were engaged in armed struggle, serious fighters, saying nonviolence is the way; teach us, we need to know more about it.”

                                                            —Jonathan Kuttab, Palestinian lawyer and nonviolence organizer, 2002

 

“There is nothing surprising in a Muslim or a Pathan like me subscribing to the creed of nonviolence.  It is not a new creed.  It was followed 1400 years ago by the Prophet all the time he was in Mecca  But we had so far forgotten it that when Gandhiji placed it before us we thought he was sponsoring a novel creed.”

                                    — Badshah Khan (the “Gandhi of the Pathans”)

 

While we were in Palestine/Israel we met numerous individuals with long and rich experience in nonviolent organizing and nonviolent activism.  It is important for us to restate this fact since during the lengthy period of violence that has engulfed Israelis and Palestinians since September 2000 the nonviolent approach to seeking justice and peace has often seemed to be a distinctly “minority view” in both communities.[1]   It did indeed seem undeniably true during our visit—as it has been since then—that in each community there still is a sizeable number of people who actively express support for the use of armed force in order to attain highly valued social goals, and that the Palestinian and Israeli advocates of a nonviolent path have often felt isolated and discouraged. 

            Nevertheless, we have three solid reasons for stating our continuing faith that a strong and hopeful nonviolent movement may yet re-emerge in Israel/Palestine.  These are:

  1. The fact that in each community, alongside the expressions of support for violence, a clear majority of the people still also repeatedly express their readiness to share the land of Palestine/Israel in some way with the members of the “other” community;
  2. The years-long experience of the second intifada, and the many acts of violence organized and committed during it by members of both communities, showed clearly to us—as it seemed to be showing with increasing clarity to many Israelis and Palestinians—that no amount of additional violence could actually bring to either community the wellbeing and sense of security that its members continued to crave; and
  3. There already exist (as noted above) many individuals in both Palestine and Israel with rich histories of nonviolent organizing; and the networks of organizations that these people have continued to sustain provide a strong foundation on which the revitalized nonviolent movement of the future can be built. 

            The issue of violence and nonviolence in Israel and Palestine is a complicated one.  Since the history of these two people’s long experience in this regard may not be much known to our readers, we have decided to include this chapter here.  We thought it would be helpful to start by revisiting the question of the role that violence has played in the thinking of each national community, and examining some statements from people on each side of the line who support the use of violence and who explain clearly what political goal it is that they see the violence as realizing.  We shall quickly recount the history of nonviolence in Israel/Palestine in the past 20 years, describe some encounters we had with a number of experienced local nonviolence activists, and sketch out some perspectives on nonviolence.  Finally, we shall make some suggestions of actions that people who are not directly involved in the conflict might consider taking, that would help to support and strengthen the work of the nonviolence activists working within the region.

 

Violence: To What End?

For both Israelis and Palestinians the dominant national discourse has often been one in which, precisely because of the need both peoples have felt to escape from a troubling legacy of past weakness, ideas and representations of weapons have a notable popular potency.  Guns, armies, and fighting men have been given a particular role in the venture of nation-building, or nation-reconstitution-- by both national leaderships.  From this point of view, adoption of the tools of violence can be seen as often having a strongly expressive function, expressing the much-appreciated fact of escape from a time of past weakness, or the possibility of escape from continuing weakness.  Some months after our trip, one of our group members wrote:

We must address respectfully the perspective of a humiliated and almost helpless people who turn to or support violence as a means of regaining their self-respect and self-determination; as an attempt to protect their families and friends; as a protest and a refusal to go on passively accepting the endless bludgeoning without letting their oppressors know that they cannot continue without suffering consequences.

            Some of the acts of violence committed in Israel and Palestine over recent years have, we do not doubt, been committed in pursuit of this expressive function.  Others have been committed out of blind rage, nihilistic despair, a highly personal desire for revenge, or other barely political motivations.  But most of the violence there has been both political and instrumental.  It has been the kind of violence that seeks to realize the laudable political end of securing or increasing the well-being of the national community, but to do so by exerting physical control and “pacification” over another population, or terrorizing those others into submission, or forcing their relocation, or “breaking” their will in some other way.

            We heard this instrumental view of violence expressed most forcefully by Sondra Baras, the community activist in [the West Bank settlement of] Karnei Shomron whose views we described in chapter 2.  “We should act fiercely against those who harbor terrorists,” Baras told us.  “We should surround their homes and neighborhoods, search house-to-house.  If necessary, we should bomb whole neighborhoods.  The IDF takes casualties now, because they are too careful…  We need a very tough, harsh attitude.  We need to make them suffer so much that they quit! ....  Only massive force, firmly applied, will quell them.  We can do no less.  Otherwise we will be attacked.”  Evidently, she was urging the use of violence as a means somehow to modify the behavior of the Palestinians suspected of harboring terrorists.

            We did not meet IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Ya’alon.  But the interview he gave to Ha’aretz in August 2002 (that we described briefly in chapter 4) revealed a lot about what this authoritative leader of Israel’s military saw as the reasoning behind Israel’s use of force against the Palestinians.  Significantly, in that whole lengthy interview, which was conducted in Hebrew with an Israeli journalist, Ya’alon did not once mention the idea that the intention of Israel’s military actions against the Palestinians was the interdiction, pre-emption, or direct prevention of Palestinian acts of violence against Israelis, though these are the reasons Israeli leaders routinely give to foreign audiences for the IDF’s proactive operations in the occupied territories.  Nor did Ya’alon describe the Israeli army’s use of violence as aiming directly at modifying any other aspects of the Palestinians’ behavior.  Instead—like masters in the world of judo to whom he referred in the interview, and also (paradoxically) like many of the smartest practitioners of nonviolence—he stressed that the main aim of the forceful acts undertaken by the IDF was to change the mindset of the opponent.

            As we noted in chapter 4, Ya’alon described the contest with the Palestinians as an “existential” one for Israel.  When asked how he defined victory in the confrontation with the Palestinians, he replied that it was, “the very deep internalization by the Palestinians that terrorism and violence will not defeat us, will not make us fold… If that [lesson] is not burned into the Palestinian and Arab consciousness, there will be no end to their demands of us.”[2]  He added,

The key point here is the staying power of the Israeli society. That is the most important factor that is being put to the test at this time and will continue to be put to the test in the near future. That is what the campaign is about. When the Palestinians initiated the [second intifada], their evaluation was that Israel would not be able to withstand even a few dozen casualties. They were surprised…  But if they see cracks and a chance of [Israel's] disintegration, a prospect of Israeli capitulation, that achievement will be erased.

Because of this latter fear, he said, Israel should under no circumstances undertake any withdrawals at all, however small or tactically advantageous they might be to Israel, until after the Palestinians had completely ended their violence.

            Fourteen months later, Ya’alon had apparently changed his mind on some of these issues.  After a briefing he held with Israeli journalists at the end of October 2003, Ya’alon was quoted as having told them that Israel had made a mistake by maintaining such a tough regime on the Palestinians of the occupied areas.  “It increases hatred for Israel and strengthens the terror organizations,” he reportedly said.  “There is no hope, no expectations for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, nor in Bethlehem and Jericho… In our tactical decisions, we are operating contrary to our strategic interest.”  In line with this analysis, he had reportedly urged the easing of the controls imposed on Palestinians.[3]

            Such an admission, coming from the IDF’s topmost commander, was intriguing and possibly very significant.  Back in August 2002, however, Ya’alon was still making clear that, in Israel’s confrontation with the Palestinians, he saw it as engaged in a complex battle of wills, one with implications far beyond the confines of Israel/Palestine:

After the Six-Day War, we succeeded in burning into the regional consciousness the fact that it is impossible to destroy Israel by military means…  However, since our first withdrawals from Lebanon after Operation Peace for Galilee [Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon], that accomplishment was increasingly eroded. For nearly 20 years, the feeling developed in the Middle East that even though the Israeli army is strong, the unwillingness of the Israeli society to make sacrifices is creating a strategic Achilles' heel. 

