A too-weak 'alternative'?
Carl Conetta, co-director of a small Washington-based NGO called the "Project on Defense Alternatives" has come out with a six-point plan for arriving at what he-- somewhat misleadingly-- calls a total US troop withdrawal from Iraq within 400 days. Misleading, because if you read the fine print in his plan, he is advocating a process that would involve:
- the US continuing to try to control the internal-Iraqi politics of the entire "withdrawal" process, and
- the US still, after those 14 months, leaving "2,000-3,000 US troops ... in Iraq to participate in multinational military training and monitoring missions, commanded by NATO and under a three-year UN mandate."
In fact, Conetta's plan adds little or nothing to the one laid out in this July 15 NYT op-ed by former CIA Director (and MIT professorial brainiac) John Deutch. In it, Deutch built on the remarks he'd made back on June 7 that urged a US withdrawal from Iraq, and told the NYT-reading public:
I think Conetta's main mistake was in hugely over-estimating the ability of the US authorities to micro-manage the politics inside Iraq during the period leading up to, and of, the troop withdrawal. The second of his six points, titled Political measures meant to draw in disaffected communities, is undoubtedly well-meaning, and includes some generally good ideas like focusing the application of punitive methods much more tightly than at present, etc etc. But under this same "political measures" rubric he also lists sub-goals that, quite frankly, are none of Washington's darn' business, like a list of extremely micro-managing things about the Iraqis' own national Constitution and governance structures...[Deutch:] Our best strategy now is a prompt withdrawal plan consisting of clearly defined political, military and economic elements. Politically, the United States should declare its intention to remove its troops and urge the Iraqi government and its neighbors to recognize the common regional interest in allowing Iraq to evolve peacefully and without external intervention. The first Iraqi election under the permanent constitution, planned for Dec. 15, is an appropriate date for beginning the pullout.
In addition to being none of Washington's business, these goals are, quite simply unattainable by the US, which has shown that (1) it has almost zero understanding of Iraqi internal politics and (2) every time it has sought to intervene in Iraqi politics in the past three years it has made things worse for itself (and also, for most Iraqis.)
So why should we expect Washington suddenly to develop the political smarts it might need to intervene "succesfully" at this point inside Iraqi politics? The only possible grounds for believing this would be if one judged that the announcement of a US decision to withdraw completely would on its own radically transform politics and attitudes inside Iraq, and cause Iraqis "overnight" to start cooperating with Washington's political schemes...
No reason, I think, to believe that that would happen-- and especially not, if the "withdrawal" plan is from the get-go designed not actually to be total.
Conetta's dirigiste (US control-freak) tendencies also show when, nanny-like, he opines that:
Until Iraq stabilizes and settles into a pattern of peaceful relations with its neighbors, the United States and others will continue to be concerned about its military potentials and will want some reassurance. However, as an alternative to a long-term large-scale military presence in the country, the United States should favor the development of a Military Monitoring Regime under UN auspices. This would require the Iraqi government to forswear weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorist activity, agree to limit the size and capabilities of Iraq's armed forces, and permit unfettered access to its military sites by a multinational corps of UN monitors. A reasonable term for the monitoring regime would be five years or less, as the Security Council sees fit. A highly effective monitoring corps might comprise 1,500 personnel and could be accompanied by a multinational security detail comprising 6,500 troops.Okay, let's review the facts here. Which of these two parties has reason to fear the military capabilities and possibly aggressive intent of the other? Might it be:
a) Iraq, which does not have WMDs or indeed (at this point) any offensive military capabilities at all; and whose present leadership has no history at all of having undertaken aggressive warfare; or might it be--So maybe, as part of the withdrawal scenario it should be the US that is subjected to a full-blown, UN-supervised, Military Monitoring Regime? (Does Conetta have any idea about the way that most Iraqis view the history and activities of the UN monitoring regimes to which they were subjected, 1991-2003? Why on earth should they feel at all that they deserve to be placed under such a regime at this point?)
b) the US, which has nuclear weapons as a routine part of every single carrier battle group it has in the Gulf region, and has many extremely capable and well-armed force projection platforms in the Gulf, and whose present leadership, yes, does indeed have a record of having launched a war of aggression in recent years?
So it goes on: attempts at unfeasible political micro-managing and international dirigisme to the nth degree. And all for what?
