Why I welcome the ISG report
The ISG report, released yesterday, did not urge two of the key steps that I consider essential if the US is to be able to undertake a troop withdrawal from Iraq that is orderly, speedy, total, and generous. It did not urge that President Bush publicly specify a deadline or timetable for the completion of the US withdrawal. And it did not urge giving the key role in sponsoring the diplomacy required to allow this withdrawal to the U.N.... However what it did recommend was a quantum-leap improvement over the policies still being publicly stated by the President (and also, over what many of the congressional democrats have been advocating.)
I consider it extremely important that this document, endorsed unanimously by this high-level, bipartisan group, came out openly and made statements as forthright (and true) as the following:
"The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path that can guarantee success... Violence [in Iraq] is increasing in scope and lethality."(xiii)The ISG report is not perfect. But in understanding its imperfections (as well as its achievements) it's important to understand what it is, and what it is not. What it is, is primarily a very high-level and serious intervention inside US politics. From that point of view, it is barely "about" Iraq at all. It is much more "about" this group of senior statespeople trying to grab hold of the wheel of the ship of (the American) state and slowly drag this lumbering great vessel away from a course that has been-- and still is, to this day-- most evidently headed towards a disaster. A disaster for all the parties concerned: Americans, Iraqis, the neighbors of Iraq... And though I completely understand that it has always been the Iraqis who have suffered the most from the terrible consequences of the actions undertaken inside their country by the US military, still, at this point it is the US government that has the greatest capability to affect the course of events inside Iraq; so if we want to stop the terrible bloodletting there the first thing we (US citizens and others) need to do is do everything in our capacity to change the policies that have until been blindly pursued by the Bush administration.
"If current trends continue, the potential consequences are severe" (ix)
"If the situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences could be severe. A slide toward chaos could trigger the collapse of Iraq’s government and a humanitarian catastrophe. Neighboring countries could intervene. Sunni-Shia clashes could spread. Al Qaeda could win a propaganda victory and expand its base of operations." (xiv)
"Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the United States should try to engage them constructively."(xv)
"The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East unless it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and regional instability. There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab- Israeli peace on all fronts."(xv)
"Current U.S. policy is not working, as the level of violence in Iraq is rising and the government is not advancing national reconciliation. Making no changes in policy would simply delay the day of reckoning at a high cost."(p.38)
Of course, if we had anything like a robust parliamentary system here in the US, or at the very least a functioning multi-party system, then we could have expected the kinds of recommendation now being made by the ISG to have been advocated very forcefully throughout the past 18 months or more by the opposition party. But we don't. We have had-- and still, until the inauguration of the new Congress will continue to have-- a completely sclerotic and dysfunctional one-party system. And what's more, even once the Democrats come in as the majority party in both Houses of Congress on January 1, we can know that they won't be much better than the Republicans on such key aspects of the policy towards Iraq as the need for diplomacy with powers like Iran and Syria; the need for urgent, even-handed engagement in Israeli-Arab peacemaking; or even on troop levels, etc... So this is what we have had instead: a high-level, "senior statespeoples' group" convened back in March at the initiative of a generally quiet Republican Conghressman from Northern Virginia called Frank Wolf, who had been shocked by what he saw in Iraq when he made his third post-invasion visit to the country in September 2005.
For my part, of course I'm disappointed that the ISG didn't go that important bit further and endorse both a much stronger role for the UN, and the announcement of a fixed timetable for the US troop withdrawal from Iraq.
Interestingly, this report in today's WaPo tells us that the most serious threat to the unanimity that marked the group's final position came precisely over the deadline issue. The WaPo reporters cite unnamed "insiders" as saying that ISG member Bill Perry-- a Clinton-era Defense Secretary-- had threatened not to sign off on the final document unless it specified such a deadline. But--
Former secretary of state James A. Baker III resisted a firm date, wanting to leave that to the president.So yes, I'm a bit disappointed. But the much larger point here is that the ISG has spelled out clearly that there is no possibility of a military "victory" in Iraq, and that the US's continued engagement there is inflicting serious, continuing damage on our citizenry's interests. (This is, of course, the classic definition of a "quagmire".) Therefore, they rightly conclude that the administration has to find a way to get the US troops out of the quagmire that Iraq has become. And as cool realists capable of reading and understanding maps (which perhaps our president is not), they all understand quite fully that no such withdrawal can be contemplated without also having a plan to win the approval of major Iraqi neighbors as Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Saudi Arabia to the withdrawal plan."I'm not going to sign anything that is going to paper over the problem," Perry said.
"Well, if that's the case, that's the case," Baker replied.
In the end, though, Baker and Perry walked off together to settle their differences rather than let them split the commission. With suggestions from other members, they crafted careful language that they both could support, a recommendation to pull out nearly all U.S. combat units by early 2008 -- a goal, not a timetable, but a date nonetheless.
Hence the need for negotiations...
The word "negotiate" is crucial there, and it frames the entire way this report is constructed. Namely, that being the (Clausewitz-informed) realists that most of these people are, they recognize that you have to get the broad political approach defined first; and only subsequently, within the parameters established through the necessary political negotiations at both the regional and the intra-Iraqi levels, can you even start to define things like the military "mission", orthe strategies or tactics to be pursued by the US forces.
Part I of the report presents the group's "Assessment", most of which covers the situation inside Iraq. Part II then presents "The Way Forward-- A New Approach", and at this point the emphasis shifts significantly. Here, the first subsection is the one on "The External Approach: Building an International Consensus", and only after that is there a subsection on "The Internal Approach: Helpiong Iraqis Help Themselves".
