Although White House lawyers said they rushed to devise a new judicial structure that could handle serious Qaeda terrorists, many of the detainees sent to Guantánamo turned out to be low-level militants, Taliban fighters and men simply caught in the wrong place at the wrong time. The Pentagon's efforts to gather intelligence from more valuable prisoners were also deeply flawed, military intelligence officers said, complicating the prosecution of some detainees and nearly paralyzing efforts to release others.So the problematic interrogation techniques were one factor that delayed the holding of any form of hearing for the Gitmo detainees. Here was another:
in several instances, military officials said, Mr. Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul D. Wolfowitz, resisted moving forward with prosecutions, in part because they felt the cases were weak.Again, quite mind-boggling. You have prosecution cases that appear to be "weak"... So do you therefore apologize to the people you have been detaining for this many months already, say, "Gosh, we're sorry, we now realize you were just riff-raff on the battlefield," give them a nice compensatory payment, and help them to get back to their homes? You might think that would be the decent thing to do? Also, perhaps, smart, in that it might help to mitigate some of the considerable anger that the continuation of the detentions at Gitmo has caused throughout the world....?
It quickly became apparent that few of the prisoners captured in Afghanistan were the sort of hardened terrorists the administration had hoped for.Gosh, if it weren't so bloody tragic it would all seem like a farce. "The Keystone Cops do Gitmo". Something ike that. And these are the people who brag that they know how to increase our nation's security?
"It became obvious to us as we reviewed the evidence that, in many cases, we had simply gotten the slowest guys on the battlefield,'' said Lt. Col. Thomas S. Berg, a member of the original military legal team set up to work on the prosecutions. "We literally found guys who had been shot in the butt.''
The reserve officer chosen by Mr. Rumsfeld to lead the intelligence operation at Guantánamo, Maj. Gen. Michael E. Dunlavey, was told after his arrival there in February 2002 that as many as half of the initial detainees were thought to be of little or no intelligence value, two officers familiar with the briefings said. He also found that the prisoners included elderly and emotionally disturbed Afghan men, including one tribal elder so wizened that interrogators nicknamed him "Al Qaeda Claus."
The order that established the military commissions on Nov. 13, 2001 [that was the order under whose authority the whole Gitmo complex was set up], authorized the Pentagon to hold and prosecute any foreigners designated by the president as suspected terrorists.Unbelievable! The Pentagon and White House had been assuring us all that the people they'd shipped to Gitmo were "the worst of the worst"... and then at some point after they have gotten them there, for "most"-- that is, more than 50 percent-- of them, they can't even fill out a one-page form telling the White House why it is that the president should designate this particular person even to be a "suspected" terrorist.
On Jan. 22, 2002, at the request of the White House counsel, Alberto R. Gonzales, Pentagon lawyers directed intelligence officers at Guantánamo to fill out a one-page form for each prisoner, certifying the president's "reason to believe" their involvement with terrorism, officials said.
But within weeks, intelligence officers began reporting back to the Pentagon that they did not have enough evidence on most prisoners to even complete the forms, officials said.
By March 21, Defense Department officials indicated they would hold the Guantánamo prisoners indefinitely and on different legal grounds - as "enemy combatants" in a war against the United States.Meanwhile, a host of other problems were busy incubating in the nasty animal-type cages in which the Gitmo detainees were being held:
In public, the administration continued to maintain that the prisoners were both frighteningly dangerous and a likely font of vital intelligence. "They may well have information about future terrorist attacks against the United States," said Vice President Dick Cheney. "We need that information."... So we then had the bizarre picture of Elliott Abrams, infamous and indeed criminally responsible participant in some of the Reagan administration's worst human-rights abuses in Central America, being one of the two NSC officials who were designated by Condi to try to draw up a whole new strategy to deal with the Gitmo detainees and the thousands of Afghan detainees whom the administration was holding by then (spring 2002) within Afghanistan...
But at the State Department, diplomats were awash in complaints from foreign governments, many of them allies in the Afghan war, about the open-ended imprisonment of their citizens. F.B.I. agents and Justice Department officials were struck by how few strong prosecution cases there seemed to be, current and former officials said.
Officials said that C.I.A. officers who were trying to recruit some Guantánamo detainees as agents [what did I tell you? See 'South Africa' above ~HC] raised another fear: that the camp could become America's madrasa, or Islamic school, radicalizing prisoners by its harsh conditions, the indoctrination of militant leaders and the detainees' focused study of the Koran - the only book they were initially given to read.
Officials on the National Security Council staff were particularly uneasy. The discussions that produced the president's Nov. 13 military order had been dominated by a small circle of White House lawyers overseen by Mr. Cheney. Ms. Rice, like Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, had been excluded, officials said, an embarrassing slight given her role as a mediator on national security issues.
"There was real concern that if detainees were harshly treated and deprived of due process, they were going to end up turning against the United States, if they had not already... We were not making any converts."Duh.
a 31-year-old Dane was sent home last February after signing an agreement to refrain from further militant activity. But last month, he said in an interview that he was on his way to Chechnya to fight with other Muslims, and invited Americans to use his earlier pledge "as toilet paper." (The man later retracted those statements, and Danish officials promised to keep him under close watch.)Look, the situation at Gitmo got so bad that even John Ashcroft got worried about it. That's how bad it was:
Officials of the Justice Department's criminal division, who worked closely with the F.B.I., were grappling with other questions. They saw the Guantánamo detentions as a source of cascading problems: angry foreign allies, a tarnishing of America's image overseas and declining cooperation in international counterterrorism efforts.Golden also has some good material about the role played by the military lawyers who were appointed as defense counsel in the (very small number of) cases brought before the special military review "commission" (= quasi court; but not a real court) that was estabished at Gitmo. As I've written about here before, these lawyers have done a good job, not least because they're very concerned to uphold the whole system of military justice in which they've been trained... Also, because people in the uniformed military in general (as opposed to the cowboys at the CIA and elsewhere) deeply understand the vaue of international commitments like the Geneva Conventions, on the protections of which US military personnel themselves rely, in the event they should be captured by foreign military forces.
"This was an issue of basic fairness," one former senior official involved in the discussions said. "The never-ending detentions were creating a lot of animosity among our allies. We pushed hard for them to move quicker. The attorney general pushed hard for it. They didn't, and there was an immense amount of frustration."
Nearly three years after Mr. Bush signed his military order, senior officials have begun to acknowledge privately that the fate of both Guantánamo and the military commissions is uncertain.Hallelujah! That's what gives me hope that, certainly if John Kerry wins on Nov 2, we might be successful in urging a dismantling of the Guantanamo gulag and the ending of the entire policy of maintaining jurisdiction-free detention zones.
I am glad you can feel even a small amount of optimism on this subject. Maybe it is justified, though I believe Kerry is just another heartless opportunist, basically indifferent to human rights and international law. Nevertheless, he may be smart enough to understand the tremendous indirect cost of these practices to the USA.
By the way, I really appreciate your tackling such a variety of subjects, from a humane and well-informed standpoint, instead of obsessing - like so many others - over the trivial "crisis" of the day. This is one of my favourite blogs.
Posted by: Messenger at October 25, 2004 02:14 PMPardon me for posting off topic here, but since the situation in Falluja is so critical, I wanted to draw attention to my posting in the "Shirin (and HC) on Falluja" comments. I posted some excerpts from a BBC article taken from a report phoned in from inside Falluja. In my view some of the information in this article is extremely important.
Posted by: Shirin at October 26, 2004 01:16 AM.
Posted by: mp3 at November 6, 2004 11:28 AM