High command problems in Israel
Aluf Benn and two colleagues writing in Wednesday's HaAretz tell us that:
- Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is still debating whether to approve the proposed expansion of the Israel Defense Forces' ground operation in south Lebanon. The proposal will be brought to the diplomatic-security cabinet Wednesday morning for approval.
Olmert fears that the plan presented by the defense establishment will result in hundreds of casualties, and therefore, wants to subject it to a careful cost-benefit analysis. In Tuesday's fighting in Lebanon, five soldiers were killed and 23 others wounded, two of them seriously.
According to a government source, Olmert has also asked the army to present him with several different options for a ground operation...
- The commander of the Israeli military on Tuesday appointed his deputy to oversee Israel's battles in Lebanon, a dramatic mid-offensive shift sidelining the head of the northern command.
The military announced the appointment of Maj. Gen. Moshe Kaplinksi in a statement on Tuesday. Israeli media linked it to plans to intensify the offensive in Lebanon as well as to mounting public criticism of the army's handling of the conflict with Hezbollah guerrillas.
Though the military denied it, the appointment looked like a shake-up of the top command on the Lebanon front in the midst of a campaign, a highly unusual move.
Writing in the Haaretz daily, veteran military analyst Zeev Schiff said the new appointment signaled serious command problems.
"Clearly, the change in the command leadership is not good for Adam personally," he wrote, referring to the head of the northern command, Maj. Gen. Udi Adam. "But it also sends a negative signal to the army and the public at large."
The last time a similar switch was made was during the 1973 Mideast war, when generals in the army reserves, including former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, were sent to the southern command to effectively take over from the general in charge, Shmuel Gorodish, in the battle against Egypt.
Israel has lost 36 civilians and 65 troops since the fighting with Hezbollah began on July 12. Despite the 28-day offensive, rockets continue to pummel northern Israel. According to the Israeli police, 145 rockets exploded in Israel on Tuesday alone.
Criticism of the conduct of the war has concentrated on the slow progression from the air campaign to a ground offensive and the failure of the military to sweep through Lebanon in a matter of days, as it did in 1982.
However, much of the criticism has been aimed at the political leadership — Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz — because the Security Cabinet they head has failed to approve the military's plans to push forward more quickly.
Two quick comments. First, the facts of the military shake-up and the strategic uncertainty in the political echelon in Israel indicate to me that I was right to estimate, back in mid-July, that the early days of the Israeli assault on Lebanon were not part of some long-hatched plan against the country-- but that in those days, as indeed since, Olmert and his equally untested Defense Minister Amir Peretz were deciding things on the run, in haste, and with great emotionality, rather than playing from a smoothly prepared strategic script. Weizman's reference to the earlier comparable command shake-up, back in 1973, underscores this. That too was a war that was not one of choice-- and comprehensive pre-preparation-- by the Israeli high command... Unlike, say the wars of 1956 or 1982, which were chosen and extensively pre-planned by the high command long before they were launched.
A second related point: It is not necessarily good news for those of us hoping for a speedy ceasefire and a far-reaching, sustainable peace to learn of the edginess and indecision at the top of the Israeli command structure. If this whole assault up until now was driven mainly by Olmert's emotional over-reaction to the capture of the two soldiers on July 12, then who knows what further risky decisions his cabinet might take over the weeks ahead?
(The more charitable explanation for Olmert's actions has been that he was determined to "re-establish the credibility of Israel's strategic deterrence", which according to many Israeli strategic analysts on the right had been severely dented by the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon back in 2000. But the effectiveness of a strategic deterrent depends crucially on the psychology of those being deterred. So long as Israeli troops are on Lebanese soil and Lebanon's people remain targeted by Israeli stand-off weapons on a continuing basis, then the Hizbullahis are unlikely to be "deterred" from continuing their military activities... But anyway, as noted above, I believe Olmert's decisions have been far more emotional and less rational than this... )
Algeria
Vietnam
Afghanistan
Chechnya
Iraq
Lebanon
Did people think the IDF was magic?
The comparison to 1973 makes sense. During that conflict there was some real brinkmanship coming out of the Nixon White House. Although the US was entirely pro-Israel at the time we weren't quite as open about it. There was at least a semblance of balance rather than open cheerleading. This is like watching Harry Caray doing a White Sox game.
I know, it's not funny. Sorry.
Joe Osorio
I don't know if the issue is emotionalism as much as that Olmert has to take factors into account other than pure military calculations. Israel, more than any other country, knows that it is put under the international microscope when it engages in any significant military operations.
Then there are other political considerations. Israelis and Israel watchers have something of an "Entebbe" and "6 day war" syndrome. If the Israelis are not able to pull off a daring, dramatic rescue, or send the enemy running literally with their boots off, then the IDF must be "losing its edge." So there is the pressure to try to show a quick success. This is not so much emotionalism as it is decision making hindered by political calculations.
A war is not a success or a failure because it hasn't reached a decisive stage by the next blogger's entry or the next op-ed writer's deadline.
This is not to say that I think that Israel has necessarily made all the right tactical decisions. I will leave that to the military experts. And I also don't think it's a bad thing that political figures think their country does not have the tolerance for heavy casualties or prolonged conflict. I actually think it's good if Israelis don't want to see war go on for a prolonged period. If only Hezbollah had such a worldview!
Ultimately, the problem goes back to the fact that Israel has, now and before, had to deal with enemies, or at least factions of enemies, that maintain an eliminationist goal. Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran ARE the current manifestation of the problem in this regard. At one point, it was Nasser, at another point, it was Arafat. And whenever any representative of the Arab world indicates a moderation of their goals, there are certain constituencies who will accuse them of being a stooge for Israel and thereby an illegitimate representative.
Lastly, let me say that I fully recognize that the Palestinians and the Lebanese are entitled to elect whomever they want. Indeed I believe to be imperative that they do so. But if the ultimate choice is someone who takes the extremist route, then Israel will have to respond accordingly. Israel may not have the political will or international capital to engage in a prolonged, drawn out war that would completely destroy such movements. But it is equally clear that such movements will not bring peace or prosperity to the Palestinians or Lebanese.
A recent article in Haaretz supports your idea that Olmert started this war on an impulse. Eric Margolis discusses this article in an essay at