The no fewer than 79 policy recommendations that are incorporated into Part II are also presented in that same order... And helpfully so, in my view. Starting right here:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The United States, working with the Iraqi government, should launch the comprehensive New Diplomatic Offensive to deal with the problems of Iraq and of the region. This new diplomatic offensive should be launched before December 31, 2006.Note the extremely speedy timeline urged there. I suppose that is neither accidental nor merely hortatory. I imagine that this upcoming December 31 was chosen-- and indeed, that the ISG worked so quickly to get its report out so soon after the November elections-- precisely because there are things it is urging the administration to do that its members know will be a lot harder to do once there is a functioning (and Democratic-led) Congress at work in the country... Such as, open up negotiations on the Iraq issue with both Iran and Syria, and activate a speedy and serious, land-for-peace-based Israeli-Arab peace negotiation.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The goals of the diplomatic offensive as it relates to regional players should be to:
i. Support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq.
ii. Stop destabilizing interventions and actions by Iraq’s neighbors.
iii. Secure Iraq’s borders, including the use of joint patrols with neighboring countries.
iv. Prevent the expansion of the instability and conflict beyond Iraq’s borders...
Here are the relevant Recommendations:
RECOMMENDATION 4: As an instrument of the New Diplomatic Offensive, an Iraq International Support Group should be organized immediately following the launch of the New Diplomatic Offensive.The speedy timing the report recommends for this ground-breaking overture to Iran recalls the high-level intiative George Shultz undertook on the PLO-recognition front, when he was Secretary of State in President Reagan's completely lame-duck administration in Novermber-December 1988. Shultz executed a bit of very rapid and fancy deiplomacy in that post-election period, with the goal basically of doing what everyone recognized the US needed to do-- that is, open up some form of explicit diplomatic channel with the PLO, then in Tunis-- but which everyone also knew would be difficult to do once a Congress made up of people weighed down with campaign promises made to well-muscled pro-Israel donors had come into session...
RECOMMENDATION 5: The Support Group should consist of Iraq and all the states bordering Iraq, including Iran and Syria; the key regional states, including Egypt and the Gulf States; the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council; the European Union; and, of course, Iraq itself. Other countries—for instance, Germany, Japan and South Korea—that might be willing to contribute to resolving political, diplomatic, and security problems affecting Iraq could also become members.
RECOMMENDATION 6: The New Diplomatic Offensive and the work of the Support Group should be carried out with urgency, and should be conducted by and organized at the level of foreign minister or above. The Secretary of State, if not the President, should lead the U.S. effort. That effort should be both bilateral and multilateral, as circumstances require.
...
RECOMMENDATION 9: Under the aegis of the New Diplomatic Offensive and the Support Group, the United States should engage directly with Iran and Syria in order to try to obtain their commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq and other regional issues. In engaging Syria and Iran, the United States should consider incentives, as well as disincentives, in seeking constructive results.
RECOMMENDATION 10: The issue of Iran’s nuclear programs should continue to be dealt with by the United Nations Security Council and its five permanent members ... plus Germany.
And then, we have this (p.54-56) on Israeli-Arab peacemaking:
The United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the Middle East unless the United States deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict...Only after undertaking this regionwide tour d'horizon-- and also making a quick side-visit to Afghanistan--does the recommendations list start getting into some issues more directly connected with Iraq:
The United States does its ally Israel no favors in avoiding direct involvement to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. For several reasons, we should act boldly:
• There is no military solution to this conflict.
• The vast majority of the Israeli body politic is tired of being a nation perpetually at war.
• No American administration—Democratic or Republican—will ever abandon Israel.
• Political engagement and dialogue are essential in the Arab-Israeli dispute because it is an axiom that when the political process breaks down there will be violence on the ground.
• The only basis on which peace can be achieved is that set forth in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and in the principle of “land for peace.”
• The only lasting and secure peace will be a negotiated peace such as Israel has achieved with Egypt and Jordan.
This effort would strongly support moderate Arab governments in the region, especially the democratically elected government of Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority under President Mahmoud Abbas.
RECOMMENDATION 13: There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon and Syria, and President Bush’s June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine.
RECOMMENDATION 14: This effort should include—as soon as possible—the unconditional calling and holding of meetings, under the auspices of the United States or the Quartet (i.e., the United States, Russia, European Union, and the United Nations), between Israel and Lebanon and Syria on the one hand, and Israel and Palestinians (who acknowledge Israel’s right to exist) on the other. The purpose of these meetings would be to negotiate peace as was done at the Madrid Conference in 1991, and on two separate tracks—one Syrian/Lebanese, and the other Palestinian.
RECOMMENDATION 19: The President and the leadership of his national security team should remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership. These contacts must convey a clear message: there must be action by the Iraqi government to make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones...(So I guess #25 was how Bill Perry's issue of the "timetable" finally got finessed.)
...
RECOMMENDATION 21: If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.
RECOMMENDATION 22: The President should state that the United States does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq. If the Iraqi government were to request a temporary base or bases, then the U.S. government could consider that request as it would in the case of any other government.
RECOMMENDATION 23: The President should restate that the United States does not seek to control Iraq’s oil.
RECOMMENDATION 24: The contemplated completion dates of the end of 2006 or early 2007 for some milestones may not be realistic. These should be completed by the first quarter of 2007.
RECOMMENDATION 25: These milestones are a good start. The United States should consult closely with the Iraqi government and develop additional milestones in three areas: national reconciliation, security, and improving government services affecting the daily lives of Iraqis. As with the current milestones, these additional milestones should be tied to calendar dates to the fullest extent possible.