Meanwhile, there's another big problem: if registering "success" according to political metrics like these is defined, to both the Iraqis and the US public, as constituting a set of successive pre-conditions for the US troop withdrawal, then-- as in the Occupied Palestinian territories!-- all that does is give a huge incentive to the forces that want to keep things stirred up inside Iraq to re-double their dastardly perpetrating of inhumane violence and social mayhem.
As JWN readers will recall, my own preference-- as first enunciated here on July 6-- is for a withdrawal of US troops from Iraq that is speedy, total and generous. By the way, an organization called Global Policy Forum just put a slightly lengthier and more thought-out version of that up on their website. In that longer version I argued that:
I should note that I reached those judgments based on having studied the politics and strategy of a fair number of troop withdrawals in recent times-- both in the Middle East, and elsewhere. The first great goal of the withdrawing power has to be to avoid a rout, or a cataclysmic event (like the bombing of the Marines barracks in Beirut) that forces it to act in great haste. The second great goal-- and this one is overwhelmingly political-- is to bring about a post-withdrawal political situation for itself that is as as good as it can be.The parallels with Israel's position in Lebanon in the late 1990s are by no means perfect, but they continue to multiply. Back then, many Israelis warned of chaos and bloodshed in Lebanon, and of vastly increased Syrian influence in Lebanon and the region, should the IDF undertake a unilateral withdrawal. The much-ballyhooed eruption of chaos never eventuated there (though there would quite likely be some continuing internal conflict inside a post-withdrawal Iraq). As for enlarged Syrian influence in Lebanon... It didn't last very long, did it? Meanwhile, after the May 2000 withdrawal Israel was able to regroup and retrain IDF units that had been tied down far too long in the (in-)security zone inside Lebanon.
I am not arguing that the US withdrawal from Iraq should [necessarily] be, as Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon was, quite unilateral. As with Israel's currently planned withdrawal from Gaza, negotiating the modalities of the withdrawal with a successor power would undoubtedly make for smoother overall performance of this complex logistical challenge. Ideally, the US withdrawal from Iraq would be negotiated. [However] those negotiations need not be long-drawn-out—and the actual implementation of the withdrawal should not be held hostage to their success, or even their formal convening. If Washington were to announce that "We have now decided that our mission in Iraq has been successful and we will therefore bring it to a complete end. We will start the complete redeployment of our troops out of the country on Date D and complete it on Date D-plus-(say) 90. And we invite the Jaafari government and all other interested parties to assure the safe passage out of Iraq of these troops," then I am sure many Iraqis would be eager to respond positively to that, at both the official and local levels.
In this latter regard, it's important to be realistic and not to try to over-reach (as Israel did in Lebanon in 1983, with its conclusion of the ill-considered and divisive "May 17 agreement" with the puppet government in Beirut.) In my judgment, if the US seeks to exert a large degree of control over Iraq's post-withdrawal politics that would constitute, in the present and all foreseeable circumstances, an exactly similar form of political over-reaching.
In pursuit of the second great goal, too, the withdrawing power certainly wants to project the image that it remains calmly in control of all aspects of the withdrawal process. Which, after all, ended up looking better for the withdrawing power: the precipitate scramble of the US forces out of Saigon in 1975, or the PLO's fairly orderly withdrawal from Beirut in August 1982? (Okay, Arafat blew the whole thing of projecting a sense of being calm and in control with his stupid and lethal return to Tripoli some months later, but that's another story.)
And of course, during World War 2 Stalin's generals made many strategic decisions on the great battlefronts in central Europe that involved withdrawals and loss of troop lives on a truly massive scale... But seldom did he or those around project the image that these redeployments were evidence of any loss of control...
How can the US bring about a post-withdrawal situation in Iraq (and its region) that is as good as it can be for the true interests of the US people ? By withdrawing fully and fast; by being generous with an offer of reparations; and by entering into a serious and respectful dialogue with Iraqis and the other peoples of the region about the subjects of intense political concern to them.
So yes, that would include the security situation in the Gulf region-- a region in which the US is, of course, actually an outsider. It would also include the situation in Palestine....