            On the Palestinian side, we did not meet with anyone of the command stature of Ya’alon.  However, as recounted in chapter 6, those of us who went to Damascus had an intriguing discussion with a person who expressed support for the actions of the Palestinian suicide bombers—or, as he called them, “martyrdom fighters”.  That was Ahmed Berqawi, one of the Palestinian professors we met at Damascus University. 

            Berqawi accused Israel of having rejected all the peace plans the Palestinians had presented them with.  “The ending of the occupation?  It’s refused!  The return of the refugees?  It’s refused!  They reject everything. … There is no hope, no solution now in view—unless Jewish society itself, inside Israel, changes its views.”

            We asked how this change might be brought about.

            “Well, there is no end in view right now,” he said.  “But it remains true that no one can prevail by military force—on either side… The Palestinians cannot declare a war on Israel and hope to win, but they can continue struggling for their rights.”

            He said he favored an outcome “built on the political basis of coexistence—one in which we share the land in equality.  Not by separation or occupation.  Neither side should oppress the other.  This outcome offers the best future for Israel.”  And in order to bring it about, he judged that the actions of the “martyrdom fighters” was slowly proving to be effective. 

            “Every person loves life!” he said.  “But the martyrdom fighters have come to their decision to make these actions after they have faced such deep brutality from Israel and the loss of all hope.  Plus, the religious believers among them see death as a passage to a better life.  It is Israel’s conduct that brings on the phenomenon of the Palestinian bombers!  Israel deprives us of our land, builds settlements, and denies us all our rights.”  However, he did state quite explicitly that the Palestinian “martyrdom fighters” should go after Israeli military targets rather than civilians.

            He remained convinced that once the conflict had been resolved, “Palestinians and Israelis can be friends, can live together.”  He noted that many Palestinian activists had good relations with peace activists in Israel.  Such Israelis, he said, “respect us.  Plus, we both reject Sharon and the racism of the Israeli government.  We seek to strengthen the alliance with the peace groups.  If such views gain ground in Israel, it would remove the need for the martyrdom bombers.”

            We suggested that, on the contrary, the bombers’ actions weakened the peace forces in Israel.

            “But they keep the focus on the root causes of the conflict!” he countered.  “Only by addressing those causes can we bring an end to the bombings.  It’s just like in South Lebanon.  There, the Israelis could not prevail by force.  In the end, after suffering so many casualties, they decided to pull out.”

            Later, he indicated that he, like Moshe Ya’alon, judged the conflict to be at its core, a battle of wills. 

We need to make the Israelis know that the Palestinians will persist in our struggle.  That there is no military ‘answer’ to their problems.  That no purely military ‘victory’ is possible.  The Israelis must come to see this reality and therefore to give up their reliance on force.  After all, the Palestinians are not asking for much.  Just for life, and a Palestinian state.

            He also seemed to confirm the judgment expressed by Ya’alon had expressed, that the successive withdrawals that Israel effected from Lebanon under the pressure of Hezbollah’s operations there had raised hopes in other Arab communities that Israel’s behavior could be modified through the application of violence.  There were other similarities between the views expressed by these two thoughtful, articulate men, as well.  As Ya’alon did in his interview, Berqawi stressed the fact that, while no “victory” in this battle was imminently in sight for his side, still, he saw evidence that the forceful strategy he advocated was starting to bear fruit.  We venture to guess that Berqawi might also—as Ya’alon did, just two months later—describe himself as both a “liberal” and a “humanist”.

            Where the views that Berqawi shared with us differed significantly from what Ya’alon said in the interview was that while Berqawi expressed his support for a future of coexistence and equality with the Israelis, Ya’alon did not say anything clear in the interview about the longterm relationship he sought with the Palestinians.[4]  In Berqawi’s view (which we do not share) the use of violent means to change the mindset of Israelis would not seriously complicate the subsequent establishment of cordial relations.

 

Roots of Palestinian Nonviolence

There is much in the heritage of Palestinians that has always emphasized the seeking of alternatives to violence.  The well-known Islamic and Arab practice of sulha is a traditional form of community mediation of disputes, providing a centuries-old alternative to feuding and the pursuit of campaigns of revenge.  Then in the twentieth century, the Palestinians adopted many practices of nonviolent community organization in their resistance to the colonial regime that Britain maintained over their country from 1922 through 1948, and to the arrival of the Jewish  immigrants who came to the country under the auspices of Britain’s rule.  These practices involved strikes, demonstrations, the delivery of petitions, sit-down protests, and the maintenance of informal, community-level, networks that aimed to bolster Palestinian self-sufficiency.

Resistance to British rule came to a head with the “Arab Revolt” of 1936-39 which spread throughout nearly all of Mandate Palestine.  Numerous Palestinian organizers showed great creativity and courage during that revolt, which started out with what has been called “the longest nonviolent commercial strike in history.”  Increasingly, though, as the revolt continued, tactics of nonviolence gave way to armed struggle; in the end, the British were able to break the revolt, killing or jailing many of its leaders and outlawing a broad range of Palestinian community organizations.  That defeat left the Palestinian community significantly weakened when, in the 1940s, it found itself faced with a new and more tenacious threat from the new waves of Zionist immigrants fleeing the wreckage of Hitler’s Europe.  The legacy of the 1930s revolt provided an essential background to the nakba the Palestinians suffered in 1948.

In the years after the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza came under Israeli occupation in 1967, they started to develop and enact a deeply-held philosophy of quiet resistance to that rule that was called in Arabic sumoud (steadfastness).  The cardinal goal of sumoud was for these Palestinians to stay on their land.  Sumoud involved trying to hang onto whatever institutions of Palestinian self-governance and self-organization they could, while also building new Palestinian institutions, with the development and growth of the Palestinian universities being a very visible example of this latter effort.  Throughout the late 1960s and the 1970s there were also many systematic efforts to build community-based organizations like women’s committees, labor unions, and professional associations.[5]  From this point of view, sumoud involved many of the elements of swaraj, which was Gandhi’s famed concept of self-governance.

            Sumoud involved, on occasion, making non-trivial concessions to the power of the occupying force—as, for example, when administrators of the growing universities had to work with the occupation authorities to get the endless “permits” required by the authorities if the administrators were to implement their growth plans.  Sumoud seemed, on the surface, to be quietist from the perspective of overt politics.  But deeper down, it was “political” at the level where it really counts—in terms of building the robustness of community institutions, along with the self-confidence of community members.

            For many years after 1967, the Palestinians of Gaza and the West Bank continued to hope that their liberation from military occupation could be brought about by outside actors. But after the IDF defeated the PLO’s military forces in Lebanon in 1982, the activists in the West Bank and Gaza who had had many years’ experience of organizing for sumoud started to realize that there was little point in waiting for liberation to come from elsewhere: they would have to try to take their future into their own hands.  Five years later, in December 1987, the entire Palestinian population of the occupied territories—including East Jerusalem—used its already rich experience of organizing for Sumoud and entered a major new phase in their encounter with the Israelis: the more confrontational phase of intifada, which in Arabic means “shaking off”.

            What followed were primarily the classic techniques of nonviolent activism: boycotts, tax refusal, silent vigils, non-cooperation, civil disobedience, parades, strikes, fasts, and other forms of protest.  Underground organizers linked in a shadowy body called the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) issued periodic leaflets giving instructions for territories-wide actions.  For example, on the 9th day of each month, there was a total strike, to mark the events that had started the intifada.  The fully mobilized population followed UNLU’s instructions enthusiastically.  There were some compromises with nonviolence, including fairly extensive throwing of stones against (mainly) Israeli troops, and some assaults with Molotov cocktails.  But for the most part the first intifada was an attempt to carry out a campaign of nonviolence in the Gandhian tradition, drawing from a vision articulated by community leaders like Jad Isaac and Ghassan Andoni (whom we met with in, respectively, Bethlehem and Beit Sahour), and by Mubarak Awad, a native of Jerusalem.[6]

            A vivid example of the ingenuity of Palestinian nonviolent resistance in this period was their manner of displaying their national colors.  One of the thousands of outrageous regulations that the Israeli military authorities had imposed on the Palestinians outlawed any public display of the Palestinian national flag.  During the intifada, however, residents of remote Palestinian villages would defiantly tie the black, red, white, and green flag to the top of their minarets; residents of refugee camps would toss makeshift flags attached to small counterweights over the many utility lines that criss-crossed their alleys; townsfolk would come out at night and proudly paint it on their walls.   Nearly every time, Israeli troops or squads of border police squads would go in to try either to remove the offending emblem themselves or, as part of their continuing battle of wills with the populace, force the Palestinians living nearest to those subversive patches of color to erase them themselves.  Palestinian artists—who had always been drawn to the use of this particular color combination!—stepped up their use of it in their paintings. Women of all ages stepped up the wearing of the national colors in their dress.