Anyway, in that clutch of Iraq-related recommendations there are some excellent points (22 and 23) and some not so good ones-- in general, the kind of hectoring way many of them refer to the Iraqis...
Then, recommendations 26-39 deal with steps that, respectviely, the Iraqi government and the US government need to take to enhance "national reconciliation" inside Iraq. All of which, as I've said before, I consider to be none of the US government's damn' business, though I recognize that the desire to help to do something in this regard may be very well-motivated.
And then, as I judge to be quite appropriate, it is only subsequently, on p.70, that the report comes to considering "A Military Strategy for Iraq." I want to reproduce just a portion of the text from this section (pp.72-75):
... By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on theWell, I truly don't believe that any of the "save-face" military "missions" that have been suggested for the US troops currently deployed in Iraq will do any good, or make either Iraqis or the US service members themselves any safer. In particular, the idea of embedding additional large numbers of US troops even more widely inside Iraq's chronically troubled security forces merely increases the dispersion of US troops in a dangerous way and will put many thousands of them into an imminent risk of being fragged by their Iraqi advisees. I truly don't think it's about to happen.
ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. Even after the United States has moved all combat brigades out of Iraq, we would maintain a considerable military presence in the region, with our still significant force in Iraq and with our powerful air, ground, and naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, as well as an increased presence in Afghanistan. These forces would be sufficiently robust to permit the United States, working with the Iraqi government, to accomplish four missions:
• Provide political reassurance to the Iraqi government in order to avoid its collapse and the disintegration of the country.
• Fight al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Iraq using special operations teams.
• Train, equip, and support the Iraqi security forces.
• Deter even more destructive interference in Iraq by Syria and Iran.
Because of the importance of Iraq to our regional security goals and to our ongoing fight against al Qaeda, we considered proposals to make a substantial increase (100,000 to 200,000) in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. We rejected this course because we do not believe that the needed levels are available for a sustained deployment. Further, adding more American troops could conceivably worsen those aspects of the security problem that are fed by the view that the U.S. presence is intended to be a long-term “occupation.” We could, however, support a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and equipping mission, if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be effective.
We also rejected the immediate withdrawal of our troops, because we believe that so much is at stake. [HC note: I find this "reason" to be worryingly unspecific. The broad judgment expressed could change under many imaginable circumstances, though given the size of the troop deployment no withdrawal could ever be "immediate."]
We believe that our recommended actions will give the Iraqi Army the support it needs to have a reasonable chance to take responsibility for Iraq’s security. Given the ongoing deterioration in the security situation, it is urgent to move as quickly as possible to have that security role taken over by Iraqi security forces.
The United States should not make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq for three compelling reasons.
First, and most importantly, the United States faces other security dangers in the world, and a continuing Iraqi commitment of American ground forces at present levels will leave no reserve available to meet other contingencies. On September 7, 2006, General James Jones, our NATO commander, called for more troops in Afghanistan, where U.S. and NATO forces are fighting a resurgence of al Qaeda and Taliban forces. The United States should respond positively to that request, and be prepared for other security contingencies, including those in Iran and North Korea.
Second, the long-term commitment of American ground forces to Iraq at current levels is adversely affecting Army readiness, with less than a third of the Army units currently at high readiness levels. The Army is unlikely to be able to meet the next rotation of troops in Iraq without undesirable changes in its deployment practices. The Army is now considering breaking its compact with the National Guard and Reserves that limits the number of years that these citizen-soldiers can be deployed. Behind this short-term strain is the longer-term risk that the ground forces will be impaired in ways that will take years to reverse.
And finally, an open-ended commitment of American forces would not provide the Iraqi government the incentive it needs to take the political actions that give Iraq the best chance of quelling sectarian violence. In the absence of such an incentive, the Iraqi government might continue to delay taking those difficult actions.
While it is clear that the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq is moderating the violence [HC note: it is??? oh well, I suppose they have to continue to propagate the fiction that what the US troops now in Iraq are dying for is, in some sense, doing some good in the world...], there is little evidence that the longterm deployment of U.S. troops by itself has led or will lead to fundamental improvements in the security situation. It is important to recognize that there are no risk-free alternatives available to the United States at this time. Reducing our combat troop commitments in Iraq, whenever that occurs, undeniably creates risks, but leaving those forces tied down in Iraq indefinitely creates its own set of security risks.
RECOMMENDATION 40: The United States should not make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 41: The United States must make it clear to the Iraqi government that the United States could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments [HC note: the codeword, of course, for withdrawals], even if Iraq does not implement its planned changes. America’s other security needs and the future of our military cannot be made hostage to the actions or inactions of the Iraqi government.
RECOMMENDATION 42: We should seek to complete the training and equipping mission by the first quarter of 2008, as stated by General George Casey on October 24, 2006.
RECOMMENDATION 43: Military priorities in Iraq must change, with the highest priority given to the training, equipping, advising, and support mission and to counterterrorism operations.
(I see that Juan Cole is, for some reason, eager to point out to us how closely the recommendations of the ISG track with the general tenor of the "10-point plan" that he had proposed for the US troop deployment in Iraq back in August 2005. Here was the response I made to Cole's plan at the time. Headline: "Cole: Too little, too late, too militaristic." In his post today, Cole seems to think that his plan would still be a good one-- though of course we are now 16 months of terrible catastrophe inside Iraq further on at this point... However, where the ISG report distinguishes itself from Juan's plan is in the strong and quite necessary priority it gives to politics and diplomacy.)
