Boys with (very lethal) toys: What are these 'toys' good for?


Posted by Helena Cobban
May 1, 2007 6:31 PM EST | Link
Filed in Antiwar

(Being, a critique of Ron Tira's The Limitations of Standoff Firepower-Based Operations:On Standoff Warfare, Maneuver, and Decision)


Ron Tira is an Israeli Air Force reservist with considerable experience in the IAF's intelligence and "Campaign Planning" departments. Last November he published this scathing critique of the way the Israeli ground forces had performed during Israel's 33-day war on Lebanon.  (See my commentary on that, here.)

Now, in his latest study The Limitations of Standoff Firepower-Based Operations, Tira has turned his sights on many of the operational assumptions and concepts developed with his own service, the Air Force.  His critique is very significant, it seems to me, for two reasons. First, it provides an IAF insider's informed insight into the flaws within the operational  concept that the IAF itself had done the most to develop within the broader realm of Israeli military planning.  The IAF's former chief Dan Halutz took the concept of relying very strongly on "standoff, firepower-based operations" (SFO's) with him when he became the chief of the IDF's entire, over-arching general staff structure; and the 33-day war of last summer was Halutz's great chance (!) to demonstrate the efficacy of these types of operation.

And beyond that, as Tira makes clear throughout this latest study, the Israeli concept of reliance on SFO's is intimately-- one might say, organically-- linked to many of the ideas and concepts developed within the US military in recent years, including the ideas about the possibility of relying on small but firepower-heavy forces capable of operating over long distances that were strongly championed by Donald Rumsfeld when he became Secreteary of Defense in 2001.  (I recently wrote here about some of the terrible consequences-- for both the US and Iraq-- of the Bush administration's reliance on the small forces dicated by that concept.) 

So clearly, Tira's critique of SFO's has relevance and potential resonance far beyond Israel's immediate theater of operations. Hence, the general nature of my title here.

A good proportion of the "boys" in both the US and the Israeli armed services have clearly always been enamored of high-tech gadgetry, and seduced by the idea that its effective utilization could reduce their own forces' casualties (and perhaps, through the development of 'precision guidance' to the desired level of 'surgical' precision, also reduce 'collateral' damage in the areas targeted) while allowing them greater flexibility to operate anywhere in the world they pleased and without all the messy, time-consuming, and expensive business of having to plan for, move into position, and then sustain in the field large numbers of the infantry's "boots on the ground"...  But until Rumsfeld's sharp-elbowed arrival in the Pentagon, operational-art thinking there had still been dominated by the basic tents of "the Powell Doctrine": that is, a basic reliance on large infantry forces (as built up over several decades in, primarily, Central Europe), with all the strategic and political constraints that reliance on such forces entails.

Rumsfeld worked rapidly and ruthlessly to bend the high command of the US military to his will.  The two great "experiments" of his attempt to reconfigure US forces according to the new focus on what Tira calls SFO's, and to which US military jargon assigns a number of other related terms (see p.11 of Tira's work), were the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.  Significantly, when Tira tries to place the performance of Israel's SFO-focused campaign in Lebanon in 2006 into a broader comparative context, in Ch.8 of this short work, the comparisons he draws are with those two US campaigns and with the US's earlier SFO-based campaign in Kosovo, in 1999...

Like his government and perhaps most Israelis, Tira terms last summer's extremely lethal military assault on Lebanon the "Second" Lebanon war, in a move that neatly obliterates the considerable amounts of suffering the IDF inflicted on Lebanon's people through the large-scale assaults it made on the country in 1978, 1993, 1996, and indeed in other years, too.  In Chs. 3 and 4, he makes clear that what  Israel aimed at last summer was the "cognitive collapse" or "cognitive-strategic collapse" of the enemy it identified there, that is (as I read him) the Hizbullah leadership.  In little graphics that he uses on pp.23 and 27 of the study, he defines the "Required military achievement" as being "Removing surface-to-surface rocket threat"; and specifies that the planners hoped to achieve this by causing a "Cognitive-strategic collapse of Hizbollah system" that would lead to "Behavioral change" by Hizbollah.

(This already leads to some very interesting questions.  If the IDF was seeking "behavior change" by Hizbollah, how on earth were they hoping to achieve this at the same time they were-- as they very evidently and avowedly seemed to be-- aggressively working for the physical elimination of Hizbollah's top leadership? If the IDF had indeed succeeded in killing Sayed Hassan Nasrallah and his circle of top aides, who did they think could issue any credible order to dismantle Hizbollah's rocket-launcher arrays?  Indeed, was it really "behavior change" they were aiming at-- or rather, the physical destruction of Hizbullah's entire decision-making and command-and-control system?)

I shall also note but not dwell on the poor grasp Tira seems to have of the nature of Israel's 1982 war against Lebanon.  In the graphic on p.23, he shows that he seems to think the strategic goal of Israel's 1982 war on Lebanon was also (as in 2007) "Remocing surface-to-surface rocket threat".  What on earth is he talking about there?  The strategic goal of the principal architect of that war, Ariel Sharon, was the destruction and/or complete removal from Lebanon of the PLO's entire decision-making and command-and-control system, which until then had been headquartered in Beirut.  The PLO had almost no rockets in South Lebanon at the time-- and certainly none capable of leaping overt the UNIFIL zone and detonating inside Israel proper.  The main physical irritant that the PLO deployed against Israel was the series of intermittent incursions its fighters launched, either by land or by sea.  But it was the political challange the PLO leadership posed that Sharon probably judged to be the greater threat to his dream of settling Jewish Israelis in all of occupied Palestine; and to defuse that threat, the PLO's leaders in Beirut had to be very visibly humiliated, punished, and sent into an ignominious exile, if not killed...  Also, contrary to what Tira indicates in Ch.3, the attainment of Sharon's goal in Lebanon in 1982 was not a rapid and decisive business.  The PLO and its local allies rapidly fell back to West Beirut; but there, they dug in and for 5-6 weeks sustained a very effective defense against the IDF-- and this, despite the IDF's use of massive firepower against them-- until finally, in early August 1982 both sides agreed to ceasefire.  Sharon was then forced to stand by near the Beirut docks while Yasser Arafat and his men sailed out of Beirut very badly bloodied but with their organization's structure and its political line still intact...  (And the Palestinians' resistance to Israel's colonial-settlement projects in occupied Palestine have only continued, and taken on many new forms since then.)

Anyway, as I said, I shan't dwell on Tira's poor understanding of that history, which does not, as I see it, substantially dent the force of his critique of the IDF's performance last summer.  Neither does the slightly confused way  in which he refers to the goals being fought for in Israel's various wars as being "military achievements".  No, surely what is being fought for in all these cases (using military means) is a strategic-political achievement, whether that is is destruction, dismantling, or incapacitation of a perceived threat, or something slightly less palpable like "restoring the credibility of Israel's strategic deterrent."  Indeed, in the Lebanon war, both those goals were actively sought, as I had noted here.

In the graphic on p.27 he shows the contrast between the way the IDF's SFO's were supposed to work during the 33-day war and the way they had worked on the Egyptian front in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.  His choice of the 1973 war was interesting, since once the first few days of  reacting to the "strategic surprise" that the Egyptian and Syrian offensives achieved were over, and the IDF had been able to stabilize its positions inside occupied Sinai, the principal war aim that Ariel Sharon, then the commander of that front, sought to achieve was-- as in Lebanon in 2007-- to restore the credibility of Israel's strategic deterrent primarily by inflicting harsh punishment on the actor who had previously been daring enough not to be totally deterred by Israel's preceding strategic posture.  In Egypt, there were geostrategic limits on how harsh that punishment could be.  The Americans were probably very happy to see Sadat's regime and his generals taken down a large peg or three; but they did not want to see Egypt's military collapse leading to a complete collapse of his regime in Cairo.  (Nonetheless, Sharon wanted it to be as harsh as possible, and he pushed his forces foward to complete the encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army even after the deadline agreed for the ceasefire.)