            In late 1989, the US nonviolence theorist Gene Sharp wrote in the Journal of Palestine Studies that he judged that up until then the intifada had been “85 percent” nonviolent.  He wrote that the two-year-old intifada had achieved a considerable measure of success as a nonviolent movement, but he urged Palestinians to give up throwing stones and Molotovs and become “fully nonviolent.” [7]

            One of the notable centers for Palestinian nonviolent organizing has for many years been the West Bank town of Beit Sahour, near Bethlehem.  Beit Sahour is regarded by Christians as the site of the “Shepherds’ Field” in which the angel announced Jesus’s birth to local herdsmen.  Early in the first intifada, after Israel’s then-defense minister Yitzhak Rabin called on Israeli soldiers to “break the bones” of Palestinian protesters, the people of Beit Sahour invited Jewish Israelis who had supported their efforts into their homes in an act of friendship called "Break Bread, Not Bones."  They also captured world attention with a courageous tax-resistance campaign called "No Taxation Without Representation."  The Israeli authorities retaliated very harshly against the tax resisters.  They confiscated machines used in cottage industries, trade goods, and household furnishings from families judged to be delinquent in paying their taxes. 

            For six years, 1987-93, the Israeli authorities— who deployed one of the world’s most technologically sophisticated and best-funded armies—were unable to break the back of the intifada.  The Palestinians built on the dense network of community-based organizations that they had created since the late 1960s to sustain an organizing structure throughout the territories that openly defied Israel and survived all the many ruses and force-based counter-measures that the Israeli military deployed against it.  Traditional class lines broke down as Palestinian city women kicked off their high heels to dig victory gardens alongside peasants.  Residents of refugee camps in the West Bank, on hearing of a particular crisis in Gaza, would pool their resources and send relief supplies to their fellow refugees there.  When the Israeli military authorities shut the Palestinian schools, locally-based popular committees launched networks to organize classes in people’s homes.  When the authorities tried to cut off food supplies, agricultural committees multiplied their efforts to organize community-wide cultivation programs.  In Beit Sahour, Jad Isaac, one of the organizers of the tax-resistance campaign, established a seed-distribution network to support the planting efforts. When we talked with him, he recalled that he had once been arrested and detained for six months.  His crime?  Selling seeds. 

            Shunning the Israeli-controlled courts, the Palestinians made widespread use of the  traditional Arab conflict-resolution mechanism, sulha, to address a range of internal civil and political disputes.  Use of this inclusive, reconciliation-based approach to resolving internal conflicts further strengthened the community.

There were Medical Relief Committees that organized community-based health services in remote areas.  There were Women’s Committees that helped Palestinian women work together to survive the terrible rigors imposed on their families and to break down traditional gender discrimination that existed in Palestinian society.  There were Agricultural Relief Committees that organized actions such as Jad Isaac’s seed-distribution network and supported agricultural and “Victory garden” ventures throughout all the Palestinian areas.  Groups like the Palestinian Human Rights Information Center, Al-Haq (Law in the Service of Man), the Mandela Institute for Political Prisoners, the Gaza-based Palestinian Center for Human Rights, the Palestinian Center for Rapprochement, and Sabeel all supported the communities involved in the intifada in different ways.  The activities undertaken by all these organizations led to the Madrid conference and the Oslo Accords, since the Israeli government came to realize that the Palestinians in “the territories” were proving to be ungovernable by refusing to accept passively their status of being permanently under occupation.

            In addition, many of the organizations named above participated in joint actions alongside Israeli and international counterpart groups.  These joint actions were a particular feature of the first intifada.[8]   In both the Israeli and Palestinian communities, participation in them posed a deep challenge to previously prevalent norms that refused to grant recognition to members of the “other” nation as co-equal members of the human family.

 

Roots of Israeli Nonviolence

            By the time the first intifada broke out in 1987, the Israeli peace movement already had its own impressive history.  In the development of the State of Israel, there have always been a number of Jewish Israelis who worked for understanding and trust between Arabs and Jews.  Though their numbers have often not been large, these women and men have carried a lot of moral weight with their Jewish neighbors.  Most Israeli nonviolent activists have not been absolute pacifists.  (People like Nathan Chofshi, Amos Gvirtz, Joseph Abileah, and a handful of others were notable exceptions to this rule.)  In the deeply challenging days of the 1930s, people like Martin Buber argued against Mahatma Gandhi that nonviolence would not have worked against Hitler in Nazi Germany.  But inside Mandate Palestine in that same exact period, Buber—along with Hebrew University President Judah Magnes—was active in groups like Brit Shalom and the Ihud that were working for Jewish-Arab coexistence there.  Indeed, Buber and Magnes testified before the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) in favor of the creation of a binational state in which Arabs and Jews could live in peace as equal partners. 

            All those early “pioneers” of the Jewish/Israeli peace movement left a rich legacy of pro-coexistence activism in favor of coexistence to the many Israeli peace groups that have functioned throughout the long period of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.  These latter groups have worked in solidarity with Palestinian organizations, and have also organized broad-scale lobbying actions on their own government.  As one thinks about the present despair in the Israeli peace camp, it is good to remember the many Israeli peace groups, such as Yesh Gvul, the “Twenty-first Year”, Women in Black, Peace Now, Oz ve Shalom, East for Peace, the Committee Against the War in Lebanon, and others that have since 1967 mounted numerous nonviolent, grassroots campaigns aiming at a future peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians. 

            Peace Now and the other Israeli peace groups had their finest hour in 1982, when they  led the movement of Israelis who opposed their government’s push into Lebanon.  In September 1982, after the IDF commanders in Beirut colluded with Lebanese militiamen who killed hundreds of unarmed Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, Peace Now and its partners organized demonstrations that brought hundreds of thousands of Jewish Israelis out onto the streets to express their strong protest at the role their army had played.  Those protests helped persuade Prime Minister Menachem Begin to comply speedily with a US request that the IDF withdraw from Beirut and its environs.  Ariel Sharon, who led the invasion, was removed from his position as defense minister, and his decisions were the subject of a high-level commission that eventually judged that he bore indirect responsibility for the massacres, and recommended that he never again hold public office in Israel.  Peace Now and a number of partner groups kept up the pressure on the government to effect further withdrawals from Lebanon.

            By the time the first intifada started in 1987 these groups already had a lot of organizing experience and a lot of strategic clarity in their view of the role of the Israel’s military.  They also had a rich experience of having organized joint actions with Palestinian counterparts.  Some notable joint Israeli-Palestinian campaigns were the “Campaign for Abu Ali Shaheen” (1984), the Ramya Committee for Solidarity (1991-92), the “Committee in Solidarity with Bir Zeit University (1980-82), Women and Peace (1991-92), the Committee Against the Iron Fist (1988), and the Committee Against Expulsions (1993).[9]  Perhaps the best-known of these joint actions involved one led by Mubarak Awad and Jonathan Kuttab in the West Bank village of Qatana in 1986: on that occasion international volunteers, Palestinians, and Israeli members of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation worked together to replace olive trees that had previously been uprooted by the Israeli authorities and taken to be planted along the boulevard leading to the Martin Luther King, Jr., Memorial in Jerusalem!  That action was captured on film, and became part of the documentary Courage Along the Divide. 