... And then, as the ISG's list of recommendations gets longer and longer, it gets further and further into making micromanaging suggestions as to how Iraqis should run every aspect of their own national administration. Toward the end, I was expecting a recommendation regarding the size of library cards in Najaf municipal branch libraries, although I never did find one... I guess what I am trying to say is that I judge most of those lower-down recommendations to be basically unrealizable dross, inserted as window-dressing to make some attempt to show that the ISG members do indeed care about good-governance issues inside Iraq-- even though they have quite evidently given up on the Prez's broad "democratization" theme, and though they know, too, that neither the US government nor the Iraqi "government" any longer has any levers of power to implement these good-governance measures inside Iraq. So I really don't take them very seriously. (Also, I repeat: most of these matters are no damn business of the US of A.)
The politics that are truly central to this report are not the internal politics of Iraq, but the internal politics of the United States. The first big question is, of course, "Will the President adopt this whole set of recommendations?" ISG co-chairs Jim Baker and Lee Hamilton have tried to stress that, in their view, the recommendations come as a single package. Some White House flacks have said something to the effect that the Prez will "give them due consideration-- along with the recommendations coming out of the other internal reviews being made by various bodies and groups within the administration." But that really isn't the point. The ISG is not merely yet another internal administration review. It's an attempt by this high-level group to make the national discussion over Iraq much broader, and much deeper. And essentially, to try to get the decision-making taken out of the hands of completely incompetent and now dysfunctional administration.
The fact that former ISG member (and long-time Jim Baker ally) Bob Gates has now been confirmed as Secretary of Defense and will shortly take over at the Pentagon from Rumsfeld makes it much more likely that the ISG's recommendations will get the most authoritative consideration possible within the cabinet.
Over on his blog on WaPo.com at noon today, Dan Froomkin wrote the following about the reaction to the report from the President and his friends:
And to finish off here, the always scary question of 'Plan B.' The main reaction that strategic analyst Tony Cordesman had to the report was to criticize it for not having any military fallback position ('Plan B'). I think he misses the point. There really is only one Plan B at this point, and everyone knows it. It would be some mixture of shuttling everyone off the US Embassy roof in helicopters and a massive and disorderly Dunkirk. But even if you want to organize an emergency evacuation under those circumstances, you'd still need to be able to negotiate it with Iran.CNN commentator Jack Cafferty found it all "kind of sad, in a way. This morning when Mr. Bush was handed the Iraq Study Group report, he looked old and tired, the kind of old and tired you look after carrying a heavy load for a long time. The war in Iraq is an unmitigated disaster and everybody knows it. The Republicans know it, the Democrats know it, our country knows it and the rest of the world knows it.
"And for the first time this morning, it looked like President Bush knows it, too. There he sat, surrounded by his father's friends, looking absolutely lost. And despite the years of experience and wisdom represented at that table, the report contains no magic potion to get us out of, arguably, the biggest, deadliest, costliest and potentially most dangerous mess that this country has been in since World War II. And President Bush caused it.
"How difficult it must be to come to terms with the fact that you were not only wrong, but that you are becoming more and more isolated every single day. For the first time this morning, I got the feeling President Bush knows it's over."
Kenneth R. Bazinet writes in the New York Daily News: "President Bush and some of the most vocal Capitol Hill backers of the Iraq war from both parties gathered yesterday [afternoon] for what an insider described as a group therapy session.
"'Or maybe it was more like an intervention,' said the source, reconsidering the description [and using a term used when friends and family members confront a drunkard with their knowldge of his condition and urge him to get treatment... ~HC]. 'And the President was grateful and welcoming.'
"Bush met with a grim-looking gaggle of 14 lawmakers and several White House staffers hours after the Iraq Study Group issued its report urging the President to order an about-face on his Iraq strategy. . . .
"The source said Bush didn't try to disguise his humility and his conciliatory gestures seemed legitimate. 'He knows there's a new math in town - the Democrats have Congress,' the insider said. . . .
The President might want to check this out on a map sometime...
So rather than wait for the inevitable further deterioration to occur and end up organizing a humiliating, chopper-borne Dunkirk under those circumstances, don't you think it would be better for the administration to get out front in the planning for an orderly withdrawal of US troops from what everyone now knows is a terrible quagmire in Iraq? (My 'Namibia plan for Iraq' does still, imho, look like far the best option.)
Good points. But these are all tactical, damage-control issues. What didn't work in Iraq could still work in Lebanon, Palestine... You'd think this was a point you'd hear loud and clear from the American left, but regrettably there isn't one. Joseph Samaha, the Lebanese columnist, has it right, however.
Agreed, we must get out now, shower Iraq with reconstruction money, make friends with Syria, Iran, etc.
A few comments about your post, Helena:
1. You didn't mention this amazing recommendation from the report: "Israel should return the Golan Heights to Syria." Amazing because you won't hear this from any prominent dem or any repub, but you hear it from a bipartisan commission.
2. Brings me to my second point, which is that the very existence of the ISG shows how undemocratic our institutions have become. Isn't it the role of government to come up with studies like that?
3. The recommendation about training the Iraqi military and embedding US troops is pathetic: both stupid and criminal. Stupid because in matters of counterinsurgency the US has nothing to teach and everything to learn. Haven't the last 3 years proven beyond any doubt that the US military is grossly incompetent in counterinsurgency. But Iraqis are the masters. (Ask Saddam!) Oh, but the difference is that the US will train soldiers not death squads. The Latin American experience proves otherwise.
4. Maybe you meant William Cohen. I was not aware that Bill Perry was ever in Congress.
I didn't express myself well. Sorry. Of course you meant Bill Perry. What I am saying is that you may have confused his resume with that of his successor.
