Hard thinking about suicide bombings
Yesterday, in West Jerusalem, a Palestinian suicide bomber detonated his bomb on a crowded early-morning bus. Eight people--actually nine, including the bomber himself-- were killed, and scores injured. What a tragedy. Here are some details about seven of these people.I was in West Jerusalem exactly two weeks ago. When I visited Israel in 2002, I was glad to have the opportunity to take a few bus-rides, as I hoped it would show some sort of solidarity with my many friends in Israel who, I know, live with a constant level of dread that something like this may happen. On my most recent visit to Jerusalem, just two weeks ago, I didn't ride a bus. But I made a point of spending an evening walking over to Ben Yehuda Street and eating in a nice, popular restaurant there. The same sort of (perhaps ill-focused) "solidarity" at work.
The Israeli government and, it seems, many people in Israel are vocal in making the case that the fear they suffer from the suicide bombers justifies many of the policies their government has adopted taken and continues to adopt toward (or against) the Palestinians. That includes the policy of not negotiating with Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority--on the grounds that the extremely hard-pressed PA is "not tough enough" on the militant organizations that organize the missions of the suicide bombers. It also, more currently, includes the government's pursuit of its present wall-building project in the West Bank.
I think I understand a little about how terrible it must feel to live in a country that is subject to periodic suicide-bomb assaults, many of them detonated in places filled with civilians. I have only spent a little time in Israel. But back when I was in Lebanon in the late 1970s, car-bomb attacks against "soft", civilian-packed targets were certainly one of the many tactics used by the (Israeli-backed) Maronite extremist organizations against the people of mainly-Muslim West Beirut. Like most of the other western journalists working in Lebanon at that time, I lived in West Beirut. I also had my children there. Yes, we were living within the bounds of an always unpredictable civil war (which was why I left the city, with my children, in 1981). Many horrendous things happened while I was there-- and of course, many even worse things, in 1982, after I was gone. But one of the things that happened periodically in West Beirut was certainly car-bombs.
I remember one in such attack in particular that I had to cover: the assailants had detonated a car-bomb outside a crowded movie theater near Corniche Mazraa-- and then, a few minutes later, as confused and scared moviegoers were milling around on the street outside the theater, they detonated another car-bomb right next to it. I turned up, notebook in hand, within minutes after that, and I can still remember some of the more vivid and disturbing aspects of the scene that met me.
Yes, it does lead to a constant feeling of dread and bereavement, and to a terrifying sense of uncertainty.
So in response to the latest suicide bombing in Jerusalem, I want to send literally heartfelt condolences to the loved ones left behind by all those killed, as well as sympathies and good wishes to all those wounded in the assault-- with this number including, at different levels, all those who have suffered wounds as a result of it, which probably includes all israelis, and many others.
However, it is also quite appropriate to start asking some realistic questions about this whole phenomenon of Palestinian suicide-bombings of Israeli civilians that are, it seems to me, too seldom asked in most western media. Questions like these:
- Is there something about these types of attack that makes them uniquely different from any other form of assault against a society, and if so, what is it?
- Do the "special" attributes of this form of attack justify "special" forms of response against those judged responsible for such attacks?
- How broadly or narrowly should such "responsibility" be ascribed?
- Given that during the current Palestinian intifada more than four times as many Palestinian minors as Israeli minors have been killed (and we might assume that the proportion of "civilians" of all ages killed on each side is roughly similar) can we say that Israel's actions against the Palestinians--inasmuch as they are claimed to be "in response to" Palestinian violence against Israelis--have actually been proportionate?
- And, given that the cycle of violence between the two peoples, with its terrible attendant casualty toll, shows no sign of abating, can we say that Israel's policies toward the Palestinians have actually been effective in achieving the claimed goal of ending the violence?
Today, I'll start with Question 1 above, and hope to make a bit of headway.
First, though, since I consider each human being on God's earth to have, at a very fundamental level, equal value as a rights-bearing person, let me give the best figures I have for the numbers killed during the current intifada. These are the figures from B'tselem, the Israeli Information Center for the Occupied Territories, as I viewed them there today. They count people killed in phsyical confrontations between Seotember 29, 2000 and January 24, 2004. They do not count, for example, Palestinians who died of avoidable causes because Israel's strict movement-control regime prevented them reaching a hospital in time, or people on either side of the line who died much earlier than they otherwise would have because of the high level of general stress in which they are living. They also do not include people killed since January 24, of which there have been many.
- Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces or Israeli civilians: 2,385, of whom 449 were minors under 18.
- Israelis killed by Palestinians: 838, of whom 104 were minors under 18, 471 were other civilians, and 263 were members of the Israeli security forces.
I start by noting that most (but not all) of these attacks seem clearly to have launched in predominantly civilian-peopled places. That means that their civilian casualties cannot be seen as as "merely" collateral damage, but as an integral part of the "target set". Under all definitions of terrorism, this makes them terrorism. And indeed the broader political intent of these attacks seems precisely to be to sow terror among the civilian population and thus "force" the civilians to change their government's policy in the direction the terrorists desire.
(I note that this was also, as far as can be discerned, the declared political intention of Israel's deadly assault against South Lebanon in 1996, which was therefore equally much "terrorism". But terrorism carried out by a state, on that occasion.)
To say that a certain set of tactics constitutes "terrorism" may be interesting; but it certainly is not all that there is to say about it. For example, when we get to questions further along in the enquiry, a designation of " terrorism" gives no ready-made answer as to what a government's response should be ( the Bushies simplistic imaginings on this core notwithstanding).
So, we have a phenomenon of bombings that are carried out against civilian targets. Does the fact that are suicide bombings (in distinction from, for example, the several remotely detonated car-bombings that I witnessed in West Beirut) give them a special character? Or, does the fact that they are carried out by Palestinians give them a special character?
I think people have many different reactions to the "suicide" aspect of these bombings. For some people, this makes them seem even more heinous and hideous than would be the case if, for example, these same bombs were delivered by some form of "remote control". (How about if they were delivered from helicopters or high-altitude planes, as several of Israel's bombs that have killed numerous Palestinians have been?)
For some people (including at least one very sane Israeli friend of mine) the "suicide" aspect of the bombing inspires a certain respect: "That they are even prepared to give their own lives for this... Like the kamikaze bombers from Japan... You can fear it, but you have to respect it, as well... "
For me, any discussion of suicide is an intimate, difficult affair. But my understanding of the depths of despair that are needed to allow any individual to even contemplate suicide as an option makes me see this entire phenomenon of people apparently eagerly carrying out suicide attacks as deeply, deeply tragic. I find it hard to disentangle everything that I see as tragic about it--so many aspects of it are!-- but certainly, one of them is the idea that, as I understand it, so many Palestinian people live in such deep despair that volunteering for a suicide-bombing operation seems like not just an option, but an attractive one.
Oh why, oh why couldn't all that energy be channeled instead into building a massive civilian-based movement to end the occupation???? They could, I am convinced, have ended the occupation a long time ago that way.
And finally here the aspect of these suicide operations being undertaken by Palestinians. The way most of the western media presents it, you'd think (1) that the only people in the world who have suffered so terribly from suicide bombings are the Israelis, and (2) that the only people in the world depraved enough to have carried out so many suicide bombings are Palestinians.
Not true, on either count. If you go this website that the notably not terrorist-friendly Council on Foreign Relations maintains on matters terroristic you can learn more about the "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam" in Sri Lanka, otherwise known as the Tamil Tigers. There you can learn that in the past 20 years the TTs have undertaken some 200 suicide bombings. Those and other tactics they have used have resulted in 60,000 deaths among the country's 19 million population.
- Deaths from TT violence of all types, per year per million of Sri Lankan people: 158.
- Deaths from Palestinian violence of all types since September 2000, per year per million of Israeli people: 42.
I'll just close here by noting that we are now at around the second anniverary of a ceasfire concluded between the Sri Lankan government and the TTs. It's been a little ragged to be sure. As you can discover if you go to this well-informed site that tracks the whole peace process there.
But here's an interesting thing: Far as I can figure, the U.S. government and just about every other western government has been an active supporter of that peace process in Sri Lanka, even though it has all along involved the TTs as a full participant. So what's with that whole thing of saying, in Palestine/Israel, not just that Israel and "the west" can't even talk to Hamas and the other militant groups that have actually organized the suicide bomb attacks-- but also, that they can't be expected to talk to Arafat's sad old PA because Arafat has "condoned" or "failed to crack down hard enough" on the terrorists?
Do I detect a double standard at work here? No, no, say it ain't so...
Come back to JWN in the days ahead if you want to read what I have to say on the other questions I posed. Meantime, if you want to contribute to this thinking-through exercize, please post your comments here.