In Lebanon in 2006, there were no such geostrategic constraints on Israel's ability to ""punish" its enemy (which made its failure to achieve that goal even more galling for most Israelis.

There were also a couple of other notable differences between Sharon's war in Egypt in 1973 and Halutz's war in Lebanon 33 years later.  In 1973, Sharon and a number of other key Israeli commanders were forced to think rapidly and effectively on their feet, once the fact and scale of the Egyptian-Syrian military project became clear to them..  (Also, a portion of the IDF general staff underwent functional collapse in response to the surprise; so Sharon and other field commanders were to a large extent left to improvise.)  In July 2006, by contrast, Halutz pulled off the shelf-- with apparently almost zero last-minute adaptation-- a strategic plan that he had long been perfecting.  Its goal was to teach not just Hizbullah but also anyone else who might dare to mess with Israel a huge and effective lesson-- and to do this solely through the use of SFOs.  He was not improvising. 

Indeed, one point Tira makes is that Halutz showed himself almost incapable of introducing any adaptations into his plan at all..  When the ferocious and very destructive bombardment that Halutz unleashed on Lebanon in the first few days of the war failed to result in Hizbullah's "cognitive-strategic collapse" and in the suppression of the organization's continued rocket attacks against northern Israel, then all Halutz showed himself capable of doing was "more, and then yet more, of the same"-- until, as Tira notes, no-one in the IDF could even think of any additional targets in Lebanon to bomb.

Another key difference between Sharon's operation in Egypt in 1973 and Halutz's in Lebanon was, of course, that Sharon was operating mainly with ground forces, and in sizeable numbers.  Once mustered on an emergency basis these ground forces were able to rely on years of good training and were thus rapidly able to become effective in the field.  Whereas in Lebanon, after Halutz eventuially became convinced that his airpower-based SFO's were not working and he needed to use some ground troops as well, he could not find any that were in any condition at all to be effective in the field.

Just how ferocious was the totality of Halutz's bombardment of Lebanon?  On p.44, Tira quantifies it thus:

in excess of 160,000 artillery shells, 15,000 sorties (including 7,000 strike sorties), 1,800 rockets carrying hundreds of thousands of small bombs [that is, cluster-bomb units], and 8,000 sailing hours, including 2,500 offshore bombardments

Imagine the cost of all that destructive power-- to Israel.  And then, of course, we all have a fairly clear idea of the cost that using all those very lethal and expensive "toys" imposed on the people of Lebanon...

And what did this huge assault achieve in terms of destroying Hizbullah-related targets in Lebanon?  Tira tells us that it

only achieved the destruction of several dozen high quality targets [though I'd love to see his definition of those-- I'm assuming he didn't mean anything as mundane as Lebanon's vital bridges, roadways, hospitals, schools, apartment building, etc... ] and the death of 200-400 Hizbollah fighters (excluding Hizbollah personnel killed in ground battles).

So what strategic outcome did these SFO's achieve? Tira writes

Due to the structure of Hizbollah, which was planned in advance to withstand SFO and therefore made Israeli fire less effective, Israel failed on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Israel did not [succeed] in generating decapitation, paralysis, blindness, or any other effect that substantially harms the will or functioning of the organization’s command and control echelon. Nor did it succeed in suppressing the operational effectiveness of Hizbollah’s combat groups and light surface-to-surface rocket formations. At the end of the day, Israel did not upset the equilibrium of Hizbollah’s system and did not create a sense of helplessness and distress, nor did it push the organization towards cognitive-strategic collapse and a drive to end the war immediately on Israel's terms.

  .. Well, there are many aspects of Tira's analysis that are worth engaging seriously with. In general, I think he provides an extremely well informed asnd well argued critique of the idea that SFO's alone can assure the achievement of substantial strategic objectives.  He does provide a fairly strong critique of the claim that some have made to the effect that in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the US military's reliance on SFO's brought worthwhile results.

But what I really want to focus on right now is the epistemological dimension of the argument Tira makes about the limitations on the effectiveness of SFO's.

Of course, given that the goal of these operations is to bring about the "cognitive-strategic collapse" of the enemy, the epistemology of all aspects of how this is to be achieved are very important.

Ch.5 of his work deals centrally with this issue.  The chapter starts thus:

Predicting the behavioral-cognitive effect on the enemy following the destruction of targets becomes more complicated the higher the rank and seniority of the enemy that is engaged, as the enemy’s systems become more complex and its set of interests and considerations more extensive. This complexity is greatest when the desired effect is aimed not at the military system but at the political level. The effect on the enemy’s political echelons becomes particularly elusive when the enemy’s mentality, culture, economy, and society are different from one's own, or when the enemy acts emotionally, errs, or just does not understand the wider picture of the war. Moreover, in many cases the enemy might act irrationally, or at least irrationally in relation to one's own projections.

I have to say, I found those ascriptions of emotionality, error, misunderstanding, or a lack of rationality quite hilarious.  What the heck is he talking about there??  The idea that Lebanese people don't like seeing their country bombed from the air, their people killed and maimed by the score, and their vital infrastructure very badly damaged, and might be angry with the people who have launched that bombardment-- and this is "emotionality, error, misunderstanding, or irraltionality"??

Ummm, just who might be in "error" in this whole discussion??

So what does Tira mean by "rationality", anyway?  In the next paragraph he argues clearly that, from a strictly cost/benefit viewpoint, the "rational" way for the North Vietnamese to respond to the huge bombardments the US launched against their country from 1965 through 1968 under Operation Rolling Thunder would have been to bow to Uncle Sam's demands. "However, North Vietnam acted in an 'irrational' manner and continued to support the Vietcong, despite the severe escalation and the destruction of its political and industrial infrastructures."

My goodness, how very "primitive, emotional, and irrational" of them! (Irony alert from me there.)

What's more, he notes that it is not only in low-income, undemocratic countries that such a seemingly "irrational" attachment to the values of national dignity and the independence of national decision-making are found... He notes (as I did, back last summer) that this same strong nationalist push-back against outsiders who are bombing the bejeesus out of your country was also present in the response of Londoners to the Blitz.  Tira doesn't, in fact, accuse the Brits of being "emotional or irrational"--  he probably reserves such sobriquets for people from non-western countries-- but he was right to note that the stubborn sense of nationalist pride and push-back was certainly present there, as well.

I think the most important portion of Tira's study is Ch. 6, because it is there that he comes closest to concluding that SFO's are inherently incapable of being waged, even in their own terms, and therefore no amount of tweaking of the concept would be capable of making them strategically effective.

He starts the chapter thus:

Standoff Firepower-based Operations and, in particular, Effects-Based Operations, are complex and difficult to manage and command. First, the discipline in itself is complicated, reading and understanding the orders is at times an exhausting task, and the terminology used – either by choice or due to the nature of the subject matter – is not necessarily accessible to the numerous officers who are supposed to carry out the orders. Second, the sometimes abstract nature of the required military achievement leads to communications lapses within the military chain of command and difficulty in monitoring the advance toward the realization of non-physical effects. The simple and straightforward commands of the past are replaced by ambiguous complex formats that are open to interpretation. 

When, for example, there is an order to create “a sense of being pursued,” it is not self-evident what steps the subordinates are to take, or in SFO terms, where to aim the sensor and at what targets the shooter should fire so that the enemy feels pursued. Moreover, tasks with a cognitive objective involve difficulty in evaluating progress and success in carrying out the mission. In classic warfare the commander sets measurable interim objectives that allow assessment of progress and success (for example, the campaign objective is to reach line x, whereby the interim objective of the next 24 hours is to reach line y). However, in cognitive effects-based operations it is hard to set milestones for assessing success, as the interim effects cannot generally be assessed; nor is it possible to define in percentages progress toward attaining a cognitive effect or the expected behavioral change...