Good points, Badger & Bernard. However (Badger) I think the Israelis already tried it in lebanon and Palestine and it didn't "work" in either of those places, either... (But I shall go over to your blog and read what J. Samaha said with interest.)
And Bernard, you are right I mixed up the resumes of the two Bills. I shall now go back and correct it. People can find Bill Perry's resume on pp. 137-38 of the report.
Also, I didn't pick out the Golan detail because I just assumed it was covered when they said the peace negotiations should be conducted on the basis of 242 and 338. Readers interested in the Golan issue can read my vintage 1998 account of some of the human dimensions of it here.
Yes, the two old hippies on the moon have come up with seventy-nine proposals for things that might work should America ever adopt the one proposal that it adamantly proclaims it won't: namely, leave Iraq. So all hail the onset of the glacier race whose outcome our descendants may one day descry at the outset of the next geological epoch. A marathon, not a race. A journey, not a marathon. A suggestion, not a schedule. A goal, not a commitment. The Ice Age commeth. "America will stay in Iraq for a long" ... long ... long ... long "time."
Meanwhile, the canary Democrats in Congress have already sniffed the poison gas of a monumental 160-billion-dollar Pentagon porkbarrel raid on the treasury -- the most blatantly naked to date -- and dutifully expired before even entering the darkened mine shaft. Congressman Dennis Kucinich and Senator Bernie Sanders (who between them pass for the only "Left" in American political life today) have clearly said that we cannot possibly allow Sheriff Dick and Deputy Dubya any further free-lunch, rob-the-future, creative "financing" for the military other than for troop withdrawal from Iraq first -- using the seventy billion dollars already appropriated by the previous Congress. Anything else remains open for the porkers at the trough to negotiate "later."
Hint! Hint! Democrats: take "now" (i.e., Peace) now and let the Republicans have "later" (i.e., War) later. They certainly didn't have any problem doing for themselves first and doing to you later when they held the purse strings for the past twelve years. Just keep saying to yourself what Dick Cheney said after the Republicans won the last mid-term elections: namely, "We won the mid-terms. This is our due." And if any Republicans come around whining about their isolation and irrelevance, just say to them (with a smile) what Dick Cheney said to a Democratic Senator not long ago: namely, "Go f*** yourself." End quotes.
I agree that the so-called "Iraq Study Group" had little to do with Iraq and everything to do with covering up for bungling American policy makers who have once again tried to make a sandwich out of soup. But in that case, this collection of over-the-hill political hacks should have honestly called themselves the "America Study Group." Not having the honesty to openly address themselves to themselves-as-the-problem, they have tried to drag the hapless Iraqis into their own muddied puddle as a rubber-ducky life preserver. Haven't the Iraqi people suffered enough from these arrogant and self-centered people? America needs to take care of its own domestic political "American" problems: what H. L. Menken called "the strife of the parties at Washington" and what Barbara Tuchman called "intimidation by the rabid right at home." Solution of this problem will save the rest of the world -- and especially the Iraqis -- the awful trauma of having to endure America's good-intentioned "help" paving for them another eight-lane freeway straight into the hellish tunnel at the end of the light.
As a former South Asian ambassador to America and France once explained to me why his government turned down American offers of military aid: "If the Americans come, they will just draw an arbitrary line through a temporary problem and make it permanent." The Koreans would understand perfectly. No doubt the Iraqis now understand, too. No promised omelets, fellow Catastrophic Gradualists; just more and more broken eggs.
But even if you want to organize an emergency evacuation under those circumstances, you'd still need to be able to negotiate it with Iran.
Helena, the person who call himself Sayed from Ahl al-Bayt he is in the White Bayt with a letter from Iran!
"December 6, 2006
There are at least two reports this morning about a relationship between the Hakim-Bush visit and the overall US-Iran relationship. Al-Hayat cites Washington sources who said Hakim delivered to Bush a letter from the Iranian president Ahmedinejad, but the only information about the content is that Iran proposes that the US acknowledge that Iran has a role to play in Iraq. The reporter then goes on to say that Hakim suggested he could be an intermediary between Washington and Tehran. There were discussions about the need to dissolve the militias, Bush pointing out that they (he and Hakim) have a mutual interest in controlling the militia of Moqtada al-Sadr, but adding that SCIRI's own militia, the Badr Corp, is also a problem. Al-Hayat doesn't return to the Iranian letter with any further details or speculation."
http://www.uruknet.de/?p=m28801&hd=&size=1&l=e
I have only read the "good parts" of the report, but that is enough for me. I cannot manage to have any enthusiasm at all for it, though I must admit it is refreshing to see an official report that puts the situation in such starkly (and realistically) negative terms. The recommendations in the report have nothing to do with Iraq's interests, as you pointed out. They are of, by, for, and all about the United States, and they are based on the assumption that Iraq belongs to the United States for the United States to do with as it sees fit.
And this: "The President should restate that the United States does not seek to control Iraq’s oil" appears to be a lie, since it contradicts the recommendations regarding privatization of oil and the "assistance" provided with by the United States in this endeavor. The United States will even appoint an American "advisor" to assist the make-believe government in making the necessary changes in the make-believe constitution - and we all understand the meaning of the term "advisor" in this context, I am sure. It seems also that the report states that unless ALL the recommendations are met (presumably that includes the ones about the oil), the U.S. government will withhold military, political, and economic support. In other words, the United States can put very, very significant pressure on the make-believe government to do whatever the United States wants - wow, what a change! (sarcasm alert)
أجرت لجنة دراسة العراق، مقابلات واستشارات مع عدد كبير من المسؤولين الأميركيين السابقين والحاليين، وبعض الوزراء والسفراء العرب والاجانب بالاضافة الى عدد كبير من الخبراء والصحافيين والباحثين. وفي الآتي أبرز الاسماء التي استشارتها اللجنة:
استشارات لجنة دراسة العراق
رئيس الوزراء الإيطالي رومانو برودي.