The spirit that had motivated all those earlier joint actions for peace has been kept alive in present-day organizations like Bat Shalom, Ta’ayush, Rabbis for Human Rights, the Israeli-Palestinian Center for Research and Information (IPCRI), the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD), Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, the Coalition of Women for a Just Peace, and Gush Shalom.  On a parallel track, the spirit behind such earlier Israeli military refusal organizations as Yesh Gvul has been kept alive by groups like New Profile, “Courage to Refuse, the Shministim of high-school-aged draft resisters, and the group of Israeli Air Force reserve pilots who in September 2003 declared their conscience-based objection to participating in airborne extrajudicial killings of Palestinian suspects.  In addition, a range of Israeli human rights organizations like B’tselem have—as we have noted throughout this report--continued to shine a light of conscience on developments in the West Bank and Gaza.

 

Results of the First Intifada

Despite the significant skills and experience that members of the Palestinian resistance movement and their supporters among the Israeli peace movement demonstrated during the first intifada, they did not achieve the result they both desired: the ending of the occupation.  What happened?  This question is an important one that requires considerable additional study.   We can surmise, however, that the reasons for the intifada’s failure to “shake off” the occupation included the following:

           

 Palestinians Debate Nonviolence, 1993-2003

In the years following the adoption of the Oslo Accords, it became clear to many of the organizers and theorists of the Palestinian nonviolent movement that the Oslo process, and the performance of the PLO leadership after it returned to the occupied territories as part of that process, fell far short of their expectations. 

            Jonathan Kuttab is one such theorist/organizer.  (In addition to his work as a lawyer, Kuttab had helped to found a number of nonviolence-based institutions including the Mandela Institute for Political Prisoners.)  “We gained many things with the nonviolent activism we used during the first intifada,” Kuttab told us when we met with him in Jerusalem. 

It was that activism that brought about Oslo!  But afterwards, we mismanaged the political process.  I stress that all must bear responsibility for this: We blew this chance.  What happened was that through and after Oslo the forces of evil and violence took away all our slogans.  They hoodwinked everyone in seeming to be for liberation.  But actually what they sought was power, domination, racism.  They should be put on trial for that! 

Who am I talking about?  Successive Israeli governments, and the US government, and the Arab regimes, and the top elites of the Palestinian Authority.  All of them.  They all disrupted and derailed the peace process. 

Essentially, at Oslo, the Israelis co-opted the top Palestinians—and the rest of us did not insist on full internal democracy.  We accepted being manipulated by the PA, under the slogan of ‘Don’t embarrass Arafat!’  But where was transparency, accountability? 

            He said that he and many others had, in the early years after Oslo, agreed to make compromises on matters of principle that in hindsight he judged should not have been made.  For a while after Oslo, Kuttab himself worked with the PA, heading the Palestinian legal team at one of the negotiations that had flowed from the Oslo agreement.  “We all went along on this ride,” he told us somberly in 2002.

For example, on the question of settlements.  We had always previously stuck to the international-law position that the settlements were simply illegal.  But then at Oslo, both sides agreed that this issue would be settled through ‘direct negotiations’.  But such negotiations leave international law and international legitimacy outside the room!  There are no rules.  The lion and the lamb are in the room alone…

The Oslo track was bound to fail.  But where was the peace and justice community?  It had been lulled to be quiet.  How could this negotiation succeed without law and justice? … Oslo could not make such an imbalance come out ‘even’.  The Palestinians who went to the [post-Oslo] talks moved away from the popular movement, and from the people.  The Palestinian ‘leaders’ had their own goals and interests—and popular accountability would get in the way of that.

            The intense disappointment that Kuttab expressed in the “fruits” of Oslo was a judgment that we also heard from every other Palestinian with whom we talked.  (Nearly all our Jewish-Israeli interlocutors expressed strong disappointment in Oslo, too.  But many of them adduced very different reasons for this: for them, Oslo failed to bring the domestic peace and tranquillity that they had thought it promised.)  On the Palestinian side, the disillusionment with Oslo had a direct bearing on the violence-nonviolence debate, since the conclusion of the Oslo Agreement Accords was widely, and probably correctly, seen as one of the main achievements of the nonviolent resistance that had been so widely used during the first intifada.  And the Palestinians who had been most vocal in criticizing the theorists and organizers of nonviolence during the first intifada were among those who, in and since September 1993, were most critical of the Oslo accords.

            It is also worth recalling that back in December 1992, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had tried to expel more than 400 accused leaders of the Palestinian Islamic organizations to Lebanon.  That move evoked many of the Palestinians’ deepest fears of a repeat of the mass relocation and scattering that their people had suffered in 1948, and provoked an uproar throughout the Arab world.  Before long, U.S. president George H.W. Bush insisted that Rabin agree to a timetable for the return of the expellees.[10]  But for a number of months in early 1993, the expellees stayed camping under canvas on a hillside in South Lebanon, awaiting implementation of that agreement, and while there many of them reportedly took part in what some commentators called “Hezbollah University”.  When they returned home they brought with them many new skills--in mass community organizing and in guerrilla warfare.

            By early 1996, the Palestinians’ disappointment in Oslo was starting to be intense.  Far from bringing the improved living conditions Palestinians had desperately hoped for, in many parts of the occupied territories conditions became progressively harsher during the mid-1990s, as we noted earlier.  Meanwhile, the Palestinians saw Israel continuing to expand its settlements, and even starting to link the settlements together with the new settler-only road network.

            In late February of 1996, organizers from the Muslim militant groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad launched a new offensive, sending suicide bombers into civilian areas of West Jerusalem and Tel Aviv in killing operations that took the lives of 55 Israelis.  Though individual Palestinians, or small groups, had carried out suicide operations against Israeli civilians before then, the 1996 campaign marked the clear adoption of this tactic for the first time by significant Palestinian militant organizations.  Those operations may have helped members of Jihad and Hamas to “express” something they felt they needed to express.  But they also helped Likud’s Binyamin Netanyahu to win the election held in Israel ten weeks later.  Despite that outcome, however, the leaders of Jihad, Hamas, and some of the militant secular nationalist organizations in Palestinian society evidently judged that the tactic of using suicide/killing operations was one that would be worth repeating in the future.

            Many factors, therefore, combined to ensure that when the second intifada broke out in September 2000 the conditions for nonviolent organizing were very different from those during the first intifada.  These factors included: the near-unanimous Palestinian disappointment in Oslo, and frequently therefore, by association, in the nonviolent tactics that had brought Oslo into being; the enhanced level of organization of Palestinian militant groups; and the presence in Gaza and the West Bank of substantial numbers of weapons brought in originally for use by the PA’s police force.

            There was another important difference, too.  In May 2000, 18 years after Defense Minister Ariel Sharon took Israel’s troops deep into Lebanon, Prime Minister Ehud Barak undertook the  last (or near-last) stage of Israel’s multi-staged withdrawal from Lebanon.  That withdrawal was undertaken because of the intense weariness of Jewish Israelis with the steady attrition Israeli troops had suffered at Hezbollah’s hands for the preceding 18 years.   The withdrawal was unilateral and unconditional.  Israel had “won” from Lebanon few of the objectives Sharon had sought when he launched the invasion 18 years before.[11]

            When we met with Jonathan Kuttab, he told us about the potency inside Palestinian society of what he called, “the Hezbollah argument.”  He characterized it thus: “The outcome of the Hezbollah attacks in Lebanon ‘proved’ that the Israelis paid attention to violence, and could be induced to withdraw from occupied territories if the occupation could be made too costly.”

            Kuttab pointed out that there were deep flaws in this argument. He noted that beside the moral objections to it, there were also practical ones.  Crucially, in his view, the “Hezbollah argument” failed to take into account the distinction for most Israelis between Lebanon, where they have no strong territorial claims, and the West Bank and Gaza, which many of them consider part of the historic “Land of Israel.”