I find that reference to an order to "create a sense of being pursued" interesting.  Was that in fact the wording of one of the orders issued by Halutz to his subordinates?  Just to create that sense-- in, presumably, Hassan Nasrallah-- and thereby drive him to the point of accepting Israel's demands?  Or rather, actually to pursue him?

Anyway, Tira tells us (pp.34-35) that during Halutz's bombardment of Lebanon,

Israel's General Staff struggled to assess whether or not the IDF was successful and at what levels to determine success or failure (there are those who say this very question of success or failure is still unclear, even today). It is possible that this is one of the reasons why the IDF modus operandi was not changed during the war despite the deep-seated feeling shared by many that the campaign themes were not bearing fruit. After a week or two, after 3,000 sorties and 30,000 artillery shells, it was possible to stop and reexamine the practicality of the campaign themes and the need to change them. However, the consensus of the General Staff was that the train was progressing at full steam, and another bombardment and another shelling would bring Hizbollah nearer to cognitive-strategic collapse...

So in other words, all that Halutz knew how to do was to carry on doing what he had been been doing.  That is, bombing.

Tira then argues that,

The picture becomes even more complex in relation to an order to generate an effect such as “weakening Hizbollah.” First, it is not clear where the sensor should be pointed and at what targets the shooter should aim in order to weaken Hizbollah (and in the broader context to assess if Hizbollah is at all weakened, or has actually gained strength in the Lebanese political system during the SFO campaign against it). Second, it is difficult to gauge progress during the fighting as to realization of the order, in other words, estimating how much Hizbollah was weakened after one week or two weeks, and when to declare that Israel has achieved sufficient success.

He was, of course, quite right to put that parenthetical possibility in there, since from the second week of the fighting onward, Hizbullah's political position in the Lebanese system did indeed get stronger with every day that Israel continued to bomb Lebanon while Hizbullah showed itself capable of withstanding that onslaught.

And then, he produces this important argument (pp.35-36):

In fact, SFO management methods are somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, the basic guideline of intelligence and SFO management is total awareness of the situation on the battlefield (dominant battlespace awareness). On the other hand, the basic principles of force utilization include damaging the enemy’s communications networks and making its system “incoherent.”  [I'm assuming that by that he means "indecipherable to and uncontrollable by the enemy's top leadership", rather than simply "indecipherable to anyone, in general."] Yet when the enemy’s known communications networks are damaged, it is impelled to use improvised alternative methods of communication and even create communications redundancy in advance. In such circumstances, dominant battlespace awareness is harmed, which compromises the ability to fight the enemy as a system efficiently. Not surprisingly, most armies in the past chose not to damage the enemy’s known communications systems, so that it would continue to use them and continue to allow obtaining quality intelligence. Similarly, inflicting damage on the enemy’s system-of-systems and making it “incoherent” [to "their"side's leadership] is liable to make the enemy unpredictable [to "our" side] and blur the battlefield.

Actually, I would say it would render the battlefield significantly unreadable... So there you have it: seemingly a very serious internal contradiction lying at the heart of the whole idea of SFO's. 

Regarding the above, I can note that using multiply redundant and low- or no-visibility means of internal communication and having a very "flat", distributed command structure were precisely some of the means that Hizbullah-- a very adaptive and learning-focused fighting organization-- had developed throughout its 20 years of confronting the IOF on the Lebanese battlefield that is also, after all, Hizbullah's own, much loved and intimately known home turf.  (In addition, even if Hizbullah itself didn't have much of an electronic signature for its own battlefield communications, it had reportedly developed some fairly innovative ways of tapping into the Israeli forces' massive digital footprint-- so at some points, especially when the Israelis started sending in large bnumbers of ground troops in the last days of the war, the Hizbullah commanders seemed more aware of what the Israelis were up to than vice versa.  Tira alludes to Hizbullah's capabilities in that regard, without giving away any details.)

In Ch.8, Tira describes the thinking behind the concept of "Effects-Based Operations" (EBOs), which he defines elsewhere as constituting the particular kind of SFOs that Halutz was trying to carry out in Lebanon.  On pp.43-44 he writes,

It should be noted that even the developers of the EBO concept say there are three prerequisites for its use: first, the enemy is organized like a system; second, the enemy’s system has critical vulnerability nodes; and third, those ready to launch the effects-based operations are familiar with these nodes. While Hizbollah is based on a systemic structure, the second and third conditions are not sufficiently extant: on the one hand, Hizbollah has a flat, decentralized structure that incorporates a network of autonomous cells with high redundancy. On the other hand, it has almost no clear vulnerability nodes or an operational center of gravity whose destruction would bring about the collapse of the other branches.

Well, goodness, what on earth can an EBO planner do when faced with such an organization!

Ch.9 is devoted to considering the responses that a range of potential enemies may resort to as they face Israel's SFOs.  He notes (p.53) that,

Any serious enemy, symmetric or asymmetric, will find the weak points in SFO. Ironically, the battle format designed to combat systems and their vulnerability nodes is itself a system with vulnerability nodes.

I don't know why he terms this "ironic"?  In fact it is, as he goes on to note, one of the major weaknesses of the whole SFO concept.  He adds,

Moreover, the transition from a balanced military force with varied capabilities to a military force that emphasizes standoff fire makes it easier for the enemy to understand the relatively one-dimensional nature of the threat with which it has to contend and to deal with it accordingly (once again, in contrast with the declared intention of SFO to move from a linear threat to a simultaneous and multidimensional threat). If the enemy clearly perceives that what it is likely to face is largely a system of electro-optic sensors and attack by GPS-guided and electro-optic weaponry, the enemy will already find the appropriate countering means. However, when the enemy is faced with a balanced and diverse adversary endowed with versatile and dynamic capabilities, the solution required of it is far more complex....

At this point, the strategic-policy prescriptions that Tira favors are becoming quite clear.  And indeed, in the concluding chapter he argues strongly that Israel should reverse its headlong rush into the beguiling arms of SFOs and return to a more balanced and flexible concept that also allows for a  succesful integration of ground force actions with (a modicum of) SFOs.

Here's his concluding paragraph (pp.66-67):

Israel should reduce the IDF's pace of change and adopt innovative ideas gradually, and only after experimenting with them and proving them on the battlefield. The risk involved in building a force and designing its operational concept based exclusively on an unproven theory that may well prove to be incorrect is enormous. Discarding classic fighting capabilities is a dramatic process that cannot be reversed in any relevant timeframe, and thus it must not be pursued prematurely. No one knows what the future holds and thus when we posit how we should prepare for the battlefield of tomorrow, ... caution and modesty are required. Evolution rather than revolution in military affairs is the order of the day.

The problem that Tira notably does not address, however, is the huge cost of what he is proposing-- both in cash terms, but even more so in terms of the manpower burden it will continue to impose on Israel's small society.  The Israeli military is already deploying scores of thousand-- perhaps more than 100,000?-- of its personnel in and around the occupied territories on a more or less continuing basis, with little reduction in the size of that deployment anywhere in sight.  After the debacle of the ground forces' horrendous unreadiness was revealed for all to see last summer, I imagine that the general staff has done something to restore the kinds of training cycles that in earlier decades kept the ground forces at an appropriately high level of readiness.  But the general staff has also committed itself to maintaining (or rather restroing) a high level of very high-end SFO capabilities.  All this requires a huge commitment of money and time.  And the time in question is primarily that of the country's non-volunteer soldiery-- the 18-year-old males who have to do their 36 months of military service, the females who have to do 24 months, and all the older men called back into doing reserve duty (whether training, or doing very onerous policing duties in the West Bank) until the age of 41 or, depending on the specialization until 54...