وزير الخارجية السوري وليد المعلم.
السفير السوري في واشنطن عماد مصطفى.
نائب وزير الدفاع الإسرائيلي افرايم سنيه.
المندوب الإيراني لدى الأمم المتحدة جواد ظريفي.
السفير السعودي في واشنطن الأمير تركي الفيصل.
وزير الشؤون الخارجية الإماراتية الشيخ عبد الله بن زايد.
السفير المصري في واشنطن نبيل فهمي.
السفير الأردني في واشنطن كريم قعوار.
السفير القطري في واشنطن ناصر بن حمد آل خليفة.
مبعوث الجامعة العربية في العراق مختار لماني.
الممثل الخاص للأمين العام للأمم المتحدة في العراق اشرف قاضي.
السفير التركي في واشنطن نابي سينسوي.
مسؤولون سابقون وخبراء
الرئيس الأميركي السابق بيل كلينتون.
النائب السابق للرئيس الأميركي والتر مونديل.
وزيرة الخارجية الأميركية السابقة مادلين اولبرايت.
وزير الخارجية الأميركية السابق وارن كريستوفر.
وزير الخارجية الأميركية السابق هنري كيسنجر.
وزير الخارجية الأميركية السابق كولن باول.
وزير الخارجية الأميركية السابق جورج شولتز.
المندوب السابق للولايات المتحدة لدى الأمم المتحدة ريتشارد هولبروك.
مستشار الأمن القومي السابق زبيغنيو برجنسكي.
مستشار الأمن القومي السابق انطوني لايك.
مستشار الأمن القومي السابق برنت سكوكروفت.
القائد السابق للقيادة المركزية الأميركية انطوني زيني.
نائب وزير الدفاع الأميركي السابق للشؤون السياسية دوغلاس فايث.
مجموعات عمل متخصصة
نائب رئيس معهد الشرق الأوسط دايفد ماك.
مدير برنامج التوثيق في مؤسسة حسن منيمنة.
مدير مركز في معهد هلال فرادكين.
الباحث في مؤسسة شبلي تلحمي.
مدير برنامج الشرق الأوسط في مركز جون الترمان.
باحث في مجلس ستيفين كوك.
مدير مركز سياسة الدفاع والأمن الدولي في مؤسسة جيمس دوبينز.
أستاذ الدراسات حول سياسة الشرق الأوسط دانيال كيرتزر.
باحثون وخبراء وصحافيون
الصحافي في صحيفة توماس فريدمان.
مدير مكتب ريتشارد هيل.
مدير مركز الشرق الأوسط في معهد مارتن انديك.
باحث في معهد فريدريك كاغان.
صحافي في مجلة وليام كريستول.
نائب رئيس مركز دراسات السياسة الخارجية في معهد كارلوس باسكوال.
رئيس معهد ستروب تالبوت.
أستاذ في برنامج دراسات الأمن في جامعة بروس هوفمان.
أستاذ الدراسات الاستراتيجية في جامعة جون زيغلر.
رئيسة مجلس إدارة المنظمة الدولية زينب صلبي.
نائب رئيس العمليات الدولية في ربيع طربيه.
Baker interviewed all those above people but he did not see any of these
1- retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner
2- L. Paul BremerIII
3- Meghan L. O'Sullivan
Surely Syria and Iran have an interest in putting an end to the loss of innocent life among their fellow Muslims. That alone is probably a basis for their cooperation. I do not think they prefer us to be tied down there indefinitely because of the harm done to Muslims.
The United States already did this Baker-Hamilton "scare the bad puppet by threatening to study 'phased' troop withdrawals" thing so many years ago in Vietnam that nobody who should remember apparently does. See Robert W. Komer's spot-on analysis of what I like to call the Lunatic Leviathan in his 1972 RAND Corporation study: Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam. (link available in Phillip Carter's Slate.com piece "What About the Grunts? The Iraq Study Group talked to generals when it should have talked to corporals.") http://www.slate.com/id/2155105/?nav=ais
Anyway, from Komer on the old Baker-Hamilton empty threat before the "new" Baker-Hamilton empty threat:
"The planning exercise for phased withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam which took place from July of 1962 to March 1964 is also seen in the Pentagon Papers as in part an effort 'to increase the pressure on the GVN to make the necessary reforms and to make RVNAF fight harder by making the extent and future of U.S. support a little more tenuous.' But it seems to have had no significant effect along these lines, being overtaken by the deterioration of the situation in late 1963 and 1964." Komer, p. 30-31
I really hate to rain on anybody's Pollyanna parade here, but the people in America's government right now wouldn't know a thing worth studying if it jumped up and bit them in their fat, sorry-assed behinds. The so-called "Iraq Study Group" (less euphemistically known as the American Political Peril Patrol) has few, if any actual veterans of any military effort that I know of, much less one that actually contained a significant "advisory" effort intended to mask a humiliatingly transparent and needlessly drawn-out retreat from Bungle in the Jungle or Debacle in the Desert.
One might also visit Newsweek's Christopher Dickey on his conversations with the Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld who says: "I think that this whole idea of Americans training Arabs is so silly I cannot take it seriously. ... They don’t speak Arabic, they don’t understand the culture, they don’t share the faith, they don’t know the history. ... The American military have proved totally incompetent. ... All they really teach is how to fight Americans. How stupid can they be?"