            Many proponents of a “Hezbollah-style” strategy in the Palestinian national movement have, anyway, overlooked the fact that an important factor in Hezbollah’s success was its ability to build vast, interlinked mass organizations inside Lebanon’s Shi-ite community, and to reach out with smart political overtures to a range of other groups throughout the country.  It was those political and organizing skills that, crucially, allowed Hezbollah to withstand the many defeats that Israel’s powerful military inflicted on it, again and again, on the battlefield.[12]

            Meanwhile, hawkish thinkers inside Israel were also--as we saw from Chief of Staff Ya’alon—deploying their own “Hezbollah argument.”  Their version of it agrees with the Palestinian version that Hezbollah’s violence against Israeli troops in Lebanon was significantly linked to Israel’s withdrawal.  But many Israelis (including Ariel Sharon) argued all along that it had been a major mistake for Israel to withdraw from Lebanon under the pressure of Hezbollah’s  attacks, because that withdrawal weakened Israel’s “general deterrence”; and therefore, that this mistake should under no circumstances be repeated in the Palestinian territories.  Palestinian suicide bombings played into the hands of the Israeli proponents of the “Hezbollah argument” since it hardened Israeli attitudes toward Palestinians and encouraged the talk of transfer, separation, walls, etc., as Israelis witnessed the scenes of terrible carnage brought about by these suicide bombings.

            When we visited Beit Sahour in 2002, we heard a sober assessment of the then-current state of the Palestinian nonviolence movement from Ghassan Andoni, executive director of the Palestinian Center for Rapprochement Between People (PCR) “Palestinians are obsessed to keep the ‘resistance’ going,” he told us:

They react badly when we say, ‘Not with guns!’  We want to find a way of resistance that does not rely on violence.

Some take pride in ‘hurting Israel.’  It makes them feel good.  So the attacks, the bombers: they are generally seen as endorsed by the public. 

Also, everyone wants an end soon.  They want it now!  Violence might pretend to offer them that.  But we know that building Palestinian independence is a long-term project.  We must not lose patience.

            Andoni talked about the role that international solidarity actions had started to play.  His organization was then hosting some of the activists from the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) who had recently started working in the occupied territories, and had trained some of the ISM activists in both Beit Sahour and Jerusalem.  “Thousands of people from around the world have told us they are ready to come and do this work,” Andoni told us.  “But Israel is not letting most of them in.”  He said he had seen a positive Palestinian response to the work of both PCR and ISM: “But we do not yet see mass demonstrations and mass curfew-breakings of the kind we would like to achieve… Our goal is to have masses of Palestinians come to demonstrations and other actions.  But it is seen as so dangerous to do so these days.  That’s why we need the ISM and other internationals to help to provide us with cover, and with media coverage.”

            “Palestinian society must be organized further in order to reach the mass base,” he told us.  “Our education system has been at fault.  Our mentality does not see and honor the full range of nonviolent techniques.”  He voiced a few words of veiled criticism of the militant Islamic activists:

Some people now seem to be more committed to Islam than to Palestine, as such.  It’s a challenge for us to keep our priority on our national goals.  We need a much better education system, to clarify this…  We seek to create positive attitudes.  Our commitment is to the goal of having the full society pursuing our national independence.  Bombers can hurt the Israelis, perhaps—but only an organized people can win our independence!  So we’re seeking to draw more and more young Palestinians into this work.

            He stressed that this remained a long-term task and admitted that at that point,

Palestinians seem to have lost confidence in themselves, and their sense of community.  We need to build all this, and to have a coherent movement.  But we’ve lost all sense of trust…  We must share the risks, in public actions, and not be abandoned or betrayed.  There is so much corruption and self-aggrandizement evident.  We need a mass nonviolent movement to strengthen Palestinian society.

I cannot promise that it will succeed on its own.  But I doubt we can get to independence without it.

            Andoni told us that PCR’s nonviolent approach was not endorsed by the P.A. or by the Palestinian political factions, though some factions had asked for training in nonviolent techniques to explore their use as part of their struggle.

            PCR had recently, he said, had to cancel one big nonviolent action it had been hoping to stage along with counterparts from inside Israel: creating a human chain all the way from Nablus in the north of the West Bank, to Gaza.  With prospects for that action dashed, they were still hoping to stage a re-enactment of the smaller, 1989 human chain around the Old City of Jerusalem, which he invited us to join.  But that plan, too, was later cancelled because of the huge logistical obstacles erected by the authorities and the small number of people—from both communities—ready to commit themselves to taking part.  (Over the year that followed our visit, the number of joint Palestinian-Israeli nonviolent actions that took place started modestly to increase.)

 

Further Directions for Nonviolence

In both Israel and Palestine, we witnessed a great deal of despair.  We heard notes of despair expressed even by seasoned activists in the nonviolence movement.  There is an urgent need to bolster that spirit of hopefulness without which these extreme courageous individuals will find it hard to continue their work.

            There are, fortunately, a number of causes for some optimism.  Firstly, it is important to note that even during the second intifada there have been many occasions on which courageous Palestinian advocates of nonviolence have mounted significant, mass-based nonviolent challenges to the reality of the IDF’s power.  In Nablus, there have been cases of mass curfew-breaking.  In and around Ramallah, actions have been organized to dismantle checkpoints and undertake the “normal” activity of moving from one town to the next.  (The avoidance of checkpoints by using rutted back-paths is already a near-daily occurrence in the occupied territories;  mass defiance of the very idea of checkpoints has been more rare.)  On nearly all of these occasions, however, either public support for the mass action petered out, or youths started throwing stones and the discipline of nonviolence broke down.  Too often, the advocates of violence—from both sides of “the Wall”--have ended up winning the day.

            One longer-lived peace  initiative was an initiative launched by Al-Quds University head Sari Nuseibeh soon after we visited him.  Nuseibeh had drafted a “Statement of Principles” jointly with Ami Ayalon, a pro-peace Jewish-Israeli man who was a retired head of one of Israel’s much-feared security organizations, the Shin Bet.  (Such changes of heart have not been unusual in Israel’s history—which is itself another cause for optimism.  In November 2003 Ayalon joined with three other former Shin Bet heads to state publicly their shared condemnation of the policies of the Sharon-led government as disastrous for the future of Israel.)

            The Nuseibeh-Ayalon statement, which was first released on 27 July 2002, was a simple declaration of six short paragraphs.  It called for “Two states for two peoples”, with their borders to be only slightly modified from those prior to the 1967 war; Jerusalem would be an “open city”; and Palestinian refugees would have the right to “return” only to the Palestinian state, not to Israel.[13]  The statement met with much criticism from inside both national communities.  For example, many Palestinians were deeply upset by the apparent denial of the “right of return” for Palestinian refugees to ancestral homes inside Israel and by territorial arrangements that would, they feared, leave in place many Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem and other parts of the West Bank.  And of course, neither Nuseibeh nor Ayalon had any official negotiating mandate.  Yet their statement was notable because of the campaign that continued around it long after July 2002: its supporters kept up a steady, low-level effort to collect signatures for it from people in both communities.  By November 2003, they had reportedly won more than 100,000 signatures from Israelis, and 60,000 from Palestinians.

            Another sustained campaign with profound potential to bolster the move toward sustainable long-term peace was the “Palestinian National Initiative”, a pro-democracy movement that was launched in Ramallah in June 2002 by three veterans of the national independence movement: Gaza physician Haidar Abdel-Shafei, West Bank physician Mustafa Barghouti, and Jerusalem engineer Ibrahim Dakkak.  The Initiative’s founding statement called for “the establishment of a national emergency leadership, the immediate implementation of democratic elections at all levels of the political system, and reform of political, administrative, and other institutional structures in order to meet the needs of the Palestinian people.”  The statement argued that these steps were needed if the Palestinians were to attain their national rights and a durable, just peace.[14]

            The Initiative’s leaders organized a number of grassroots actions like demonstrations against the Separation Wall that Israel was building inside the West Bank, or campaigns against Israel’s lengthy detention of Palestinians without bringing them to trial.  In some of these actions it worked with Israeli or international counterpart groups.  Meanwhile, it also kept up its campaign for democratic accountability within the P.A. and all other Palestinian institutions.