It was precisely that horrible burden on the lives of the country's young people, families, and small businesses that the shift to SFOs was meant to ease.  But to carry on policing the West Bank, plus maintaining a large and combat-ready ground force, plus continuing to invest in SFOs??  I just don't see that Israelis will be ready to do that for very much longer...

However, at the level of the broader debate within "western" societies over the effectiveness of SFOs, I think Tira's study has made a real contribution.

Of course, here in the US, there has already been a strong and still growing understanding that the "lean, mobile, hi-tech" force championed by Donald Rumsfeld has not been effective at all in bringing about-- especially in Iraq!-- on a lasting and stable basis the large-scale strategic shift that he promised for it.  Hence we have seen the Bush administration's hasty (and completely doomed) rush to increase the size of the ground-force deployment in Iraq.  And we have already seen the proposals and plans, subscribed to by leading Democratic politicians just as much as by Republicans, to increase the overall size of the US's standing military by 92,000 or even 100,000 people.

Increasing the US's military to that degree will similarly impose a huge additional burden on the US citizenry; and certainly I intend to do some hard-hitting analysis of all these proposals in the very near future. (Given the time it will take to fund and build these additional forces, they will come online far too late to make any appreciable difference to the situation in Iraq, which is going downhill for the US suide very fast, even as I write this.  But might some Americans hope this new force could do make a good contribution in Afghanistan, or elsewhere?  I very much doubt that-- particularly if these new forces are trained in line with the same kind of extremely aggressive fighting concepts that the US military has adhered to up until now; and particularly if the US still plans to retain the same degree of operational independence it hangs on to today for most of the forces it has in Afghanistan, from any form of multilateral command and control... )

But that discussion on the effectiveness and general utility of large, ground-force-based militaries is for another day.  For now, it is just great to be able to take account of the critique that this very well informed Israeli Air Force insider has provided of the inutility, or even disutility of Standoff Firepower-based Operations.

Please!  Let the little boys of the world put all their high-tech, gee-whiz fighting toys back into their sheaths.  (Or could we perhaps transform some of them into socially useful plowshares?)  And then, the rest of us-- the adults of the world-- can get together and start designing a security structure for all the peoples of the world that does not depend on anyone waving around, or threatening to use, or even using all these extremely harmful weapons of large-scale destruction.



Comments
Comment from... John C., at May 1, 2007 09:33 PM:

Two things strike me about this interesting essay: (1) the connection between war and sex, from the Western male perspective, and (2) the extent to which Power Point summaries have replaced actual experience-based learning, analysis and planning within the military/political/industrial complex. The basic fallacy of the SFO doctrines is the assumption that the "enemy" (in the role of the opposite sex) is playing the same game.

Comment from... Joshua, at May 1, 2007 10:57 PM:

WOW! Four entries in a row where hateful Helena goes after Israel or those affiliated it. She can really get on a roll sometimes!

But of course, she's the "adult" dealing with those "childish" Israeli and Americans who are concerned with actually ensuing that their enemies can't kill them.

Do you think the leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah are adults or children, Helena?

Comment from... Blowback, at May 1, 2007 11:08 PM:

Israel should reduce the IDF's pace of change and adopt innovative ideas gradually, and only after experimenting with them and proving them on the battlefield.

He makes it sound as if the IDF has plans to make many more wars in future.

The other problem with experimenting and proving ideas on the battlefield is that you give the opposition a chance to develop counter-measures and that is something that Hezbollah has proved very adept at. So it comes down to which side can cycle through John Boyd's OODA loop fastest and I would still put my money on Hezbollah.

Comment from... Randal, at May 2, 2007 06:31 AM:

Of course, for those who envisage their nation's armed forces being used on a legitimate moral basis, none of the above is a particular problem.

High tech standoff firepower-based systems are excellent for destroying relatively lower tech massed armed forces, and particularly if they attempt offensive operations. I want my government to have such systems in case of a recurrence of a potential threat such as the Soviet Union. To deal with a more powerful potential enemy such as the US, I want my government to make provision for the kind of militia-based anti-occupation defence so successfully exemplified by Hezbollah. And I want my government to have a sufficient nuclear-armed missile force (the ultimate standoff firepower-based system), with second strike capability, to deter attacks and preclude nuclear blackmail.

However, none of the above systems lend themselves greatly to the kind of aggression that the regimes in my country and the US have abused my country's armed forces for in recent years - Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, shortly Iran.

So I'm all in favour of building a standoff firepower based military, although it needs to be kept small enough so that my contemptible "leaders" are no longer tempted to misuse it for murderous interference in other nations' affairs.

Comment from... Randal, at May 2, 2007 06:35 AM:

"Let the little boys of the world put all their high-tech, gee-whiz fighting toys back into their sheaths."

Noted for future use next time Helena complains of sexism in some other person's commentary :-)

(I'm not objecting to it, per se - I have no particular problem with sexism, myself.)

Comment from... Alan Rimmer, at May 2, 2007 07:32 AM:

If I wish informed debate about the Middle East, I don't read the local newspapers nor do I seek out the comments of persons such as Joshua who, rather than presenting an argument, resorts to name-calling.

I read your web site to be informed, and I am, generally. Please spare us the comments of Joshua! I have enough in my life that irritates me.

Comment from... Helena, at May 2, 2007 08:10 AM:

Very frequently, Alan, Joshua doesn't know how to do anything else except name-call. By just calling me "hateful" as he does so frequently instead of engaging with the subject of the posts he indicates that he hasn't even really read these posts closely, and far less is he able to engage in any serious way with the topics discussed.

Sometimes I keep his comments in just to indicate the jejune level of the discourse of knee-jerk Israel-uber-Alles folks like him. Sometimes I keep them in because he expresses arguments that are common out there in the general US discourse so this gives me a chance to engage with those arguments. Sometimes I don't keep them in.

But you're right, they do very frequently interrupt the flow of serious, substantial discussion here.

Comment from... vadim, at May 2, 2007 08:24 AM:

Joshua's comments are 'jejune', 'knee-jerk', reflect an 'Israel uber alles' mentality.. and he's the name caller? Helena, you'd do better to simply delete his comments than talking over his head with condescending slurs.

Comment from... Tom, at May 2, 2007 08:47 AM:

Such a great article that I feel foolish asking the following:
You use the term "shan't": would you comment on your understanding of the shall/will distinction?

Comment from... John O'D, at May 2, 2007 09:00 AM:

Sounds like these guys went to business school rather than staff college. EBOs? Cognitive objectives? No wonder they messed up :-)

Comment from... Joshua, at May 2, 2007 11:42 AM:

Typical Helena. Ignore the fact that her vindictiveness, and her false comparisons have been exposed. Then turn it into a personal attack.

Comment from... Inkan1969, at May 2, 2007 03:47 PM:

Joshua, how do you expect anyone here to respect you when you keep reverting to abhorrant behavior like writing "hateful Helena"?

Comment from... VietnamVet, at May 2, 2007 04:42 PM:

Parallels between Israel and the USA:

Colonial occupations that are straining existing military resources
Fighting wars on the cheap
Ethnic cleansing another people
Leaders lying to themselves and their citizens

Comment from... salah, at May 2, 2007 09:05 PM:

Posted by: Joshua
You do know what she refers to when she says "Israel Uber Alles" don't you?

"I told him I was calling P.M. Begin immediately. And I did -- I was angry -- I told him it had to stop or our entire future relationship was endangered. I used the word holocaust deliberately & said the symbol of war was becoming a picture of a 7-month-old baby with its arms blown off."
" Then on June 7: "Got word of Israel bombing of Iraq -- nuclear reactor. I swear I believe Armageddon is near."

Reagan diaries reveal president's private musings


What a "Terrorist State" Israel is.....