Interesting and provocative as always, Helena. My (brief) answers to your questions are as follows:
- No. Suicide bombing is a method of carrying out the form of asymmetric warfare known as terrorism, and as such is neither more nor less morally reprehensible than other terrorist acts. To the extent that suicide bombers' willingness to die makes them harder to stop or detect, the distinction between them and other terrorists is practical rather than moral, although this distinction does impact on proportionality (see below).
- Yes and no. Obviously suicide bombers are not deterred by fear of death, so they can't be intimidated by superior firepower, and it's impossible to retaliate against them afterward. On the other hand, I'm not sure traditional "deterrence" logic works with suicide bombers at all. Combating suicide bombers requires a much more prevention and policing-based approach, which most often involves intelligence, infiltration of terrorist organizations and checkpoints or other movement restrictions. With the exception of the settlements, Israeli counterterrorism tactics are actually pretty standard stuff; to the extent that they're "special," they're tailored to the tactical situation.
- Whoever planned and/or gave logistical aid to the bombers should be held responsible.
- I'm somewhat skeptical about the proportion of civilian deaths being roughly equal on both sides, given (a) the fact that civilians are primary targets for the Palestinians, and (b) some Palestinian factions' use of minors as combatants. A great deal depends on the particular definition of "civilian" being used.
- Again, yes and no. On the one hand, suicide bombings and other attacks haven't stopped, and negotiations have broken down. On the other hand, far fewer bombers are getting through than in 2002 or even the first half of 2003. I doubt this is for lack of trying. So while Israeli repression hasn't solved any of the long-term problems and has probably exacerbated them, it does seem to have achieved some results in immediate security.
If by "special response" you mean retaliation against the bombers' families, then I'm not in favor of that. If any family members provided active assistance, they should be tried as accessories, but there should be no further retaliation.
In any event, though, proportionality under international law consists of using the minimum force necessary to achieve a given military objective. The very factors that make suicide bombers effective - stealth, ease of infiltration and ability to attain very close proximity to targets - increase the amount of force necessary to stop them. This is one of the reasons I think the wall should be understood in terms of proportionality; it unquestionably imposes hardships on the Palestinians, but it may facilitate the removal of the greater hardships (e.g., internal movement restrictions) that result from the need to police the WB in two dimensions. Don't get me wrong - I have serious problems with the fence route, and I'd much rather see it built along the Green Line - but it's more proportional than the current occupation measures, and it will likely facilitate settlement withdrawals and other measures that may someday result in walls coming down.
In any event, the point I'm trying rather clumsily to get across is that, just as Palestinian terrorism isn't unique, neither is the Israeli response. Counterinsurgencies are always brutal, and counterinsurgencies against invisible enemies especially so. I don't mean in any way to excuse Israeli brutality, but there's no need to invoke Nazi Racist Israeli Apartheid (tm) to explain it, and Palestinians can't rationally justify terrorist responses by claiming a historically unique level of oppression. What's necessary is for both sides to come off their high horses of historical uniqueness and address the root causes, and by this time terrorism and the occupation are root causes to each other.
A few more thoughts: You mention the Western response to the Sri Lanka conflict as a possible double standard. It may indeed be one, but not in the way you think. While the Sri Lanka war has caused more than 60,000 deaths, the lion's share of the killing has been committed by the government and pro-government paramilitaries rather than the LTTE. There have been hundreds of extrajudicial executions, widespread torture, more than 16,000 disappearances and massacres of Tamils with the tacit acceptance of the government. The Sri Lankan government also pioneered some of the techniques now used in the WB/Gaza, including checkpoints, curfews and movement restrictions. (I laid out some of the Sri Lanka-Israel comparisons here).
All this has gone on with the acquiescence of the international community, which occasionally clucks about Sri Lanka's human rights record but has never threatened any meaningful condemnation or sanction. In other words, at the same time that the international community has pressured Sri Lanka to negotiate with terrorists, it has also been more tolerant of the government's own human rights violations. I don't think you'd approve if Israel emulated the Sri Lankan response to suicide terrorism or if the international community responded to Israeli human rights violations in the same way as it does to those in Sri Lanka (which, like Israel, is basically a democratic country where government policies have broad support). So... be careful what you wish for.
Jonathan, good to have your always helpful comments here.
You write, "I'm somewhat skeptical about the proportion of civilian deaths being roughly equal on both sides, given (a) the fact that civilians are primary targets for the Palestinians, and (b) some Palestinian factions' use of minors as combatants."
