On the Sunni Vote in the October 15 Constitutional Referendum
By Gilbert Achcar, October 16, 2005
The major difference between the October 15 vote and the January 30
election as is now confirmed has been the—uneven but nevertheless important—Sunni
participation. It is interesting to have a close look at this development.
A summary of the official positions:
Islamic Party: As is well-known,
the only major Sunni political force to have called for casting a YES vote in
the referendum is the Islamic Party. This is the Iraqi branch of the Muslim Brotherhood
(though the Association of Muslim Scholars is also close to the international
MB). Among Iraqi Sunni groups, the IP is one of the most susceptible to
pressure from the Saudi Kingdom and Jordan, and has for long collaborated with
the US along with the bulk of Iraqi opposition in exile before the fall of
Saddam Hussein. They reversed their position on the constitution after an
agreement with the Shiite and Kurdish coalitions, brokered by US Ambassador
Khalilzad, according to which there will be a procedure to amend the
constitution after the election of a new Parliament in December (by majority
vote in the new Assembly, which, if secured, is to be followed by a popular
referendum with the same rule as in the October 15 referendum: two-thirds
voting NO in three provinces would defeat the amendments). The reversal in the
IP’s attitude led to splits within its ranks, and even violent attacks on some
of its offices and members, but the attacks were condemned by most other Sunni
forces.
Boycotters: The first
Sunni-based forces that have defined an attitude toward the constitutional
referendum were, of course, for its boycott as a matter of “principle.” They
were two: 1) the Ba’ath Party (communiqué of the pan-Arab leadership dated
September 9 and communiqué of the Iraqi leadership the same month) calling for
a boycott of the referendum to deprive it from any legitimacy (political groups
serving as legal facades for the Ba’ath, like the “Supreme Committee of Patriotic Forces-Wahj al-Iraq,”
followed suit); and 2) Zarqawi’s
al-Qaida branch in Iraq, which did not only warn against any participation in
the referendum—from both a “principled” ultra-fundamentalist attitude against
any human-made constitution and an anti-occupation stance—but also accompanied
its threats with violent actions against those calling for the participation.
“NO” Voters: Four major
armed groups called on their followers to cast a NO vote in the referendum in
order to defeat the draft by gathering the required two-thirds majority in
three provinces: these are The Islamic Army in Iraq, The Army of Mujahideen, The
Movement of Islamic Resistance (Hamas-Brigades of the 1920 Revolution) and The
Islamic Front of the Islamic Resistance.
These groups, which initially were calling for a boycott, explained the
reversal in their position in a communiqué released on the day of the
referendum with the following basic arguments: they do not want to be accused
one more time of preventing fellow Sunnis from acting politically; the recently
defined rule that made the rejection pending on two-thirds of actual voters in
three provinces instead of registered voters; they got guarantees that the
Sunnis would supervise their voting areas so that no falsification of the
results would be possible; there is a big part of the Iraqi people, Sunnis and
Shiites, opposed to the draft, and therefore there is a great hope to defeat
it. The groups added accusations to the US of trying to prevent the Sunni
regions from taking part in the vote for fear of a defeat of the draft,
referring to the recent onslaught by US forces that started in Tal Afar and
extended to Samara, Ramadi, etc.
The only remaining major Sunni armed group is the Army of Ansar
al-Sunna. They simply did not issue a position, probably torn between their
inclination to boycott and the desire not to stand against what has become the
dominant trend among Sunnis.
Coalition of Sunni Political Groups
Several Sunni political groups called similarly for casting a NO vote in
the referendum. However the official statement of the coalition gathered around
the Association of Muslim Scholars, the Council of Iraqi National Dialogue, acting
as a the political counterpart of the armed groups, both Fundamentalists and Ba’athists,
left the matter open between boycott and NO vote, just calling for a rejection
of the draft by all “legal” means, i.e. avoiding violence.
Explaining that they were not convinced of reversing their rejection of
the draft after the last-minute agreement between the Islamic Party and the
Shiite and Kurdish coalitions, their spokesperson, Saleh al-Mutlak (or Mutlaq:
there are different spellings of his name in Arabic sources), used the following
argument to reject the agreement, which is a striking and amazing illustration
of the double standard applied by Iraqi factions in their political reasoning:
he said that the rule of two-thirds in three provinces (that would be enough to
defeat future amendments) is unfair because it would allow majorities in three
provinces to defeat what 80% of the Iraqi people would have adopted!
Here are excerpts from an analysis of the referendum in the Sunni
provinces by an insider Sunni source, published on the evening of Saturday
October 15 after the end of the vote. It sheds an interesting light on the
dissensions among Sunni forces and their motivations.
The Votes of Sunnis were lost between the Islamic Party’s Conspiracy and
Zarqawi’s Fanatism
(Mufakkirat al-Islam, Oct. 15)
Although four of the major and most influent resistance groups on the
Iraqi scene called Sunni Iraqis yesterday to go to the polling centers and cast
a NO vote on the constitution, reality was contrary to what was expected from
all Sunni circles, as our correspondents have reported that the regions falling
under the control of al-Qaida’s organization in Iraq have seen almost nil or
insignificant rates of votes in the referendum.
This has incited Sunni Iraqis against the position of al-Qaida’s
organization because it contradicted the rest of jihadist combatant groups in
Iraq that requested from the Sunnis to vote in order to abort the constitution.
Mufakkirat al-Islam’s correspondent in Ramadi reported that four Sunni
citizens were killed this morning in the early hours of the referendum by
elements of al-Qaida’s organization, as they were coming out of one of the
polling stations after voting NO, according to their relatives. This has
created a state of fear among city residents and prevented them from taking
part in the vote although the number of registered voters in Ramadi reached
347 000 …
Sheikh Abdul-Sattar Muhammad, one of the imams and preachers of
Fallujah, said that al-Qaida’s organization made a huge error in preventing the
people by threats and intimidations to take part in the vote, adding that
al-Qaida contributed with other groups to the marginalization of the Sunnis and
their impotence in the face of Shiites, Kurds and secular parties… He said also
that if al-Qaida’s elements had let the people vote, the constitution would
have been rejected by 100% of Sunnis and would have been aborted, while it
would have been proved that Sunnis are not a minority in Iraq…
Whereas the Islamic Party has deliberately contributed in splitting the
votes of the Sunnis in calling for a “yes” vote, Zarqawi has also given a gift
to the occupation and the Safawi [a pejorative formula used in Sunni circles to
designate the Shiites deemed to be “Iranian agents”] followers of Sistani by
contributing unknowingly, through their threats to the voters, to the
neutralization of the Sunni votes opposed to this constitution, under which the
Iraqis may have to live miserably for a long period. It would have been better
if it had behaved like the Army of Ansar al-Sunna, as said one of the mosque
imams in Mosul…
The question now in Iraq is when will al-Qaida’s organization stop allowing
the assassination of Muslims under various pretexts, after the murder of some
Sunnis in Ramadi today because they took part in the vote, and, before that,
the authorization to kill members of the Islamic Party. Before that also
al-Qaida’s followers turned their weapons against members of other armed groups
during the second siege of Fallujah under the pretext that they ought to accept
Zarqawi’s leadership after Usama bin Laden’s appeal to this end. This attitude
weakened the ranks of the resistance and allowed US occupation forces to
execute their well-known offensive in the southern part of Fallujah…
Through their political facades and their jihadist groups, the Sunnis
wanted by voting to impede the Safawi dream, supported by the occupation and
Iran, and this by harassing the occupation and its agents politically, while
the resistance is carrying on its steadfast action in combating the occupier.