Comment from... Cindy Smith, at May 2, 2007 10:03 PM:

***Please endorse our petition and forward widely***

War Is a Racket!

In the words of a USMC General, war is the oldest, the most profitable and the most vicious racket—one in which the profits are measured in dollars and the losses in body bags.

Full text available at: http://tinyurl.com/2pammb

And at: http://tinyurl.com/2t2mu7

Contact:
Cindy Smith
cindya.smith@yahoo.com
Human Rights Coordinator
CASF

Comment from... salah, at May 2, 2007 10:20 PM:

"As far as Israel is concerned, it would be difficult to imagine a more convenient scenario. Its stubborn enemies, Iran and Syria, are now being accused by the international community, one for its nuclear program, the other for its behavior in Lebanon... Israel has hoped for this outcome since the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States in 2001. Immediately after the collapse of the Twin Towers, Israeli officials began to speak about the anticipated change, and expressed a hope that the United States would bring order to the region, and would deal with Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and not only Iraq."

-Aluf Benn, Haaretz, October 25, 2005
The Salvador Option in Beirut

Comment from... Joshua, at May 2, 2007 11:18 PM:

Now will Helena delete Salah's posts for being off-topic hateful rants? Or will she demonstrate her double standards once again?

Salah, do you have a point in all this? Or do you just try to find every negative quote you can about Israel. I suppose we can't blame you. This blog does encourage such misanthropy.

Comment from... salah, at May 3, 2007 12:53 AM:

Joshua
I suppose we can't blame you.

I post what's comes from Israelis mouths,

Don’t blame me blame them

Comment from... Joshua, at May 3, 2007 01:49 AM:

Yes Salah, and I could simply post memri translations of the virulent racism that comes through the Arab media every day. Or go back and post all of the arrogant belligerent and genocidal rhetoric of Nasser and his ilk on the eve of the 67 war. Or post links documenting the Mufti of Jerusalem's links with the Nazi party. Of course, someone may decide to delete that as "off topic" (yet quotes from a Reagan bio are somehow on topic, how strange). But I don't do it anyway, since I don't see how it proves or accomplishes anyway.

We know you have a pathological hatred toward Israel. You don't need to go trawling through the internet to find quotes to demonstrate that.

Comment from... Salah, at May 3, 2007 03:24 AM:

We know you have a pathological hatred

You speak about yourself obviously no doubt about that just go after all your posts and read them carefully to discover what your character instead of paint others.

Israel a state no need to say what is the Stat of Israel, although it’s your lover but here behaviours in the region for the past 50+ tells more about what’s this state doing.
Unless State of Israel respect others in the region, treats them equally as a countries and as a nation without denying their total rights from a Holly land and their occupied land to have their advance technology and development in all field of life, then Israel will never gaining any sympathy or respects of dissent minded people.
When that happens?
Don’t bother to reply to this I will not read it.

My apologies to Helena, our friends for this out of topic, this is the last post in this regards.

Comment from... Salah, at May 3, 2007 03:59 AM:

An interview with Alison Weir of If Americans Knew. Producers: Paul Chek and John Odam (2006)

Is she also telling laies or she "have a pathological hatred?

Comment from... Helena, at May 3, 2007 09:11 AM:

Reminder: the topic here is:

"Hi-tech war 'toys'-- what are they good for?"

This is a really important topic, not least because it affects so much else that is happening in today's Middle East.

Until now, the voting publics in both the US and Israel (and perhaps also other countries-- including various oil-rich countries around the world?) have been seduced by the idea that possession of such ulttra-lethal gizmos can allow their nations to fight and win wars in ways that do NOT involve putting any significant numbers of their own side's soldiers in harm's way, or indeed keeping large numbers of their own side's young people in a battle-ready condition, at all. Another, ancillary "promise" of these weapons was that they would enable these nations to fight and win these wars in ways that reduced almost to zero the number of "other side" noncombatants who would be killed or wounded, thus allowing these wars to be considered to be extremely "humanitarian".

It turns out, though-- and Tira gives us some very helpful analysis on this-- that these promises are quite false. These high-tech gizmos do not guarantee that a military "victory" can be won in a way that puts very few of "our" soldiers at risk and that minimizes damage to noncombatants.

Indeed, we have also seen these lessons more than amply demonstrated by the four-year-long sequelae of Rumsfeld's military "experiments" with them in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Tira's piece, it seems to me, is an essential piece of evidence in any solidly convincing argument we want to build to the effect that "War is not the answer" to any of the world's ills.

(Back in the 1990s, remember, many members even of the international "human-rights" movement would energetically argue that things like "precision-guided [!] missiles" could allow for "clean" victories against Serbia and therefore make a military attack against Serbia seem like quite a "humanitarian" and effective response to Serbia's large-scale rights abuses in Kosovo...)

Anyway, let's keep this discussion on-topic from here on. As I said, it's an important topic.

Comment from... vadim, at May 3, 2007 10:29 AM:

He does provide a fairly strong critique of the claim that some have made to the effect that in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the US military's reliance on SFO's brought worthwhile results.

Tira's critique of the US' performance in Afghanistan is confined to Operation Anaconda. There he expressly notes the value of precision weapons used in combination with ground forces. Nowhere does he challenge that the results of that war as a whole have been worthwhile.

Comment from... Helena, at May 3, 2007 10:43 AM:

Thanks for the correction, Vadim. You're quite right. Tira specifically writes that in Anaconda it was the combination of SFOs and ground forces that allowed what he considered to be a successful battle there. My own evaluation of the results of Anaconda-- as I noted above-- was considerably less positive; and of the effectiveness of the broader US war effort in Afghanistan, more negative still.

So I was perhaps wrong to attribute to Tira the judgment that reliance on SFOs in Afghanistan had failed to bring worthwhile results-- though the idea of "reliance" on them (and thus, by implication, an exclusive reliance on them) is a key part of this whole discussion.

Where I agree with Tira is in his well-substantiated conclusion that exclusive reliance on SFOs cannot assuredly bring about achievable victories. Where I disagree with him is in the judgment that use of SFOs in conjunction with use of more traditional massed ground forces can bring achievable victories: he supports that judgment, while I for the reasons stated above don't. So I was wrong if I seemed to attribute to him concurrence in my judgment on that score, and in my judgment on the outcome to date of the broader US war effort in Afghanistan.

Comment from... vadim, at May 3, 2007 11:06 AM:

Thank you for the clarification Helena. But has the war in Afghanistan been exclusively a "US effort?" Although most of the troops there are from the US, 47 other countries are also represented, including Switzerland.

Re: "more negative still." I recognize that the military effort there hasn't yielded perfect results. But it would be hard to argue that unuseating the repressive Taliban government (with accompanying declines in child mortality, significant improvements in health care, nutrition, education etc) represents a "negative" compared to the status quo ante bellum.

Comment from... Helena, at May 4, 2007 10:41 AM:

My understanding is that there are at least two separate and very different non-Afghan campaigns being waged inside Afghanistan these days. One is an area-stabilization campaign being waged in some provinces by NATO's UN-sanctioned ISAF force (10,000-plus troops). The other is the much more free-wheeling and pugilistic campaign being waged in various areas by the US's 'Operation Enduring Freedom' force (= 17,000 US forces and 2,000 non-US.) Five-plus years after the US's invasion of Afghanistan vast areas of the country still remain mired in insecurity and deep conflict.

Yes, there have been some reported inmprovements since 2001 in such factors of wellbeing as the ones you mention, though the documentation on this is extremely spotty and the Taliban did manage to deliver some degree of basic services, including crucially a degree of public security (albeit on a highly gender-specific basis.)

The current situation in Afghanistan certainly cannot be described as a strategic success for the US and its allies-- or, for the human security of the Afghan people. As in Iraq, the rampant lack of public security threatens every aspect of the human security of the people in Afghanistan's many vast strife-riddled areas. See e.g. this very recent report on food insecurity (hunger) in the country... And this, remember, is after more than five years of the US-led regimen there.