            An additional cause for optimism lies in the continuing creativity and capacity for reflection shown by the nonviolent activists in both communities.  We have already written much in these pages about some of these individuals.  Another of them—whom we were not able to meet on our trip—is Iyad Sarraj, the executive director of the Gaza Community Mental Health Program.  In May 2003 he wrote very perceptively that, “There are many lessons learned from the past two years. One is that violence can only breed violence. The suicide bombers of this intifada are the children of the first intifada – people who witnessed a great deal of trauma as children. As they grew up, their own identity merged with the national identity of humiliation and defeat, so they are avenging that defeat at both the personal and national levels.”  

            In an attempt to help bring this repeating cycle of violence to an end, Sarraj issued a powerful invitation for Palestinians and  others to join together to struggle for an ultimate political outcome that would be, in his words, “just, fair, and viable”:

Enlightened Jews, Palestinians, and friends of peace and justice everywhere should rise above the ocean of hatred and division and be united in their struggle to achieve their noble goals.  Unfortunately, Palestinians and Arabs have failed to build alliances with Jews, many of whom object to the occupation of Palestinian land.  There has been little attempt by Arab politicians and intellectuals to understand the Israeli ‘enemy.’ Furthermore, any attempt at the extension of understanding and reconciliation has been targeted as the work of a fifth column. In the meantime, Israel has engulfed itself in a shell of paranoia and fear.[15]

The suggestion by Sarraj that Jews, Palestinians, and friends of peace and justice everywhere should work together for their goals is particularly potent, expressed as it is by a person forced to deal on a daily basis with the damaging effects of the Israeli occupation on his own life, his own family, and the community that his organization serves.  It is also a suggestion that is in line with the tradition of universalist bridge-building that is embedded in the best of the worldwide experience of nonviolent activism.  When Mahatma Gandhi was leading the Indians’ struggle for independence from the British, he was clear that the ultimate relationship he strove for with the British was one of friendship.  When Desmond Tutu was deeply engaged in the struggle of Black South Africans for political rights, he wrote friendly letters to the apartheid government’s prime minister John Vorster, inquiring about the health of his family and seeking to build a relationship within which he could persuade Vorster to do the right thing by all the country’s citizens.

 Gandhi and Tutu—like numerous other leaders in the worldwide nonviolence movement--well understood that nonviolence is not just a smart “tactic” that currently weak peoples can choose to adopt or ignore at will.  Nonviolent engagement is a spiritual venture, and one that has a unique power to transform both human relationships and the people involved in them.  If pursued with wisdom, compassion, and authenticity it can open a chink of understanding in the heart of a current opponent, opening up the possibility that he may indeed be tomorrow’s negotiating partner, ally, or even friend.  As the veteran Norwegian theorist of nonviolence Johan Galtung wrote in a small 1989 book about nonviolence in Israel/Palestine, “The whole theory of nonviolence is based on the idea of Self recognizing the human being in the Other, appealing to that human being not only for [com]passion with one’s own plight, but also for self-interest in a better future, to be enjoyed together.” [16]

            The whole history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict since the 1930s has shown that when nonviolence is adopted merely as a tactic, rather than embraced as an entire philosophical and spiritual vision, then whenever setbacks occur in this struggle for justice—as they inevitably do, somewhere along the way—many individuals will turn to other tactics, principally the tactics of violence.  Moreover, if the “playing-field” on which the parties engage is the field of violence, then the side that has the deadliest means of violence at its disposal will win.  What Gandhi, Tutu, Martin Luther King, Jr., and other great philosophers of nonviolence understood, however, is that if nonviolence is embraced as an entire and transformative worldview, then its proponents can explain and transcend setbacks while remaining true to their radical, transformative goal.  For this to start happening in Israel/Palestine, it will probably require that nonviolence activists from both communities commit both to some version of a deep philosophical-spiritual vision of nonviolence and to engagement in those kinds of transformative actions that flow from such a vision. 

            This principled nonviolence is what most Quakers embrace as a logical extension of our belief that “there is that of God in every person.”  It is what Bishop Tutu of South Africa describes as “ubuntu”, an African word embodying the meaning that “we are human in as much as we recognize the equal humanity of others.”

             Since the mid-1980s, numerous peoples around the world  have overthrown undemocratic regimes or won their independence using active nonviolence: the Philippines, Haiti, Chile, South Korea, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, Albania, South Africa, Serbia, and Macedonia are all good cases of this. One could add a dozen examples from the break-up of the Soviet Union.  Both Israel and Palestine compare favorably to several of these countries in factors that are helpful to the cause of nonviolence, including levels of education; the presence of a variety of civil institutions in society through which people can make connections; the vitality of their mass media; a fairly clearly established sense of national identity on both sides; and their numerous connections with the outside world.

 

            The harsh controls that Israel has imposed on the Palestinians of the occupied territories have undoubtedly hindered the Palestinians’ ability to organize active nonviolence; but even in this respect the Palestinians have some advantages over some of their predecessors in nonviolent struggle.  Israel is, in some ways, a very suitable “target” for nonviolent action.  It is a relatively open society, with a press that, in our experience, is readier to address the realities of the occupation than most of the mainstream media in the U.S.  Israelis are marked almost as much by their ideals for their country as they are by their ethnic and religious identity.  This creates a valuable opportunity for nonviolent activists to highlight the dissonance between Israel’s stated ideals and the reality of what Israel is doing in the occupied territories. Israel is, physically, extremely close to the victims of its occupation: few Israelis live more than a few miles away from the roadblocks, razor-wire and daily humiliations of the Palestinians’ daily existence in the occupied territories.  Often-times, they live very close indeed to the Palestinians.  In both Hebron and East Jerusalem we saw settlers living in the upper stories of buildings whose lower floors were occupied by Palestinians.  Very few of the 20th century examples of successful active nonviolence that we cited involved groups in such intimate proximity as Israelis and Palestinians.  In Palestine/Israel, in addition, the two communities carry burdens of historic suffering that have many, many parallels with each other.  Though in the midst of pain and suffering it may be hard to see these parallels, once recognized they can provide a powerful basis for continuing joint action for justice and peace.

 

            We therefore agree with those on the scene who are convinced that active nonviolence offers the most promising path toward a just and sustainable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Assertive, creative Palestinian nonviolence has immense potential to stir world opinion.  And if a commitment to nonviolence is sustained systematically over a period of time, and in the face of even harsh and violent Israeli counter-measures it can impose mounting cognitive dissonance on the Israeli public, highlighting as it would the contradictions between Israeli ideals of justice and democracy and the reality of Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands.

            It would be hoped, too, that this experience could lead, in both communities, to the next step of finding ones own experience reflected in the experience of the other.  As the Jewish theologian Marc Ellis wrote  in 1987, 

 

The torture of the death of Palestinian children calls us to a theology which recognizes empowerment as a necessary and flawed journey toward liberation…  Today, the Palestinian people ask the fundamental question relating to Jewish empowerment: Can the Jewish people in Israel, indeed Jews around the world, be liberated without the liberation of the Palestinian people?  Once having understood the question posed by the Palestinian people the occupation can no longer continue.[17]

 

            For his part, Johan Galtung is especially good in addressing the question of the imbalance of power by insisting that the nonviolent actions of the oppressed alone cannot produce a victory.  What is needed, Galtung argues, is nonviolent action from within the oppressor community that is supported by nonviolent actions of those outside the situation:

 

It is not obvious that nonviolence against an oppressor is primarily the task of those who are oppressed.  They certainly have not only the right but also in a sense a duty to resist.  But if their resistance is an invitation to even more brutal oppression the question can be legitimately be asked.  What are the alternatives?  One answer, very well known, is violent instead of nonviolent resistance from below.  That answer is unsatisfactory to the believer in nonviolence.  Hence, a much better answer is the one that I am leading up to in this chapter: nonviolence, to destroy the oppressive structure, but by others than the victims themselves; for them, on behalf of them, partly also of them, but not primarily by them.[18]  

            It was clearly our experience that nonviolent cooperation between the Israeli, Palestinian, and international communities will be required if peace is to be achieved and sustained. We are moreover convinced that such cooperation is possible.  We conclude this section with three very inspiring example from Jewish-Israeli peace activists of the kinds of action that they have been pursuing.