I can answer that from personal experience: "Too stupid to stipulate."
Congress just has to cut off Deputy Dubya's "commander-in-briefs" Warfare Welfare and Make-Work Militarism allowance. Neither he nor the Bozo Brass who have screwed this pooch and contracted Doggy Disease in the process deserve another dime or drop of blood from anyone. They apparently don't even know enough to download a freely available RAND Corp. *.pdf file and learn everything they need to know about bad puppets about whom Komer says:
"We became their prisoners rather than they ours; the GVN [read Maliki Shiite Claque] used its weakness far more effectively as leverage on us than we used our strength to lever it." Komer, p. vi.
Even when available for free, you can always count on the Lunatic Leviathan to ignore any and all sane advice that would tend to calm its agitated and addled schizoid "mind." We already did this insanity thing forty years ago. Why do we have to sit around and watch it all unfold again when we know damn well, far in advance, exactly how badly it will turn out the longer we keep contributing to it?
I love the choice of words in the report. Some examples:
1. Privatization (English). In Bakerspeak: "to reorganize the national oil industry as a commercial enterprise".
2. Taking over the Iraqi Ministry of Oil (English). In Bakerspeak: "provide technical assistance to the Ministry of Oil for enhancing maintenance, improving the payments process, managing cash flows, contracting and auditing".
3. Giving away the assets of the Iraqi people to ExxonMobile, Halliburton and related companies (English). In Bakerspeak: "encourage investment in Iraq’s oil sector by the international community and by international energy companies."
4. Safeguarding stolen property (English). In Bakerspeak: "The U.S. military should work with the Iraqi military and with private security forces to protect oil infrastructure and contractors."
5. Support for Israel, settlements, wall and occupation (English). In Bakerspeak: "There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab- Israeli peace on all fronts."
6. Blaming the victims for the results of the occupation (English). In Bakerspeak: "Violence is increasing in scope and lethality. It is fed by a Sunni Arab insurgency. Shiite [Shia] militias, death squads, al-Qa'ida and widespread criminality. Sectarian conflict is the principal challenge to stability."
Helena, Given your prediction about an attack on Iran, I was quite relieved to pass the ISG "deadline" for that. However, now that GWB (WPE) is backing away from the report as fast as he can, my concern...fear...panic! is returning.
Robert.
PS I live in Beirut.
According to Mazin Qumsiyeh:
"It is truly remarkable that the so called "Iraq study group" report in 160 pages and thousands of words fails to mention human rights and International law (the words only appear in describing the background of three of the study authors such as "Mr. Jordan practiced general, corporate, legislative, and international law in Washington, D.C." and "Mr. Hamiltons distinguished service in government has been honored through numerous awards in public service and human rights as well as honorary degrees".)"
I have not read the report myself, so i can't confirm this, but if true, considering that Dr. Quandt was a key player in this report, how is this possible? can we respect such a report?
I agree with Michael. Much of the 1972 Komer article is depressingly on point, although he avoided answering the central question of whether such efforts are inevitably doomed to failure, let alone whether they are per se immoral. Even highly educated, experienced and perceptive Americans usually cannot be convinced that there is no right way to do the wrong thing.
There would be other possible outcomes for our Iraq misadventure only if the people making decisions for the US government were completely different than who they actually are, which could only have occurred if the political culture and bureaucratic institutions that create and support these people had evolved in completely different ways than they actually did. In other words, if we had some steak, we could make steak & eggs, if we had some eggs.
To the extent there is any realism in the ISG project, it is the narrow realism of self-preservation, of CYA, of recognizing the need to distance one’s self and one’s closest associates from an obviously impending disaster. The game is blame. The field is the 2008 presidential election. The prize is the pork barrel. As Helena aptly observed, actual conditions in Iraq have practically nothing to do with it.
By the way, I hope everyone noticed this article a few days ago in the WP:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/04/AR2006120401347.html
This is the kind of actual, real world INFORMATION that only rarely appears in any “news” article, whether in the MSM or the blogosphere. The numbers tell the story.
Some thing different and out of topic, who like to taste some thing from Iraq from Hilla "My Home Town
Michael Rakowitz has spent four months trying to get a date. Actually, make that a ton of dates.
The ton of dates never showed up. But when Rakowitz pulled up to his storefront in Brooklyn on Tuesday morning, he had 10 13-pound boxes of Iraqi dates in tow. To the best of Rakowitz's knowledge, those dates would be the first labeled "product of Iraq" to be sold in the United States in 25 years.
It was a long and arduous journey to New York from Hilla, Iraq. The dates traveled more than 6,000 miles through three countries and faced inspection by at least three government agencies. They were held at two airports, and by the time they made their debut at Davison's & Co. — the art exhibit-cum-import store run by Rakowitz — they looked a bit weary.
The skin on the large, plump Kheary dates was peeling. The jewel-toned Azraq dates were small and a bit shriveled. But their age doesn't affect their status: These are legendary Iraqi dates, product of what is thought to be the world's most ancient cultivated fruit tree, grown in what may be the cradle of civilization.
They are said to be sweet and rich, and some have a subtle, nutty flavor. But few Americans have ever tasted them due to three decades of sanctions and embargoes that have made obtaining most goods from Iraq nearly impossible.
The allure of Iraqi dates in the United States can be compared to that of the Cuban cigar: difficult to obtain — and therefore expensive — but with a distinctive taste that makes it, well, worth it.
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/12/05/national/main2231675.shtml
Troops Out, Oil Companies In: The Baker Agenda?
