Les Gelb's proposed partition of Iraq
by Gary Sick, May 2, 2006
Over the past few years, I have had several opportunities to hear Les Gelb
present his ideas on Iraqi separation or autonomy. Most recently, he spoke
at Columbia University, where he mentioned that Sen. Biden had become a
"believer" and that they might publish an op-ed together. Yesterday they
did, in the New York Times ["Unity Through Autonomy in Iraq," Thread 14].
In my view, the separation thesis makes sense as analysis, i.e. that the
course of events in Iraq might lead to such an outcome whether you like it
or not. But I have never understood how Gelb and a few others could argue
that the United States should make this a U.S. policy objective. I have
had my chance to raise questions and counter-arguments with Gelb, but I
have found his answers to be unsatisfactory. Briefly, here is what I
object to in this formulation.
Gelb correctly identifies several really thorny problems: the danger of
ethnic cleansing and potential genocide if the fissiparous tendencies in
Iraq run out of control; the problem of disputed cities, e.g. Kirkuk and
Baghdad itself; the uneven distribution of oil resources (since the
Kurdish and Shii areas are far better endowed than the Sunnis); the
difficulty of protecting rights of women and minorities; the pernicious
role of militias that represent various ethnic or sectarian groups; and
the danger that a civil war would draw Iraq's neighbors into a regional
war in defense of particular groups or strategic territory.
When you ask him (as I did recently) how a weak central government could
prevent this from happening or otherwise deal with these issues, he simply
replies (as he did at several places in the op-ed) that present policies
are already failing. The implication is that we have nothing to lose by
trying something different. I find that totally unsatisfactory. The
question is not whether the present situation is bad, but whether this
proposal would make it better. Where does he explain how that would
happen?
If you accept (as he does, explicitly, in person) that the militias will
remain and will provide "security," and that there will be no serious
national army or security service, then who is going to enforce all these
changes? Is the Kurdish Peshmerga really going to amicably settle the fate
of Kirkuk? Is the Badr Brigade really going to address itself to the
condition of women's rights in Shia-stan?
He proposes to "bribe" (he insisted on the use of that word in his spoken
presentation) the Sunnis with promises of a substantial percentage of the
oil revenues. Will the feeble government in Baghdad (still, presumably,
dominated numerically by Shii and Kurds) enforce this? Why?
He proposes that U.S. aid be increased (another bribe) with the
understanding that it will be withdrawn unless the rights of women and
minorities are respected. At the moment, we are spending some $10 billion
per month with very limited effect. That is the equivalent, in current
dollars, of a Marshall Plan every thirteen months. Are we going to keep
that up -- even increase it -- after this project goes into effect just to
protect women and minority rights? And will the Shia authorities in the
south revise their traditional behavior accordingly? If you believe that,
I have a bridge I'd like to sell you.
These are national questions and they must be resolved by a national
authority. Yes, they must have the acquiescence of the constituent
parties, but that is called democracy, not secession.
In one respect, this proposal is merely making a virtue of necessity. If
things are inevitably headed toward civil war and separation, then let's
adopt that as our policy and come out on the right side of history. Right?
Not necessarily.
Appealing as it may be, we are not going to be able to simply shuck off
our responsibility and withdraw with our (slightly tattered) honor intact.
On the contrary, we would be taking on the additional responsibility of
overseeing the emergence of three separate political entities, each with
its own interests, vulnerabilities and ambitions. It is we who would
accept responsibility for equitable distribution of oil revenues, for
preventing ethnic cleansing in the highly mixed Iraqi population, for
maintaining minority rights.
Is Bosnia a fair comparison? There we have a country surrounded by
European allies who offer willing cooperation and a per-capita troop level
that would make Gen. Shinseki proud. Is it realistic to expect the same in
Iraq, which is surrounded by malevolent powers on all sides and plagued
with a perpetual troop deficit?
Note that a great deal hinges on what Gelb calls "international police
protection." In other words, we must enlist the United Nations or a
coalition of the willing to come in and do what we have been unable to do
with our 130,000 troops and $10 billion per month. Is it reasonable to
expect that a regional conclave with U.S. (Sunni) allies Saudi Arabia and
Jordan, U.S. enemies Iran and Syria, plus Turkey, which is preoccupied
with the Kurds, will produce a harmonious and enforceable regional
compact?
Let's just imagine that after we adopt a policy of separation under a weak
central government, the militias remain vicious, the insurgency
accelerates, ethnic cleansing becomes endemic, rights of women and
minorities do not improve, and regional powers prove to be more interested
in their sectarian interests than in saving Iraq. According to this plan,
we have now accepted responsibility for making all of this work. Will we
really be better off than we are now?
Gelb insists that we have given a policy of promoting a strong central
government a chance, and it has failed. It is worth reminding ourselves
that it has only been three years since a brutal dictatorship was
overthrown, leaving the country in utter political chaos. Quite apart from
the egregious errors committed by the U.S. administration in the meantime,
it is fair to ask ourselves what would have happened in the United States
if we had excluded the concept of a strong central government from the
U.S. constitution after the first three years. Remember that Gelb first
proposed this idea, also in a New York Times op-ed entitled "The
Three-State Solution," less than seven months after President Bush
proclaimed "mission accomplished." Gelb was advocating partition even
before all the present troubles emerged and before there had been a single
Iraqi election.
Accepting partition as the solution to U.S. misfortunes in Iraq requires
a
leap of faith no less breathtaking than the original neo-con conviction
that Iraq would be a cakewalk with adoring crowds to welcome us. In short,
this is a really bad idea, which threatens to make a desperate situation
even worse than it is now.
Gary Sick is the Executive Director of the Gulf/2000
Research Listserv and an Adjunct Professor of Middle East politics at Columbia
University