Regarding future prospects, it is seriously doubtful whether there is anything the present configuration of foreign and national forces can do to help Afghanistan's people regain the broad public security they so desperately need. But already, if we draw up a balance-sheet on five-plus years of the US-dominated regime in the country, I think we'd have to say it has not delivered the kind of basic human services that a serious commitment to sociopolitical reconstruction of the country should have delivered by now. (As in, post-1945 Germany or Japan.... )

Would the better approach have been more US boots on the ground? Perhaps that would have been better than the present situation, though probably still not optimal. Having a much more solidly international commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan, and doing so without all those hi-tech, standoff weapons-based US strike forces rushing uncontrollably around the country, would have been better yet. Meanwhile, with or without a 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, relying on a combination of expert police work and finding effective ways to build the human security of the people of the Afghan-Pakistan border would surely have been a more effective way to incapacitate and then unroll the threat from Al-Qaeda, which was after all the prime "target" in 2001. But because of the Bushites' reliance on pugilism and hi-tech standoff weapons in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the threat from Al-Qaeda has not only remained active but has grown.

Comment from... JHM, at May 4, 2007 11:03 AM:

Dr. Cobban's post of 10:41 4 May seems to invite an "obvious" compromise position that I doubt she would actually much care for. In both Afganistan and Iraq one might conclude that high-tech whizbangs worked admirably to get rid of the ancien régime but were close to useless when it came to replacing it with anything else in particular.

"Creative destruction," yes. Real positive creation? Not much sign of that!

Comment from... Helena, at May 4, 2007 02:32 PM:

JHM, I actually do agree with the conclusion you state briefly there. In these two cases (but notably not in Lebanon last summer) the almost exclusive reliance on whizbangs did achieve the sought-for overthrow of the previously existing order. But the broader thrust of my argument is that, even when they achieve that, use of the whizbangs on their own cannot either bring about the installation of a stable and sustainable better order or guarantee the whizbangs' non-harming of noncombatants.

Meanwhile, since Hizbullah showed its forces (and leadership) capable of withstanding the whizbangs last summer, you can bet that numerous other states or parties that fear they might be a target of similar attacks in the future have taken good note. Actually, a close reading of Ron Tira's work provides a rather good summary of the lessons that can be learned by such actors.

Comment from... Randal, at May 4, 2007 05:10 PM:

"Until now, the voting publics in both the US and Israel (and perhaps also other countries-- including various oil-rich countries around the world?) have been seduced by the idea that possession of such ulttra-lethal gizmos can allow their nations to fight and win wars in ways that do NOT involve putting any significant numbers of their own side's soldiers in harm's way, or indeed keeping large numbers of their own side's young people in a battle-ready condition, at all. Another, ancillary "promise" of these weapons was that they would enable these nations to fight and win these wars in ways that reduced almost to zero the number of "other side" noncombatants who would be killed or wounded, thus allowing these wars to be considered to be extremely "humanitarian".

It turns out, though-- and Tira gives us some very helpful analysis on this-- that these promises are quite false. These high-tech gizmos do not guarantee that a military "victory" can be won in a way that puts very few of "our" soldiers at risk and that minimizes damage to noncombatants."

This is misleading, I think.

The "high tech gizmos" do, in fact, guarantee a relatively bloodless (for the owners of said gizmos) victory in the kind of wars most people actually think their "defence" budgets are for (ie actual defensive wars against military aggressors). Those are the occasions when success really matters. The problems Tira and Helena highlight stem primarily from the attempt to use them in wars of aggression such as Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. The argument that these systems can be useful in such circumstances (mainly in supposedly reducing collateral damage through "precision targeting") was always only ever a "bolt on" addition to their advocates' sales pitch, in response to US and Israeli military dominance and the consequential absence of any credible threat to maintain the political momentum for the purchase of the systems in question.

The reason these systems are not so useful in wars of aggression as they are in defensive wars is that in the latter case, destruction of the enemy's offensive military capability is sufficient to achieve success. That is not the case with the former. (By offensive military capability I do not include the kind of trivial harassment represented by Hezbollah's Katyusha etc attacks on Israel during the recent attack on Lebanon. I mean actual existential threats, or substantive threats to the territorial integrity of the target nation.)

Comment from... Dominic, at May 5, 2007 01:36 AM:

The high-tech weapons are for "third-worlding".

Let me explain what I mean with an example.

During the criminal Israeli aggression against Lebanon last year, a large dairy products business was destroyed. The account I read framed this act as "collateral", but the owners were, as I recall, convinced that it was a deliberate act designed to remove them from the market they had developed, leaving it open now or in the future, to takeover by Israeli or US capital.

You "third world" a country by destroying its growth points. This selective activity is what the high-tech or "smart" weapons are designed to do. It is war a la carte. The capitalists of Nation A can even line up beforehand to specify which plants in Nation B they want destroyed.

From the capitalist point of view, this is a great advance on the "neutron bomb" theory of warfare, where the people are killed and the fixed assets are left standing.

Real capitalists know that fixed assets don't make money by themselves, and are relatively easily replaced. In fact they frequently need replacing, anyway. Capital needs labour more than fixed assets - in the form of impoverished people who are compelled to sell their work potential daily so as to be able to buy food, at least, with cash.

Hence it is a much better plan for capitalists to destroy other peoples' equipment, with weapons designed for that purpose, while leaving the people "third-worlded", i.e. in a proletarian condition ready to be exploited as labour (and as market for goods, of course).

(This process would be accelerated if, for example, there was an extensive campaign of assasination and exiling of intellectuals. And, for example, if peasants' fields were sown with cluster bombs.)

These weapons are designed to do what Imperialists have done before, as in India and in Africa. One could say they can't help themselves. Imperialism stands or falls on its ability to create a great gulf of difference between the metropolis and the periphery. All talk by Imperialists of global "development" is worse than hypocrisy. It is plain lies. The existence of these kinds of weapons is part of the proof of that lie.

In Africa, we will never forget the Khartoum medicine factory that Clinton hit with a cruise missile.

Comment from... JHM, at May 6, 2007 12:31 AM:

Meanwhile, since Hizbullah showed its forces (and leadership) capable of withstanding the whizbangs last summer, you can bet that numerous other states or parties that fear they might be a target of similar attacks in the future have taken good note.

Well, maybe we DO more or less agree, then, HC and I?

Let's put it to the test: the broadest geopolitical moral I have drawn from most of the recent troubles is that whoever stands strictly -- VERY strictly, all preëmptive self-serving neo-nonsenses excluded -- on the defensive nowadays becomes almost inexpugnable.

That provisional rule of thumb means Hizballáh is safe enough (for the moment) in south Lebanon, yet it also means that Israel is safe enough (for the moment) in the Levant.


Comment from... Helena, at May 6, 2007 04:35 PM:

Dominic, good point. I think what you call 'third-worlding' is what Sarah Roi and others call 'de-development'. There are many ways of achieving de-development, of course. In the OPTs, Israel has used a combination of hi-tech direct physical assaults (especially in the spring of 2202) and lower-tech, longterm development-strangulation measures...


JHM, I think your conclusion is right, up to a point. If you recall, in my Boston Review article on the 33-day war I said that at the end of it both sides had succeeded in restoring the battlefield deterrence against the other that the outbreak and general course of the war up till then demonstrated had been lost. (And therefore, as I noted there, the ceasefire has a degree of structural robustness regardless of the size of deployment of UN peacekeeping forces.... That forecast has been borne out.)

However, at a broader level, most Israeli strategic planners right now feel that the course of last summer's war left their ability to project a credible 'big' strategic deterrence had been badly dented. For me, that's a source of concern. Might it motivate them to launch an additional, very demostrative 'big' strike someplace in an attempt to restore the credibility of their strategic deterrent capability?