            Yitzhak Frankenthal is chairman of  the Bereaved Families Forum, an organization of Israelis and Palestinians he founded after his 19-year-old son, Arik, was killed by Hamas militants in 1994.  He writes about his son’s killing with painstaking clarity:

It is unethical to kill innocent Israeli or Palestinian women and children.  It is also unethical to control another nation and to lead it to lose its humanness... 

           We lost sight of our ethics long before the suicide bombings.  The breaking point was when we started to control another nation.  My son Arik was born into a democracy with a chance for a decent, settled life.  Arik's killer was born into an appalling occupation, into an ethical chaos.  Had I myself been born into the political and ethical chaos that is the Palestinians' daily reality, I would certainly have tried to kill and hurt the occupier; had I not, I would have betrayed my essence as a free man.  My son Arik was murdered when he was a soldier by Palestinian fighters who believed in the ethical basis of their struggle against the occupation.  My son Arik was not murdered because he was Jewish but because he is part of the nation that occupies the territory of another.

            Frankenthal has put these values into action.  The Bereaved Families Forum provides mutual support to families from throughout Palestine/Israel who have been lost children to political violence.  The three principles adopted by the group are “preferring the ways of peace and negotiation as a means of achieving the legitimate goals of the Israeli and Palestinian people; favoring the dignity of a person, his/her freedom, well-being, safety and welfare over any other value (mostly over territorial values); striving for reconciliation and lasting peace between the Israeli and Palestinian people.”[19]

            The second example is a description by Gila Svirsky of a peace vigil held in Tel Aviv in late May 2003, to mark the near-completion of the 36th year of Israel’s occupation of the West bank and Gaza.

The speakers alternated -- Jews and Palestinians from Israel, two Palestinian women from the territories, and one woman representing the internationals who risk their lives in an effort to intervene nonviolently.  Dalit Baum, feminist Jewish activist, opened by showing the connections among all the forms of violence -- occupation, poverty, brutality against women -- through their common roots.  Suher abu-Uksa  Daoud, a Palestinian writer doing her doctorate at Hebrew University, spoke of how her own life moved from anger to peace activism.  Yali Hashash, a feminist defender of Mizrachi  rights among Jews, challenged us to examine our commitment to justice, and pay a solidarity visit to the protest encampment of impoverished Israelis in Tel Aviv…

 

            A particularly moving letter written by Cindy Corrie, the mother of Rachel--the American peace activist who was killed by a bulldozer as she tried to prevent the demolition of a Palestinian home--was read out loud and said, in part: ‘There have been times when I have been quiet because I felt there were others who knew more. But I am no longer intimidated by experts and critics. After all, my daughter had the courage to stand in front of a bulldozer’.  Shulamit  Aloni, former Israeli cabinet minister and outspoken defender of justice and equality, was eloquent in demanding an end to the bloodshed and the dawn of an era of peace…

            Zahira Kamal, senior official in the Palestinian Authority, and committed all her life to peace, women, and workers, declared ‘I believe in the power of women. Women are grounded in their awareness of the sanctity of all human beings...I believe we can work together for ending the occupation and that we can live in peace together.’ Rauda Murkus, Palestinian from Israel, closed with an aching and touching poem…

 

            As the situation in the territories gets worse; as witnesses are barred from the scenes of violence; as political rhetoric raises expectations and then retracts them; our hopes still lie with the duet of the people, the lament caressed by quiet clapping, the Palestinians and Israelis who have kept their faith, who still reach out to each other inside the pain and wait--and work together--for the lament to end.[20]

 

            For her part, Israeli linguist and peace activist Tanya Reinhart-- commented favorably in one of her recent books on the Palestinian thinker Edward Said’s view that, “The Palestinian struggle… must be based on the understanding that the Jewish people are here to stay.  The struggle must strive towards a settlement that will enable coexistence based on human dignity, a settlement that “will capture the imagination of the world.”  She added,

On the Israeli side, on March 20, 2001, 140 academics published an ad in three Palestinian newspapers that said: ‘we extend our arms to you in solidarity with your just cause…and wish to cooperate with you in opposing the IDF’s brutal policy of siege, closure and curfews.’  In the spirit of Mandela and Said they too believe that this cooperation ‘may serve as a precedent -setting example for future relations between the two communities in this country, our shared country.’

            On March 2001, in the village of Rantis near Tul Karem I watched, bewildered, as approximately two hundred Israelis--youth along with old veterans--demolished with their bare hands the stone and earth barricade erected by the IDF--just one of the dozens of events of this kind that have taken place since the current round of Israeli oppression began.  The people knew that as soon as they left, IDF bulldozers would return to reconstruct the barricade.  Still they looked happy.  Because they knew that they too will be there again.  They will be there for the only future worth living--a future based on basic human values.[21]

 

 

Suggestions for Actions by Concerned Outsiders

We do not presume to tell nonviolent activists in either the Israeli or Palestinian community what they should do.  We do, however, feel able to suggest some directions that people in other places might consider taking to support the nonviolent organizations inside those two communities, as indicated in the following paragraphs.   

Self-Education

            All of us need to learn a lot more about the rich and complex history of nonviolence in the Palestinian-Israeli context, and about the debates between advocates of nonviolence and advocates of violence that continue inside each community.  (We also need to continually educate ourselves about the roles our own governments play in the area.)   Most of the organizations mentioned in this chapter—or elsewhere in the report--have good websites, and many of them have written publications that are very informative.  In addition, there are numerous English-language articles and a growing list of books on this topic.  We have tried to indicate in Appendix D which of these resources might be most helpful.

Aiding Palestinian and Israeli Nonviolent Organizations

            When we asked Ghassan Andoni how we could help the Palestinian Center for Rapprochement, his response seemed modest: 

We need resources, funds.  But not a lot.  For example, we need to buy prepaid phone-cards, in order to stay in touch with each other.  During the siege at the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem,[22] when we supporting the ISM people who were in there, we were using 30-35 phone cards a day!  Then, we need to create a media center here.  We often have specific requests and needs… 

I stress that we have no paid staff.  All are volunteers.  But the internationals who come to work with us need to have their living expenses covered.  Perhaps we could link to  churches or Quaker meetings or other groups?

            Many of the Israeli and Palestinian nonviolence organizations post specific requests on their websites or in their publications.  We urge readers to do what they can to respond.

Building Longterm Partnerships

            Andoni’s suggestion of “linking” with faith-based or other support groups internationally seems to us an excellent one that can strengthen the work of everyone involved.  An important aspect of any such partnership would be for the internationals to provide consistent and loving support for the women and men involved in the work of the local group in a way that helps these courageous people to bear the hardships of their situation while reducing the sense of isolation and despair that can on occasion beset them.

            Such a partnership might also involve making a solid commitment, on a long-term basis,  to funding, technical support, fund-raising support, or the provision of other needed resources.  It might grow to the point where some members of the international group might volunteer to go to Palestine/Israel and work for and with the on-site organization.  Another possible way to support the people in these organizations might be to provide a “respite ministry” that provides a safe and supportive environment away from tensions of the homeland where they can collect their thoughts, restore their energies, and engage in some brainstorming and experience-sharing with members of the partnering group.

Bearing Witness

            All of us, because we had the huge privilege and challenge of being part of the IQWP, feel under the weight of a leading to bear witness about what we saw and experienced on our journey.  (This publication is part of that effort.) We know that many other “internationals” who have had similar experiences of traveling around Israel/Palestine, or who have had the privilege of working with nonviolence organizations there, have similarly found ways to spread their witness as widely as possible; and we urge the continuation of such efforts

            This might involve something as simple as inviting friends over for dessert so you can tell them what you saw, or convening a small group of interested persons from your congregation or other civic group; or it might involve becoming passionately engaged in a large-scale attempt to sway your national government; or, anything in between.  All such efforts are good!  We would suggest, however, that a good portion of all these messages might usefully focus on the role of the nonviolence organizations in Israel and Palestine.   All of us can help to magnify their voices in the global discourse.

             If you have not had the opportunity to visit Palestine/Israel yet—or even if you have—you always have the opportunity to help spread the testimony of other witnesses. 