I did mean to say that the proportion of civilian deaths on each side might be presumed to be roughly equal to (better authenticated) number of deaths of minors on each side. I'm not sure your point (a) above is relevant independent of point (b) also being relevant. As for your point (b), I'd love to know what the evidence for it is, though it's an argument I've often seen made. (Along with an associated value judgment that Palestinian adults wantonly use their children to fight their battles for them...
All the evidence I've seen, however--some of it from very close encounters--is that Palestinan adults are terrified of their children getting caught up in any clashes. It is a constant battle for Palestinian parents to try to keep their kids, especially boys, away from the areas of tension. And all I've seen the evidence I've seen of Palestinian political/military groups across the political spectrum is that they, too, don't want the kids to take part or to get anywhere near the possibility of cross-fire.
So I'd love to see any evidence that indicates the opposite.
Of course when Israeli troops launch ground missions into heavily-populated districts, almost inevitably some kids do get caught in the cross-fire. And when the Israelis undertake "assassination from the air" mission, civilians of all ages are put at huge and quite unwarranted risk. A death caused through "reckless endangerment" feels the same way to a loved one left behind, in my experience, as a death through "intentionality"... But you probably don't disagree too much on that.
You say, too, that the new wall (wall system) being built in the WB is, "more proportional than the current occupation measures, and it will likely facilitate settlement withdrawals and other measures that may someday result in walls coming down." I think that's an excessively rosy view of it! The new wall system is integrally linked to the existing wall systems throughout the WB, and I've seen no indication at all from Sharon that it is designed to provide an alternative for them...
Anyway, I've been writing a big piece for Boston Review about all the wall systems. So you can wait a couple weeks and read that, or you cd cruise through some of my recent posts here for some reactions to what I saw of them on the ground.
Maybe I should qualify what I said above: there are documented cases of armed Palestinian minors, who may or may not belong to armed factions, conducting infiltrations. I'm not familiar enough with the Palestinian factions' recruiting practices to say whether or not they actively recruit minors, but even if the minors in question were acting on their own, the calculus regarding their civilian status is the same.
Re the wall: I agree for the most part about Sharon's intentions, but I also don't think the wall Sharon wants is the one that will be built. Sharon's been overtaken by events quite a bit lately - it was only a year ago that he said Netzarim was as vital to Israel as Tel Aviv - and there's every sign that the same thing will happen with the wall.
Item: international pressure. Even aside from the Hague ruling, which probably bothers the Israeli government more than it's willing to let on, Sharon will need US backing to pull off a unilateral withdrawal. The US has reportedly set conditions: no eastern fence, no transfer of Gaza settlers to the WB, and territorial contiguity for the Palestinians.
Item: domestic pressure. Shinui isn't thrilled about the fence route, and neither is Avoda (who Sharon will need once Mafdal and the National Union bolt the coalition). There's also a proceeding in front of the Israeli Supreme Court, which the Israeli government is taking much more seriously than the Hague trial, and the judges were skeptical of many of the government's arguments. My guess is that the court will order some route changes and direct that the enclaves (e.g. Qalqilya) be opened.
The combination of the two means that things will change. In fact, things are already changing - the Baka al-Sharqiyeh loop is coming down (so much for "irreversible") and Olmert is hinting at a WB withdrawal larger than previously planned. Do you think the timing of these is accidental? Me neither.
My prediction ex cathedra (and I'll admit I'm far from infallible) is that the ultimate route of the fence will take in the large settlement blocs and East Jerusalem but follow the border east, that the Palestinian territory will be contiguous and that the Israeli presence on the other side will be limited to military bases in the Jordan Valley. Good? Not really, but by allowing a fixed defense in one dimension, it will enable free movement to the east rather than a maze of checkpoints and access roads. And then, after the next change of government in Israel, maybe things can get serious again.
I thought both Helena's and Jonathan's comments are very illuminating. The comparison between this conflict, in the 1st world I-P region, and that in the 3rd world Sri Lankan civil war, was likely to reveal chiefly that a conflict in the latter has to kill far more people before it receives attention.
As a student of economics this hardly surprises me; empathy for the perceived victims in any conflict is usually not the most decisive factor in stimulating foreign intervention. IMO one big stimulus for Western concern in the I-P conflict is that the West is a belligerent, and increasingly acknowledged as such.
What's on your mind, if you will allow the overstatement?