I note that they had similar worries and concerns after the Egyptians and Syrians proved themselves undeterred from launching the 1973 war... But in the period after 1973 there was (and this was no accident) a very intensive effort by the US to regain strategic stability in the region by other means-- i.e., by undertaking some very serious peace diplomacy between Egypt and Israel... and that forestalled any Israeli attempt to launch a demonstrative further military action until the 1978 invasion of Lebanon... This time, there is no peace diplomacy worthy of the name.

Comment from... Dominic, at May 7, 2007 12:57 AM:

For some of us this question will always remind us of the 1973 publication of "How Europe Underdeveloped Africa" by the Dar-es-Salaam intellectual Walter Rodney.

Rodney was later murdered in his native Guyana. The book is available in full on the Interent at www.marxists.org

A typical Israeli example in the OPT was the destruction of the Gaza power station last year.

The long sanctions against Iraq coupled with air strikes and no-fly zones are another.

It is a vile kind of policy that has its direct harvest of misery, disease and death.

Even South Africa has been significantly "underdeveloped" or "de-developed" since 1990.

Comment from... JHM, at May 7, 2007 04:37 AM:

HC: [A]t a broader level, most Israeli strategic planners right now feel that the course of last summer's war left their ability to project a credible 'big' strategic deterrence had been badly dented. For me, that's a source of concern. Might it motivate them to launch an additional, very demostrative 'big' strike someplace in an attempt to restore the credibility of their strategic deterrent capability?

I was not thinking of deterrence or retaliation when I suggested that nowadays anybody who is STRICTLY on the defensive is likely to do better than an aggressor, only of the cases where really fighting has actually happened. (Prëemptive retaliation, though, is only aggression accompanied by a certain type of press releases.)

"Big strategic deterrence" sounds like an Israeli scheme directed at Iran, and my generalization would apply to that case, I think, to the extent that it would almost certainly make the existing government politically stronger, even if nukeless. The exact application, though, would be if somebody was foolish enough to try to march to Tehran and change the régime. (Speaking of which, is it just my imagination, or is Gen. Petraeus really trying to tone down the anti-Safavid stuff from our other generals and colonels at Baghdad and from the Administration chickenhawks? Maybe he really is smarter than most of 'em? -- although I'd have thought any West Pointer could see that their Iraq caper ought to be concluded before starting another one with all those troops out there for the Iranians to strike back at.)

In a different paper, Tira wrote

Maintaining the ability to handle the full spectrum of potential threats requires a force buildup and an operational concept based on the ability to engage in an all-out war in Syria, a war against Hizbollah, and a war on the Palestinian front, while maintaining strong strategic reserves in the case of escalation on another front. At the same time, this also requires deterring Iran and, if the deterrence fails, achieving a clear advantage in exchanging blows with Iran and creating a strategic balance with Iran in low-medium intensity conflicts. The timetable until the next war may be short and thus it is incumbent on Israel to act rapidly, diligently, and thoroughly while increasing the defense budget by billions of shekels.

It looks as if he thinks of deterrence only in connection with Iran (where there is no common border), with Hamás and Hizballáh and Damascus falling in some different category.

I don't know enough about the Palestine situation to judge whether such views are typical in Tira's circles, or enough about military science to judge whether they are sound. The man does sound pretty alarming, though, especially the scrap that I emphasized. I doubt he'd be happy to find himself cited in somebody else's argument maintaining that war doesn't work in general, or even only that high-tech war usually doesn't.


Comment from... Joshua, at May 7, 2007 10:33 AM:

The main problem with Dominic's and Helena's analysis of "de-development" is that it is unsupported by fact. When Israel first occupied the territories, it built infrastructure, opened universities, which led to DEVELOPMENT of the Palestinian economy. Palestinians who were completely unable to come into Israel before were allowed to come in and work. And Israelis, including settlers, frequented Palestinian businesses in the territory, allowing for further development.

We previously went over some of these figures. Of course, Helena deleted many of the posts because she didn't like being factually contradicted.

The same thing happened in Lebanon. From 1977 to 2000, residents of Southern Lebanon, particularly the Maronite Christians who were friendly with Israel, made use of the "Good Fence" to obtain employment and export goods through Haifa.

The stunning decline in the occupied territories and in Lebanon is not so much a result of "Israeli occupation" but a result of renewed hostilities. The re-igniting of the intifada, the expulsion of the Jewish community of Gaza, and the building of the separation barrier to prevent terrorist infiltration into Israel have all wrecked the Palestinian economy.

But this is not due to an attempt to "third-worldize" or "de-develop" Palestine. Israel actually WANTS better economic relations with the Palestinians. And despite the rockets, the suicide bombs, the election of Hamas, Israelis still remarkably try to create such ties at the micro and macro level.

For example: A group of Israeli and Palestinian entrepeneurs, despite the conflict, are working to develop a "virtual operating system" which could revolutionize the industry.

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3395852,00.html

And on a government level, despite the hostilities, Israel recently agreed to purchase natural gas from companies operating in the Palestinian Authority, which PNA has a stake in.

http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/DocView.asp?did=1000209059&fid=1725

Israel does not want to de-develop anyone. Just the opposite. By creating economic ties and cooperation between the countries, you make the conditions for peace possible.

But with groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah waging war on Israel, such cooperation becomes less possible. Sadly, the Palestinians are the larger losers in such a conflict.

Comment from... Dominic, at May 7, 2007 12:37 PM:

Joshua, what you do used to be called "apologetics" when I was at school.

Now, this thread is about standoff bombs and what they are for. The destruction of the Lebanese dairy plant and the Gaza power station have been led in evidence.

In response you write something resembling a general induction pamphlet for new arrivals to Israel from New York. The kind that the dissillusioned will later look ruefully back upon.

You're not doing yourself any favours thereby. So hhow about trying to redeem yourself with an honest admission of what these weapons are used for?

Let me put it this way: Armed bulldozers are for knocking down family homes, right? Likewise, standoff bombs are for destroying factories and infrastructure. Simple. Admit it or try to deny it, or just keep quiet. But please don't keep evading. A standoff bore is not as bad as a standoff bomb, but who needs it?

Comment from... vadim, at May 7, 2007 01:23 PM:

Dominic, Hezbollah's arsenal of missiles are also stand-off weapons unlikely to accomplish any tactical objective but harassment of Israel and the promotion of further conflict. Whereas Joshua hasn't uttered a word in defence of bulldozers. Instead of trying to bully us with pedantic sneering, how about an honest admission that Hezbollah has no business possessing, much less using their own lethal "toys"?

Comment from... vadim, at May 7, 2007 01:31 PM:

Oh wait -- I forgot: "Israel is a settler colony. It has no right to exist."

And yet Dominic sees himself on the side of peace... what a joke!

Comment from... Dominic, at May 7, 2007 02:04 PM:

Pardon me, Vadim: Your snarl is showing.

Comment from... Joshua, at May 7, 2007 02:15 PM:

Dominic, you are the one who decided to divert the discussion with marxist claptrap of de-development. Whatever one feels about Israel's response to Hezbollah's unprovoked aggression, to claim that Israel decided to target businesses because they were economic competition for Israeli capital is, to be euphemistic, farfetched.

I do understand why Israel bashing, previously the province of the far right, has gained currency in a fringe of leftist thought as well. There's a lot of resentment toward Israel because it was the one national liberation movement of the 20th century that actually not only to political emancipation, but a remarkable increase in prosperity. This is totally foreign to some people, who prefer to wail about the ills of the after-effects of oppression. Israel is a counter-example that belies much of the argument.

So one has to instead falsely present Zionism not as the national liberation that it was, but instead import labels like colonialism. It makes for a truely Orwellian display, Dominic.