Well, parts of Conetta's plan are certainly worth reading. At one point, he makes the following valuable and well-expressed observation:
None of the coalition's successes in killing or capturing foreign terrorist leaders or former regime members have dented the insurgency. Those neutralized without apparent effect include Saddam Hussein, his sons, Sabawi Ibrahim al-Hassan (purported to be a key financier of the insurgency), dozens of other former leading Baathists, and several high-ranking associates of terrorist leader Abu Musab Zarqawi. During the past two years, thousands of insurgents have been reported killed and many thousands more Iraqis have been imprisoned and interrogated. And yet the insurgency has not only persisted, but grown. In other words: American success at the tactical level, which is undeniable, has not led to progress at the campaign or strategic levels. Indeed, military operations seem to be having a negative effect, on balance.He also writes:
In sum: overly ambitious and intrusive objectives and the needless multiplication of enemies have bedeviled the [U.S.'s] postwar mission from its inception. Had the Bush administration sought to accomplish less, it would have achieved more -- and at much lower cost to the United States and Iraq.I think he should take that advice to heart, himself, too. A plan that aims at a less-than-total withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, and at perpetuating a large degree of US control over the country's internal politics strikes me as being, at this point, "overly ambitous."
Actually, if they followed that plan it would be an improvement. Not going to happen though.
In one sense, the Pottery Barn sense of "you broke it, you own it," the US can be said to have a responsibility towards Iraq, to ensure that the new regime can "stand up" before the US "stands down," as Bush put it recently.
But it seems doubtful that this will happen anytime soon. There are too many factors - ethnic, regional and sectarian divisions, fundamentalist zealotry versus secularism, embedded crime and corruption, collapsed infrastructure, etc - that suggest a troubled and problematic medium term future for the benighted country and its poor citizens.
So in another sense, all this "withdrawal strategy" sounds like face-saving nonsense. There were no flowers and smiles in 2003 welcoming you, and there will be none in 2006, or 2026, when you finally leave.
Helena wrote about Kenya. Even the most moderate and liberal of Americans still seem to be all too ready to adopt British colonialist, paternalistic "what’s best for Iraq" attitudes towards withdrawal. Didn’t work for the Brits - look at their ex-colonies now - and won’t work for you.
Here in NZ, well-meaning liberal whites used to agonise over what was best for the Maoris. Till the Maoris got sick of it, and said "Listen, WE will tell YOU what is best for us."
I hope that the Iraqis do that soon. The US doesn’t own Iraq, any more than the Brits owned Kenya or India. And it can't solve all Iraq's problems, any more than the Brits could in those places.
"The US doesn’t own Iraq, any more than the Brits owned Kenya or India."
This the truths that GWB and Brits don’t like it they play with the time to the degree that Iraqi get sick...
But I believe they are mistaken if they do, and the history told us what Iraq is and the future will tell us what the outcome.
BTW, World Bank to agree on Iraqi lending plan soon, July 1, 2005 - Iraq and the World Bank are close to signing an agreement on a two-year lending strategy that will include $500 million in soft loans to help rebuild the country's infrastructure, Reuters reports a World Bank official said June 29.
http://iraqieconomy.org/home/macro/wb/20050701
$US500 Millions..... It’s a revenue of one day from Iraq oil production now!!!!!!
Where is the oil money?
Iraq is highly unstable. I worry that big changes in the US presence could trigger a bloodbath. The most likely bloodbath would be the Shiites and Kurds against the Sunnis. The second most likely would seem to be the exact opposite: an escalation of the terror war against mainstream Iraqis into a Sunni lead bloodbath and general rule by terror.
The next likely possibility (I admit I'm guessing here) is that the Shiites and Kurds will wall off the Sunni areas, or some of them, with an Israeli style wall. Perhaps around Fallujah.
The least likely scenario is that the Iraqis will, as the last Humvees trail off into the sunset, make peace and set up a peaceful and fair compromise government. And they all lived happily ever after.
The UN is not legitimate in the eyes of the Sunnis/Baathists and, as far as I can tell, would just be another target.
Helena,
The more people in the US talk about withdrawal alternatives, the best. Whatever they are, they push the US opinion to reconsider the situation in Iraq.
Of course, the news of Iraq are very bad, some of the last bombings (like that of the gaztank at the end of last week) seem to indicate that Iraq is at a tipping point. The longer the US stays, the worse things will get after their departure.
If US begins immediate preparatives for a fast withdrawal, then, there is hope that a part of the Sunni resistance will be able to make sensible deals at least with the Shiites - if not with the Kurds- and that then Iraqis will unite to throw the extremists out.
Mmm... Then, these endured fighters will come to EU because it's nearer than US and they will merge in their immigrated communities here.