Missions to Palestine and Israel by International Nonviolence Organizations

            We know of a number of international groups do activist work in Palestine/Israel based on an intentionally nonviolent philosophy.  A few of these are listed below.

             The most experienced such group is the Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT).  It started out as a ministry of the historic “peace churches” (Church of the Brethren, Mennonites, and Quakers) and continues to embody a specifically gospel-based, pacifist approach to its work.  CPT has maintained a full-time presence of four to six team members in downtown Hebron since 1995.  On its very informative website, CPT explains that:  Hebron typifies a condition in which one party has most of the power and the other has little. Until both parties have hope for a fair relationship that begins at the negotiating table the conflict appears unresolvable. CPT workers try to emphasize or encourage nonviolent methods for redress and get in the way of violence when they can.”[23]

            While the CPT sees its role in Hebron as primarily a ministry of presence, the Ecumenical Accompaniment Program in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI), a younger organization, bases its work on the more mobile approach of “accompaniment.”  EAPPI’s website explains that it, “is an initiative of the World Council of Churches ...  Its mission is to accompany churches in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) in their nonviolent actions and concerted advocacy efforts to end the occupation and support a just peace in the Middle East.”[24]

The International Solidarity Movement (ISM), which was mentioned above by Ghassan Andoni, is a secular group organized along loose “affinity-group” lines.  It describes itself as a “Palestinian-led movement of Palestinian and International activists working to raise awareness of the struggle for Palestinian freedom and an end to Israeli occupation. We utilize nonviolent, direct-action methods of resistance to confront and challenge illegal Israeli occupation forces and policies.  As enshrined in international law and UN resolutions, we recognize the Palestinian right to resist Israeli violence and occupation via legitimate armed struggle.  However, we believe that nonviolence can be a powerful weapon in fighting oppression and we are committed to the principles of nonviolent resistance.”[25]

We have also heard with interest about a proposal that the U.S.-based Quaker organization Friends Peace Teams (FPT) might establish a presence in or around the Friends Schools in Ramallah in order to develop the ability of Friends worldwide to contribute to nonviolence work in Palestine and Israel.[26]

Supporting the Vision of Nonviolence in Israel/Palestine

  We have noted above the robust state of pro-violence discourse in Israel and Palestine (including both versions of the “Hezbollah argument”), and the disadvantage that some advocates of nonviolence have felt in the field of public opinion.  Are there things that thoughtful outsiders can do to help strengthen the nonviolent voice in the internal debates in each community?

We hesitate to suggest we have answers on this, but we also recognize that the advocates and organizers of nonviolence in Israel and Palestine are trying to live and work under horrifying conditions that often leave little mental energy for study and reflection, and also that for most Palestinians access to libraries, seminars, and conferences is simply impossible.  There may be more that outsiders not suffering these impediments can do, acting in close conjunction with the local activists, to strengthen their capacity to interpret their work and its guiding vision. 

Are there books or other printed materials that they would like to use or to distribute, that outsiders could donate?  Is there translation work, into Hebrew or Arabic, that they would find useful?  Are there experiences of nonviolence movements elsewhere in the world that they would like to learn more about?  Are there conferences elsewhere in the world that they want to attend, but for which they have trouble finding either the travel costs or the necessary permissions (from Israel or the host country)?  Are there other such areas in which outsiders might help?

  We believe it is especially important to stress in the Palestine/Israel context that nonviolence is not a specifically Christian doctrine, but part of the spiritual heritage of all humanity.  Are there, therefore, specific intellectual tasks like restoring the heritage of Muslim thinkers of nonviolence like Jalal al-Din Rumi or (more recently) Badshah Khan, or their Jewish counterparts like Martin Buber or Abraham Heschel, that could help Palestinian and Israeli nonviolence organizers to undertake more effective faith-based outreach to Muslims and Jews?


 



[1] We wonder to what extent this perception is the result of the focus that most the global media place on acts of violence and their consequences, rather than on the simple grace shown by people helping their families and communities make it through tough times. 

[2] Ari Shavit, “The enemy within,” in Ha’aretz, Aug. 29, 2002.  Hebrew-language specialists have told us that the word used here for “burn” also carries the connotations of “sear” or “brand.”

[3] Moshe Ya’alon, quoted by Nahum Barnea in Yediot Aharonot, Oct. 29, 2003.  At the time, Barnea referred to  his source merely as a “senior military official,” but the fact that it was Ya’alon emerged later that day.  See Molly Moore, “Top Israeli officer says tactics are backfiring,” The Washington Post, Oct. 31, 2003, p. A1.

[4] Ya’alon may have addressed this issue in public, but we have not found any reference to such utterances.

[5] A good description of these developments can be found in Joost R. Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada : labor and women's movements in the occupied territories (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1991).

[6]  Awad’s right to reside in his native city had been withdrawn by Israel some years before.  He had U.S. citizenship, however, and in the early 1980s he used his U.S. passport to return to Jerusalem to set up the Palestinian Center for Nonviolence.  His activities attracted little attention from the Israeli authorities until the intifada started, at which point they promptly deported him on the grounds that his visa had expired.

[7] Gene Sharp, “The Intifadah and Nonviolent Struggle” in Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. XIX, no.1 (Autumn 1989), pp. 3-13.

[8] In 1989 one of our IQWP members, a U.S. citizen, took part in a campaign to form a human chain around the walls of the Old City of Jerusalem.  That nonviolent action was met with water cannons and beatings by the  Israeli police.

[9] For more information on these actions see Maxine Nunn, Creative Resistance: Anecdotes of Nonviolent Action by Israeli-Based Groups (Jerusalem: Alternative Information Center, 1993).

[10]   This expulsion was, of course, a clear infringement of the Fourth Geneva Convention. However, the fact that even that dramatic  escalation failed to win for Israel the intended goal of damping down the intifada—indeed, it had just the opposite effect—likely helped persuade Rabin to try the different strategy of supporting talks with the PLO, instead.

[11] He had, of course, won what he had sought from the Palestinians in Lebanon, namely the dispersal of the PLO’s leadership from there.  But beyond that goal, he also sought to use the 1982 invasion to install a pro-Israeli government in Beirut.  And that, he notably failed to do.

[12] An account of Hezbollah’s political work can be found in Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah: Politics and religion (London and Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2002).

[13] Text available at <http://www.mifkad.org.il/eng/PrinciplesAgreement.asp>.

[14] Information from <www.palestinemonitor.org/Other%20Updates/palestinian_national_initiative.htm>.  The Initiative has its own website, with an English-language section accessible at: <www.almubadara.org/en>.  The Palestinian-American scholar-activist Edward Said was a strong supporter of the Initiative until his death in September 2003.

[15] Common Ground News Service, transmission of May 16, 2003.  Text available from Search for Common Ground, 1601 Connecticut Ave NW, # 200, Washington DC, 2009, or from <www.sfcg.org>.

[16] Johan Galtung, Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Institute for Peace, 1989), p.14.

[17] Marc H. Ellis, Towards a Jewish Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987), p.132.

[18] Johan Galtung, Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine, p.20. 

[19] More information about the Bereaved Families Forum and Yitzhak Frankenthal is available at <http://www.theparentscircle.com/parents/about.asp>.

[20] Communication by e-mail from Gila Svirsky, 30 May, 2003.

[21] Tanya Rhinehart, Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948 (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002),  pp. 234-35.

[22] During “Operation Defensive Shield” in spring 2002, the IDF reoccupied Bethlehem.  A few dozen Palestinian militants sought sanctuary in the Church of the Nativity, around which the IDF then threw a tight siege.  Some ISM activists slipped into the church compound, bringing humanitarian supplies for the people inside.

[23] <http://www.prairienet.org/cpt/history.php>, accessed on July 15, 2003.

[24] <http://www.wcc-coe.org/wcc/what/international/palestine/eap.html>, accessed July 15, 2003.

[25] <http://www.palsolidarity.org/about/aboutISM.htm>, accessed July 15, 2003.

[26] We have little news at this point about the progress of this proposal.  A visit to the FPT website is probably the easiest way to find out about its status: <www.friendspeaceteams.org>.