As Vadim quite accurately points out, you are at least candid in your admission that you refuse to accept Israel's right to exist, and support violent resistance toward it's elimination. You are the only one who has defended violence and a refusal to make peace with the other side. But that's just more newspeak from Dominic. Typical.

Comment from... Dominic, at May 7, 2007 02:38 PM:

Candid newspeak? That's actually quite good, Josh.

Comment from... Joshua, at May 7, 2007 03:07 PM:

Dominic,

You are candid in your call for the destruction of Israel.

Your attempt to phrase it in progressive or pro-peace terms is what is newspeak.

Comment from... Dominic, at May 7, 2007 03:39 PM:

Oh. I see.

Comment from... vadim, at May 7, 2007 05:27 PM:

http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief006-10.htm#link15

Let's see:

Number of rockets fired: 4228
Number of military targets: zero
Acres of land recovered: zero
captive soldiers recovered: zero
"installation of a stable and sustainable better order" er- no
"destruction of the enemy's offensive military capability?" none
"bloodlessness to gizmo-owners?" er-hardly
glories victories alleged: one

With stats like these, who'd see Hezbollah's war of choice -initiated with a cross border raid and missile attack- as anything but a glorious victory? I'm sure they're eager to repeat the experience. Maybe our own armchair guerrillas can goad them into it.

Comment from... salah, at May 7, 2007 06:22 PM:

"who'd see Hezbollah's war of choice"

Vadim, I hared this story I don’t know how much truth in it, but we see something from it about " Hezbollah's war of choice"?

In the end of the trial of Mao Tsi Tung's wife, while the judge reading the sentence, Mao's wife laughed loudly! Then the judge asked her why she laughing?

She replayed to him by saying: you executed the dog's mouth not the dog!!!

Comment from... kdj, at May 7, 2007 09:36 PM:

Not sure where to put this-Perhaps a section on Gaza on JWN? It is tragic that Daoud Kattab's call for peacekeeping in Gaza (at the suggestion of the Italians) was never implemented-This article from the BBC does not do justice to the radical cultural terrorism which hit Gaza last evening-
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6632383.stm

Comment from... Salah, at May 8, 2007 03:47 AM:

Joshua,
Israel does not want to de-develop anyone. Just the opposite. By creating economic ties and cooperation between the countries, you make the conditions for peace possible.

In my childhood I have suffered fear, hunger and humiliation when I passed from the Warsaw Ghetto, through labour camps, to Buchenwald. Today, as a citizen of Israel, I cannot accept the systematic destruction of cities, towns and refugee camps. I cannot accept the technocratic cruelty of the bombing, destroying and killing of human beings.
I hear too many familiar sounds today, sounds which are being amplified by the war. I hear “dirty Arabs” and I remember

“dirty Jews”. I hear about “closed areas” and I remember ghettos and camps. I hear “two-legged beasts” and I remember “Untermenschen” (subhumans). I hear about tightening the siege, clearing the area, pounding the city into submission and I remember suffering, destruction, death, blood and murder ... Too many things in Israel remind me of too many things from my childhood.

These words are from a letter written by Dr Shlomo Shmelzman, a survivor of the Holocaust, to the press in Israel announcing his courageous hunger strike at the height of the bombing of West Beirut in Lebanon in August 1982

Comment from... Helena, at May 8, 2007 09:57 AM:

You do have to admit, though, that Joshua's argument above that seeks to prove that Israel did not 'de-develop' the occupied territories or occupied southern Lebanon is truly hilarious in the form it takes and the unexamined assumptions he builds it on. Basically, it takes as a given that prior to Israel's occupation of these areas there was zero significant economic or intellectual activity, and that it was only after the enlightened Israelis came to rule over them that the people there could find jobs and markets...

Well, it would be a hilarious revelation of Joshua's own deep ignorance of the societies concerned in their pre-occupation eras (and of the way that colonial societies always systematically try to build the indigenes' deep dependence on the colonizers' economies, including by destroying indigenous economic capabilities)-- it would be hilarious, were it not for the fact that the kinds of arguments he makes there do have some continuing credibility amongst many Americans...

As for the Palestinian universities: yes they are valuable institutions. But many Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank had access to fine universities before 1967-- in Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, and elsewhere. Also, the Palestinians had to fight every step of the way to establish such places as Bir Zeit, Beit Laham University, Gaza Islamic, U., etc. It wasn't done through any "grace and favor" from the occupying power-- let alone any financial subsidies (such as have, of course, been shoveled very generously into all of Israel's own institutions of higher education including the ones now being established inside the settlements.)

Then, there's the question of what the graduates of the Palestinian universities do when they graduate? Where are the bustling economic or cultural projects for them to work in?

The comparison to keep in mind is what these still-occupied communities would have looked like today if there had NOT been any 40-year period of living under the Israeli military yoke. I wager Gaza might have looked very much like Cairo, and the West Bank like Amman. Or perhaps, in both cases, quite a bit better given the Palestinians' higher levels of educational attainment.

Instead of which...

Joshua, do you have much knowledge of the state of Palestinian society and south Lebanese society prior to them coming under their respective bouts of Israeli occupation? Or of the degree of economic and social development Egypt and Jordan have experienced in the past 40 years? Do tell us about your familiarity with such matters.

Comment from... Joshua, at May 8, 2007 10:16 AM:

Sure Helena, I have never professed specific professional training, which is the same thing that can be said for just about everyone else in the conversation. But the subject is one that I have followed quite a bit as a layman. Enough that I can point out some of the more egregious factual errors and assumptions of someone like yourself, who purports to be an expert.

We went over this around a year or so ago. Myself and other participants went over several statistics which showed that all major economic indicators, as well as indicators of well-being such as literacy, infant mortality, and the like, improved after 1967.

Another thing which is quite objectionable is your remarkable misstatement of my post (you have a tendency to create a lot of straw men, it's a pretty shamful tactc). I never said that there was no economic or intellectual activity. But I did say that once Israel occupied the territories, these indicators improved. Whether or not Israel was "generous" in allowing Bir Zeit University to open is besides the point. The fact is that Israel DID allow it to open, while Egypt and Jordan did not allow ANY universities (other than teacher's colleges) to open during their much more brutal occupation of those territories.

Given that Palestinian economic and educational developments proceeded better than that in other Arab countries, I think your claim that the Israelis "de-developed" the territories makes no sense (in any event, "de-development" implies removal, and even if development wasn't as swift as it was in other countries, it clearly was not "de-developed.").

Helena, I know you are uncomfortable when someone does not share your vindictiveness and hatred toward Israel, and does not share your patronizing Great White Mother attitude toward the Palestinians. Nevertheless that is no excuse for you to fail to acknowledge when the facts simply don't support your broad overgeneralizations. Instead you try to attack me by asking whether I have any expertise. Meanwhile, there are several posters who routinely delve into off topic and counter-factual posts, but that's ok so long as they are deranged rants about Israel.

In any event, if you want to insist that, after 1967, economic and other indicators actually decreased in the territories, I'd love to see the evidence. But if you can't do that, then I really do not need patronizing and condescending lectures from you.

Comment from... Warren, at May 13, 2007 12:24 AM:

Joshua said: "Helena, I know you are uncomfortable when someone does not share your vindictiveness and hatred toward Israel, and does not share your patronizing Great White Mother attitude toward the Palestinians."

I find the sort of cheap, groundless psychologizing embodied in the above statement endlessly entertaining. This statement is both petulant, and like cases of psychological projection generally, bereft of any empirical grounding. Since I recently found this web-site, I have to admit that I'm perversely impressed by Joshua's tenacity in attempting to derail the substantive flow of discussion on these threads. Your (undoubtedly weary) tolerance, Helena, for such a clear obstructor of rational discourse is truly laudable.

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