Recommendation 62 says the US government should help draft an oil law that "creates a fiscal and legal framework for investment." It further recommends that the US, in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund [IMF], should "pres Iraq to continue reducing subsidies in the energy sector...until Iraqis pay market prices for oil products..." That is, in a country besieged by civil war, bombings of infrastructure, unemployment at 50 percent levels, and the lack of necessities, the Baker Report proposes to make everyday life harder for average Iraqis so that the oil industry profits.
Recommendation 63 says the US should "assist" Iraqi leaders in privatizing the national oil industry into a "commercial enterprise" to encourage investment by the multi-national oil companies.
Who said it was not about blood for oil?
http://www.alsharqiya.com/display.asp?fname=economic\2006\12\008.txt&storytitle
Oil for Sale: Iraq Study Group Recommends Privatization
Can't Stay the Course, Can't End the War, But We'll Call it Bipartisan
Despite the breathless hype, the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group (ISG) report did not include any dramatic new ideas for ending the war in Iraq. In fact, it did not include a call to end the war at all. Rather, the report's recommendations focus on transforming the U.S. occupation of Iraq into a long-term, sustainable, off-the-front-page occupation with a lower rate of U.S. casualties. Despite its title, it does not provide "A New Approach: A Way Forward."
The new catch phrase of spin around withdrawal used in the report is "responsible transition." In the introduction, the report states that "this responsible transition can allow for a reduction in the U.S. presence in Iraq over time." It is not aimed at ending that U.S. presence. It is very clear that the Baker-Hamilton team do not propose a diminishing of U.S. efforts to control Iraq;
- The word "occupation" appears only five times in the entire report.
- Three times it is used to describe what Iraqis "believe" or "think" about the U.S. presence in their country.
- Twice it refers to U.S. troops in the post-World War II Army of Occupation in Germany.
- Never does it refer directly to the U.S. occupation of Iraq (nor to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land).
Following this sensible proposal is one much more radical--complete privatization of the oil industry, combined with foreign investment, and technical assistance by the U.S. government. This directly contradicts the ISG's earlier recommendation that, "The President should restate that the U.S. does not seek to control Iraq's oil" and guarantees that the U.S. and multinational corporations will be vying for control and power in Iraq for decades. Clearly this section of the report was heavily influenced by commission members James A. Baker III and Lawrence Eagleburger, whom have sought access to Iraqi's oil for most of their political careers, as well as by the longstanding consensus of U.S. corporate and government opinion about the importance and claimed legitimacy of maintaining U.S. control of Iraqi oil.
Phyllis Bennis "mp3 speaking about the ISG report" is a fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington and of the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam. Erik Leaver is the Carol and Ed Newman Fellow at IPS and the policy outreach director for Foreign Policy In Focus.
Salah, no matter what anyone says, the occupation CANNOT continue for "decades", for the reasons shown in the WP article I mentioned above. The fact is, the so-called insurgents are winning the war and the US is losing the war. That is not a prediction or an opinion, it is a fact. That doesn't mean the violence is anywhere near over, but it does mean that none of the dreams of the neocons or the Baker-Hamilton "realists" or the Cheney-Rumsfeld imperialists will ever be realized.
Helena - There is an article in the Nation that you should call to the attention of your readers, as it illustrates more clearly than anything I have seen why the US must bring the troops home ASAP: http://www.thenation.com/docprint.mhtml?i=20061211&s=soldiers_story
It is by Major Bill Edmonds, a Special Forces officer who advised and lived with an Iraqi intelligence officer.
Major Edmonds reminds me of why it was once possible to be proud to be an American and a soldier. I suppose if there were 20,000 American soldiers like him to work with the Iraqi army and police they might be able help Iraq avoid the catastrophe that we have set in motion there.
But there aren't that many and there can't be soon enough, so Edmonds implicitly addresses those who feel that before the US can leave Iraq we have to repair what we have broken. He shows why we are now doing far more harm than good in Iraq, with no hope of changing that dynamic.
John C.,
it does mean that none of the dreams of the neocons or the Baker-Hamilton "realists" or the Cheney-Rumsfeld imperialists will ever be realized.
No Bravery
A nation blind to their disgrace
A 4 Minute Video
U.S. and Iraqi troops have sealed off the city of Haditha in Anbar province, in the heartland of the Sunni insurgency, and have warned residents to keep off the streets and stay indoors, officials and residents said on Friday.
To Let "...." and the Death Squad to sluggers Iraqis at their homes.
The U.S. military said troops were manning checkpoints and building a sand berm to crack down on insurgents in Haditha and in neighbouring Barwana. It said U.S. troops were protecting "the population and good citizens of Haditha".
But residents in Haditha, which is at the centre of a U.S. military investigation into the deaths of two dozen civilians in November 2005 by U.S. Marines, said electricity has been cut off and that no food is being allowed into the city.
Schools have been forced to close, they said.
While the U.S. military has acknowledged it shut down electrical power in the area during recovery efforts following the death of four U.S. troops last week when a Marine helicopter came down, it has blamed current power losses on "maintenance requirements" at a nearby dam.
"This is the sixth day Haditha is without electricity," one resident said on Friday.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20061209&articleId=4101
The weekend gave me a chance to read the ISG report with attention to details. The sentiment I am left with is that I really wish I could get hold of their mailing list; I would send them a great Christmas (oops sorry, Holiday !) present:
http://press.princeton.edu/titles/7929.html
Peace and Cheers all!
"I would send them a great Christmas (oops sorry, Holiday !) present:
"">http://press.princeton.edu/titles/7929.html"
Well, said, David! My sentiments exactly!