Needless to say that we are immensely thankful to Bush for this gift and also to Blair, Belusconi, Aznar etc..
Christiane--
The more people in the US talk about withdrawal alternatives, the best. Whatever they are, they push the US opinion to reconsider the situation in Iraq.
You're right, of course. You're right, too (in your comment on Sunday's post) to say that we need to keep attention on Israel's wall-building land-grab around Jerusalem and in the rest of the West Bank... I'll try to get something up about that.
"Iraq is highly unstable."
The sole cause of that instability, directly and indirectly, is the U.S. presence (and not just the troops, but the whole U.S. presence). With the U.S. gone the cause of the instability will be gone, and there will be a chance, at least, for stability to be restored. It will, unfortunately happen slowly and painfully, but it is the only way it will happen at all, ever.
"I worry that big changes in the US presence could trigger a bloodbath."
And just exactly what do you think has been going on there for the last 28 months, if not a blood bath?
As to the rest of your uninformed speculation - ZZZZZZZZzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz.
Warren:
It seems fairly obvious that the strategy of at least some of the insurgency is to trigger civil war. The continued brutal targeting of Shiites is proof of that.
Allawi has said civil war has already started. Certainly Sunni are claiming that the elite security forces are frequently killing and often torturing Sunni. It is said in the theocracy of Basra that several hundred Sunni have been murdered...
The signs are ominous and the warnings continue.
Shiite strike back against the Sunni is meant to unite the Sunni and also encourage stronger support for the insurgency from other Arab countries. Saddamites believe they can win, Jihadists see the possible beginning of a war of purification.
You have to remember that many of the peaceful areas of Iraq or under the control of or heavily influenced by Shiite zealots with heavily amed militias. The US struck a truce with one of these a year ago, but that doesn't mean that he is our friend or the cities he controls are a success by the standards Bush admires once used. The fact that they are trumped up as such now is like the fact that we remain silent and will soon boast that Iraq is GETTING MORE ELECTRICITY (very small letters now, whisper, don't even say it, mention how liberals hate America and love the axis of evil) from (THAT"S RIGHT FOLKS!) Iran, we do see 2 sides forming.
As for the Kurds they will enjoy this, more federalism, a chance to drive out *both* Sunni and Shia Arabs from "their" lands, power plays, a few incursions into Turkey...
As for us here's what will happen if civil war breaks out. We can try to protect Sunnis from the mobs further extending our overextended military and putting us in coinfrontation with Shiites which means lot of the "peaceful successes may not be quite as calm and key logistic lines may be threatened or we remain neutral or even vaguely support the Shia. Whatever we do much of the Sunni world will be convinced it's all a plot to destroy "true Islam."
And all the insurgents have to do to increase the odds of this happening is blow up people.
"The longer the US stays, the worse things will get after their departure."
One thing missing her, John Negroponte to Baghdad what this man did really?
His record in Latin America is full of shame by advancing the contra war which includes escalating activities on Nicaragua's southern front, and "raising profile with anti-Sandinistas
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB151/index2.htm
I put this link from you Helena “Some notable truth commissions since 1974”
http://justworldnews.org/archives/truth_commn_table.html
For some of you may think this isn’t right but we understood sending some one like Negroponte it not a peaceful chose or thinking by US administration, after invasion when their plan to contented Iraq severely fallen and found its hard to control the country, we see the outcome of their cooked Iraq problems by putting the country in chaotic status.
The main thing is no one or group asking to control the resources and counting for it, let start with the oil which obviously the production is unmeterd and no one can tell us how much oil produced and how much the revenue?.
We all agreed these killers and criminals who doing all the chose inside the country obviously some one pay for them. What we saw these criminals hold hostages and demanding a huge amount of money its clear singe of their motives, its money and criminal acts.
"The occupation in itself is a problem. Iraq not being independent is the problem. And the other problems stem from that - from sectarianism to civil war," he said. "The entire American presence causes this."
The same sort of "micromanagement" has been pursued by the world bank and IMF in many countries. Recently Naomi Klein wrote an article reviewing the sordid attempts of the Clinton administration to force suicidal economic policies down the throat of President Aristide in exchange for restoring him to power.
Whenever I read about these U.S. plans I think of Sen. Byrd's comment during the congressional debate over the war resolution that most municipalities spent more time planning their sewage system then congress had spent discussing the war resolution. Americans are the last people qualified to run Iraq.
Point taken Helena.